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ABSTRACT 
What explains public support for social welfare policies?  The extant literature on 
this topic suggests that people’s attitudes are mainly a reflection of their political 
ideology and economic self-interest.  However, this explanation fails to recognize the role 
that the public sector plays in influencing individuals’ social welfare policy preferences.  
The literature, with few exceptions, also does not thoroughly acknowledge how national 
context alters people’s attitudes.  Data from 23 national samples in Europe, North 
America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania taken from the 2006 ISSP are examined using 
multilevel regression.  The dependent variable is a measure of individual’s views of 
governmental responsibility, reflecting eight different types of social welfare policies.   
The analysis reveals that public attitudes about social welfare policies vary both 
within countries and between countries.  Variation within countries is a function of socio-
demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector.  
Across-country variation is largely a function of the quality of government institutions, 
income inequality, and, to a lesser extent, economic conditions.  These results suggest 
that how people come to judge public sector actors, as well as the quality of the work 
they perform, directly influences their level of support for social welfare policies.  
Similarly, the findings also imply that levels of government effectiveness measured at the 
country-level matter, as well.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Section 1.1:  Research topic 
What role should government play in the lives of its people?  This question, 
perhaps more so than any other, lies at the heart of debate over contemporary public 
policies.  Without a doubt, the reach of the state has grown substantially over the course 
of the past century.  Kettl (1999) claims that “Government in the United States and 
around the world, hinges more centrally on administration than ever before” (127).  
Nowhere is this perhaps more true than in the realm of social welfare policies.   
The modern welfare state is premised on the notion that government has an 
outright responsibility to provide public services in order to meet its people’s basic needs 
for income, health, education, and housing (Gangl 2007, Gërxhani and Koster 2012).  
Over time, the size of government has grown in response to the challenges posed by an 
increasingly interdependent society (Mason 1960; Tanzi and Schunknecht 1997), with the 
ultimate purpose being to protect society’s most vulnerable against the “vicissitudes of 
modern life” (Dong and Cui 2010: 244).   
Section 1.2:  Status of the research literature 
Despite the fact that the rise of the welfare state has permanently altered the 
relationship between people and their government, comparatively little scholarly attention 
has been paid by political scientists to examining public attitudes toward social welfare 
policies.  Indeed, much is still unknown about the determinants of social welfare policy 
support (Breznau 2010; Gërxhani and Koster 2012).  What is known comes mainly from 
the political sociology literature where two main explanations dominate:  (1) People will 
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support (or oppose) social welfare policies in accordance with their ideological beliefs, 
and (2) People are self-interested and will support social welfare policies when it is in 
their economic best interest to do so (Calzada, Gómez-Garido, Moreno, and Moreno-
Fuentes 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011).   
Even though this bifurcated explanation is quite parsimonious, it may also be far 
too simplistic.  The most glaring omission from this account is that it fails to take into 
consideration people’s views towards the public sector itself – in particular their level of 
trust in public sector actors and their evaluations of government performance.  Likewise, 
with few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gërxhani and Koster 2012; 
Voicu and Voicu 2011), much of the extant research fails to acknowledge the role that 
national context plays in shaping social welfare policy attitudes.  While comparative 
studies do exist (e.g., Andreβ and Heien 2001; Breznau 2010; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 
2003; Salmina 2014; Svallfors 2004), few inquiries make use of multilevel statistical 
techniques.  Those that do focus mainly on only one primary variable of interest – the 
institutional structure of the welfare state (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Edlund 1999; 
Svallfors 1997).   
Section 1.3:  Research questions 
This dissertation seeks to contribute a much more complete understanding of what 
factors influence public support for social welfare policies.  The research will address the 
following questions:  First, across countries, what levels of support do people hold for 
social welfare policies?  Second, what individual-level attributes and attitudes correlate 
with these levels of support?  Third, does national context account for variation across 
countries in terms of the level of support?  Finally, does the public sector play a role in 
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determining levels of social welfare policy support at either the individual or country-
level?   
Section 1.4:  Research approach 
The data used in this study comes primarily from the International Social Survey 
Programme’s (ISSP) 2006 “Role of Government IV” module (ISSP Research Group 
2008), which contains data from surveys administered across countries worldwide.  
National samples were drawn from the adult population in each participating country 
using multi-stage stratified sampling designs.  A variety of methods were used to collect 
the data, including face-to-face interviews, self-completion surveys with interviewer 
assistance, and by mail.  To ensure data quality, ISSP methodological groups study the 
sampling and administration of the annual surveys.  For this research, I specifically 
examine data for 23 countries located in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and 
Oceania. 
 The analysis for this dissertation will be conducted in three distinct stages.  First, 
descriptive statistics are examined in order to identify variation in public support for 
social welfare policies across countries.  Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models are estimated for each country in order to determine whether social welfare policy 
support is influenced by similar individual-level attributes across countries.  Third, in 
addition to the demographic and attitudinal variables included in the country-specific 
models, country-level correlates are also considered.  In order to explain variation 
between countries, multilevel regression models are estimated by pooling together all of 
the national samples.   
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Section 1.5:  Contribution to the literature 
The intent of this study is not only to identify the extent to which individuals see a 
governmental responsibility for the activities identified above, but also to explain these 
attitudes.  There is reason to believe that developing a fuller understanding of these views 
is quite important.  Jacobs (1992) suggests that the general public is able to exert a 
powerful influence on policymaking.  Even when one takes into consideration the 
influence of political elites and organized factions, public opinion can still have a 
considerable impact on the policies that are enacted (Burnstein 2003).  Scholars have 
found that shifts in the support for redistribution can indeed lead to policy change 
(Manza, Cook, and Page 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).  According to 
Page and Shapiro (1983), “… there is a great deal of congruence between changes in 
policy and changes in opinion during the last half century” (177).  In fact, research by 
Brooks and Manza (2007) indicates that higher levels of public support for social welfare 
policies correlate with the generosity of welfare provision in developed countries.   
Political elites are known to pay close attention to public opinion (Hasenfeld and 
Rafferty 1989).  To the extent that policy change occurs when the orientations of political 
elites and the mass public converge, as suggested by Kingdon (2011), policy 
entrepreneurs may manipulate images to influence the public’s understanding of a 
particular issue (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Ginsberg 1986).  By examining public 
support for social welfare policies, we are better positioned to understand the 
determinants of change in this area of public policy.  Without this information, we are left 
with an incomplete account of the process by which policies are fashioned. 
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In addition, this dissertation specifically considers the relationship between public 
views toward the public sector and their public policy preferences.  This is an area of 
scholarship that has been commonly ignored in academia.  Much of the literature treats 
political trust (e.g., Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004; Mischler and Rose 
1997; Van Ryzin 2011; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003) and government performance 
(e.g., Ariely 2011, 2013; Van de Walle 2007; Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, and Vashdi 2010) 
as dependent variables.  However, this is short-sighted, as it overlooks a logical 
consequence of these phenomena – the shaping of public opinions about the proper role 
of government.   
While it is commonly acknowledged that contemporary public opinion generally 
favors the provision of many forms of social welfare, much less is known in terms of how 
and why people formulate their views about these aspects of public policy (Breznau 
2010).  In addition to the explanations offered at the individual-level, this dissertation 
advances the view that social welfare policy support is conditioned by national context.  
Thus, for this research a comparative method is adopted which stresses how variation in 
conditions measured at the country-level sway people’s policy preferences.   
By comparing attitudes in differing contextual settings, one is able to illuminate 
possible causal relationships that underlie attitudinal patterns (Svallfors 2010).  This line 
of inquiry is sorely needed in the field.  Even though there exists a sizable literature 
which focuses on the development of the welfare state, much less is known about why 
people support or oppose it as a matter of policy.  According to Svallfors (2007b), “In 
spite of considerable progress over the last few years, comparative research on 
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orientations, values, and attitudes has still not reached the status of a mature research 
field” (2).    
Finally, it is worth noting that in recent years people have become more fickle in 
their preferences for public services.  As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) assert, “Publics 
tend to be vigilant against reductions in popular and basic welfare state services (health 
care, education, pensions), yet more skeptical and more demanding (in terms of service 
standards) than in the past and, at the same time, more resistant to tax increases” (163).  
In response, governments around the world have focused on enhancing the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and performance of the public service (Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 
1992).  However, little remains known in terms of how people’s policy attitudes are 
shaped by their views and assessments of the public sector.  One of the key contributions 
of this research is revealing how the outputs of public policy – either perceived or actual 
– influence the policies that people want.              
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section 2.1:  Defining social welfare policies 
Fundamentally, social welfare policies exist to both ensure socio-economic 
security and to promote equality.  A useful definition of social welfare policies is offered 
by Andreβ and Heien (2001), who suggest that they involve “… guaranteeing a basic 
income, providing jobs for all, supporting children from poor families to go to university, 
or reducing income differences” (339).  Indeed, the range of public services which is 
commonly labeled as a form of “social welfare” is quite extensive and complex (Richan 
1988).  Kahn (1964) claims that “Social services appear everywhere in the modern world.  
They continue to exist and ever expand as productivity increases and as average 
standards of living are raised” (14).   
However, social welfare policy includes more than just a system of laws or 
procedures prescribed by governmental entities for dealing with the destitute.  Rather, 
this extensive policy area includes a particular set of activities created to cure an 
extensive list of societal ills (Breznau 2010; Richan 1988).  According to Rochefort 
(1986), “The multiplicity of client groups receiving service via this system (old people, 
the mentally and physically ill, families with dependent children, veterans, 
schoolchildren, unemployed adults, disabled persons, and others) is matched only by the 
variety of methods used to support them …” (1).  In order to provide these public 
services, whether it be income assistance, healthcare, housing subsidies, education, etc., a 
complex organization of programs, agencies, and different levels of government are 
involved.   
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Friedlander and Apte (1974) argue that “Social welfare is a system of laws, 
programs, benefits, and services which strengthen or assure provisions for meeting social 
needs recognized as basic for the welfare of the population and for the function of the 
social order” (12).  Overall, social welfare policies constitute a form of mutual aid, which 
has been a key characteristic of human society since time immemorial.  Simply stated, it 
is a means by which people living together survive through cooperation.  “Mutual aid in 
the modern world is more complicated than helping to rebuild a neighbor’s barn when it 
burns or sharing a pot of chicken soup with a sick friend, but the essence of mutual 
concern for others is still very much a part of authentic humanity” (Prigmore and 
Atherton 1986: 12).         
It is constructive to emphasize the point that the formulation of social welfare 
policies is a response to conditions that are perceived by policymakers and the public 
alike as social problems (Segal 2010).  As Prigmore and Atherton (1986) comment, “Like 
it or not, a social problem is whatever people with enough ‘clout’ say it is.  Sometimes 
many people are in agreement. … Sometimes something can be defined as a social 
problem by relatively few people if they are powerful and well organized” (40).  To this 
extent, it is fair to say that social welfare policies are socially constructed.  Their 
existence is owed to set of normative expectations determined by societies themselves 
that evolve over time.   
Kuhnle and Sander (2010) are keen to point out that poverty, for instance, has 
been a pervasive challenge throughout all of human history.  However, poverty has not 
always been perceived as a “social problem.”  Thus, “… the social welfare policy-making 
process and its outputs are critically related to contemporaneous attitudes, beliefs, and 
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perceptions that are prominent among diverse societal groups” (Rochefort 1986).  Since 
these collective perceptions are very context-dependent, there is cause to believe that a 
great deal of variation exists in attitudes about social welfare policies from one country to 
the next (Prigmore and Atherton 1986).  Indeed, different societies may maintain 
different expectations in terms of the role that the state should plan in ameliorating 
difficult social conditions.   
For this reason, it is necessary to compare public attitudes using a consistent 
standard.  While it is true that social welfare can take place in many forms, in this 
dissertation I define social welfare policies using the framework offered by Andreβ and 
Heien (2001) above.  Ultimately, social welfare policies involve governmental action in 
key areas of public policy in order to secure the lives and livelihoods of a country’s 
people – particularly those who happen to be materially deprived.  Although social 
welfare policies can be conceptually defined to refer to a much broader set of programs 
and endeavors meant to ameliorate a variety of societal ills, the more limited definition 
adopted here is utilized in order to facilitate the comparison of public views across a 
variety of national contexts.          
The Development of the Social Welfare State          
A country’s social welfare policy is ultimately a reflection of the manner in which 
“… society responds or does not respond to social need ….” (Abramovitz 2004: 19).  
That being said, societies’ answer to the pressing problems posed by economic 
insecurities over the centuries has varied substantially.  Richan (1988) claims that the set 
of institutions that now make up the modern welfare state had their roots in the socio-
economic relationship between lords and their serfs during Medieval times.  In those 
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early days, a system of mutual aid existed in which the serf provided manual labor to his 
master, and in exchange, the lord provided for the families of his peasants in the event 
that the serf either perished or became too infirmed to work.   
While certainly not free, serfs were afforded certain social rights as a matter of 
principle.  Under this arrangement, “The serf could not leave the land, but he could not be 
made to leave it either.  He had a right to a certain amount of land for his own use.  If he 
died, his widow and children had certain rights to support” (Prigmore and Atherton 1986: 
19).  In this way, a social agreement existed between lord and serf with a clear 
expectation of deliverables and obligations for both parties.      
 In the wake of the Black Death, the manor system which had dominated Medieval 
Europe for so long began to wane (Richan 1988).  During this time period, churches and 
trade guilds began to provide many of the social services that had previously been offered 
under the feudal model.  However, by the 16
th
 century, the demands for action by the 
commoners became too great.  In particular, laws created in England during the reign of 
Henry VIII, as well as his daughter Elizabeth I, are noteworthy.  Collectively known as 
the Tudor Poor Laws, these acts served as a national response to the problem of 
widespread poverty and contained many elements of the social welfare framework that 
currently exist today.   
For example, the Act for the Relief of the Poor of 1601, also known as the 
Elizabethan Poor Law, created a national system of assistance for those impoverished 
(Kuhnle and Sander 2010).  Administered by parishes locally, this policy specifically 
targeted destitute children, disabled people, the infirmed, and those who were 
unemployed.  The Elizabethan Poor Law distinguished between three classifications of 
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those destitute, and outlined a specific policy remedy for each (Richan 1988).  The 
“impotent poor” included older people, the mentally and physically ill, as well as the 
disabled.  These people were sent to live in almshouses, or otherwise provided with relief 
in their own homes.   
A second category consisted of dependent children.  To provide for their care, 
minors were assigned to local citizens for whom the children would work to justify their 
maintenance.  Finally, a last group labeled “sturdy beggars” comprised a cohort of able-
bodied people who were poor.  These people were assigned to workhouses.  Overall, the 
Elizabethan Poor Law is significant because it provided a workable framework for 
providing poor relief across an entire country.  Administratively based at the parish level, 
this form of public policy specified relatively detailed solutions to meet a pervasive social 
problem.      
With the passage of time, social and economic developments made the need for 
additional social welfare policies necessary.  With the increasing industrialization that 
took place during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, the problems associated with urbanization 
became more pressing (Kuhnle and Sandler 2010; Mason 1960).  Expansion of the state 
in areas such as education, healthcare, public pensions, and public assistance to the needy 
and unemployed became the solution (Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997).  According to 
Rimlinger (1971), two forces played a very influential role in changing attitudes with 
respect to the need for a social welfare state.  The first was the Industrial Revolution 
itself.  According to Prigmore and Atherton (1986), “It is apparently true that when 
industry moves from the cottage to the factory, from generalization to specification, from 
country to city, something happens to make human life different for at least a transitional 
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period” (23).  Via the industrialization of the economy, workers came to view themselves 
as a single class with similar problems (Kuhnle and Sander 2010).  
The second force identified by Rimlinger (1971) which altered the development 
of the welfare state was the acceptance by the population of new conceptions of 
individual rights that had been at the core of the American and French Revolutions.  
Combined with the solidarity shared by workers over their sometimes precarious 
economic situation, a new perspective was suggested in which government itself had a 
responsibility to protect its people from economic insecurity – that all people had a right 
to social protection.  In the words of Kuhnle and Sander (2010), “Prior decades had seen 
the spread of democracy and political rights.  Directly or indirectly, these now smoothed 
the way for social rights” (63).   
 The twin influences of industrialization and democratization paved the way for a 
new model of relations between the state and its people.  According to Kaase and Newton 
(1995), “It is not just the scope of government which has expanded, but also the depth of 
its influence on the everyday lives of citizens” (65).  Historically, the first social 
insurance program implemented on a grand scale occurred in the German Empire with 
the Imperial Decree of 1881.  Although commonly understood today as an overt attempt 
by German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck to engender support for his regime among the 
working class (Rimlinger 1971; Wehler 1985), the policies enacted created a national 
insurance program to provide benefits for the sick, the old, and those who had the 
misfortune of being the victim of an accident.  “The new policy was radical (in several 
senses, but most importantly in the way that individual citizens … were to be 
compulsorily insured and became entitled to social benefits as a matter of right rather 
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than provided with poor relief benefits on the basis of discretionary needs and means 
tests” (Kuhnle and Sander 2010: 64).       
 The policy reforms undertaken in Germany, and subsequently by other countries, 
in the concluding decades of the 19
th
 century marked the first step in a process that would 
eventually lead to the fashioning of the modern welfare state (Flora and Alber 1981).  
Prior to these shifts in policy, the role of the central government was mainly constrained 
to (1.) protecting citizens from foreign intervention and domestic criminality, and (2.) 
developing national infrastructure in order to promote economic growth (Kuhnle and 
Sander 2010).  However, with the crafting of new policies specifically designed to 
mediate the effects of economic insecurity, a third function of government was instituted:  
social protection for all on the basis of one’s social rights ensured solely by their 
citizenship. 
 While the seeds for contemporary social welfare policies may have been sown in 
the late 19
th
 century, the vast majority of development of the welfare state took place 
during the 20
th
 century.  According to Kaase and Newton (1995), “Whatever the measure 
– taxes enacted, money spent, people employed, services delivered, laws passed, 
regulations implemented, people affected – the amount and range of state activity has 
grown out of all recognition in the twentieth century, especially in the latter half” (65).  
But, why did this revolution in governance occur when it did?  Kaase and Newtwon 
(1995) point to three explanations.  First, the Great Depression of the 1930s primed the 
public for a fundament change in the economic system.  As a result of the severe 
hardships and instability caused by the downturn in the economy, political officials were 
willing to embrace new means of social policy.   
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Second, the national mobilizations necessary to fight the Second World War 
conditioned people to unusually higher levels of governmental intervention in their 
personal lives (Goodin 1988; Peacock and Wiseman 1961).  As a result of wartime 
spending and activities, a new normal was artificially created.  The war also created a 
sense of national solidarity among citizens that lasted even after the war came to a close 
(Goodin and Dryzek 1995).  Finally, in the aftermath of the war, pro-government feelings 
were engendered via the reconstruction process.  These three developments set the stage 
for the political conditions necessary to formulate an extensive welfare state.  The peace 
and economic growth of the postwar 1950s and 1960s only further facilitated the rapid 
expansion of social welfare policies (Kaase and Newton 1995).     
From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1970s, the size and scope of 
the public sector grew hastily.  During this time period, public opinion viewed an activist 
state as the appropriate tool for solving social and economic ills (Kaase and Newton 
1995).  However, it is commonly recognized that the expansion of the welfare state halted 
after reaching its zenith in the mid-1970s.  For the first time in quite a while, the role of 
the state was called into question (Peters 1991).  Politics at multiple levels of government 
became more anti-bureaucratic (Frederickson 1996).  Rather than being a solution for 
societal problems, government was increasingly seen as a potential cause of them 
(Douglas 1989; Hadenius 1986).  A number of possible explanations have been suggested 
as to why the post-war development of social welfare policies stalled, including: the 1973 
Oil Crisis, the rise of globalization, the movement in many countries towards service 
economies rather than an industrial one, etc. (Nullmeier and Kaufman 2010).   
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Certainly in recent years, doubts have been raised about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector, spurring calls for reform.  Beginning in the 1980s, 
governments around the world began implementing policy and bureaucratic reforms in 
order to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the public service 
(Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  This approach embraced market mechanisms, 
decentralization, and government downsizing with the overall intent of making policy 
implementation much more efficient and quality-oriented.  The primary goal of what has 
been labeled the New Public Management (NPM) movement has been to restore public 
trust in government by producing demonstrable results (Bouckaert 2012; Radin 2006; 
Van Ryzin 2011).   
Will social welfare policies continue to provide the level of services they have 
traditionally offered in the past?  Or will they crumble under their own weight?  The 
modern administrative state is the product of a devastating economic depression, world 
wars, and a wholesale effort during the postwar period to eradicate poverty and 
discrimination (Van Riper 1999).  But its continued existence remains uncertain.  
According to Nullmeier and Kaufmann (2010), “Whether social benefit levels will 
ultimately be stabilized in the face of shrinking contributions and tax revenues, rising 
debt and the related fiscal crisis of the welfare state, or whether social benefits might 
even be further expanded … will greatly depend on political constellations – these, in 
turn, also depend on economic developments and their framing in public debates” (100).     
Support For and Against Social Welfare Policies                   
 It is commonly argued that welfare policies have been implemented as a 
“cushion” for the growth of inequality around the world (Dallinger 2010: 333).  Esping-
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Andersen (1990), for example, contends that industrialization has made the welfare state 
both possible and necessary.  It was during the 20th century that a decided shift among 
the public began to take place with respect to the role that government plays in the lives 
of its people.  For the first time, large segments of the public began to favor government 
intervention in matters of private life in order to aid the disadvantaged so they could 
overcome the drawbacks of industrial capitalism (McClosky and Zaller 1984).   
Despite the many benefits of a capitalistic economy, “…this system does not 
cover all members of society.  For those who cannot work because of health or physical 
limitations, for those who cannot find work, or for those who are excluded because of 
their race, sex, age, physical ability, or sexual orientation, there is no market exchange of 
salary” (Segal 2010: 10).  Left to its own devices, ungoverned capitalism does not 
provided adequate opportunities for all people in society.        
According to McClosky and Zaller (1984), every step in the development of the 
welfare state has generated intense controversy.  Even today, the debate over the extent to 
which government has a responsibility to provide these particular services remains quite 
contentious.  At the heart of this dispute lie two conflicting principles.  The first is the 
notion that individuals should be able to live their lives in a manner consistent with 
prevailing social standards (Marshall 1964).  The second is the view that people have a 
responsibility to make an effort to be as economically self-sufficient as their ability 
permits (Feldman and Zaller 1992).   
 The debate over the extent of social welfare provision follows a typical left-right 
ideological divide between liberals and conservatives.  The debate can be framed in terms 
of disagreements over the values of democracy and capitalism.  Liberals ask how “…can 
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a genuine democracy be achieved when powerful private interests dominate the society 
and millions of citizens lack the necessities for a decent and fulfilling life?” (McClosky 
and Zaller 1984: 264).  The values of the democratic tradition stress equality, as well as 
social and economic justice.  This perspective holds that if the problems confronting 
people are too large for one individual alone to solve, they have every right to request 
assistance (Feldman and Steenberger 2001).  Thus, “… no one can be allowed to suffer 
exploitation, mistreatment, or other social and economic injustice.  All are entitled to live 
in dignity and to enjoy a fair share of society’s benefits” (McClosky and Zaller 1984: 
279).   
 In contrast, conservative defenders of capitalism allege that governmental 
intrusion into the lives of its people undermines the values of self-reliance and individual 
initiative.  “On the right, the argument is that people ought to take care of themselves.  
The traditional exhortation to the poor is ‘Lift yourselves up by your own bootstraps’” 
(Prigmore and Atherton 1986: 9).  In the tradition of Adam Smith (1776/2004), economic 
competition is seen as the preferred means to maximize wealth for those who are willing 
to work.  According to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “… what is stolen by 
paternalistic government is that precious compound of initiative, independence, and self-
respect that distinguishes a man from an automaton, a person from a number, productive 
and competitive enterprise from a regimented people” (1967: 34).  This disagreement 
over what role government should play in society continues to rage among policymakers 
and citizens alike in every state around the world, often with enthusiastic discourse being 
offered by both sides.      
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Section 2.2:  The implications of social welfare policy support 
 Kraft and Furlong (2010) assert that “Public policy is what public officials within 
government, and by extension the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about 
public problems” (5).  Social welfare policies exist in order to provide essential services 
to those who need them in order to ameliorate their desperate condition.  In the words of 
Prigmore and Atherton (1986), “While many people are very critical of social welfare, 
there is still the expectation that society should provide for the delivery of a secure level 
of basic life supports (food, housing, health care, education, and various kinds of 
counseling and protective services) to people as a benefit of citizenry” (8).  To this end, 
public support for social welfare policies plays a very important role in determining the 
creation and extent of these public services.   
Perhaps the most defining attribute of a functional democracy is the linkage that 
exists between public policies and public opinion (Monroe 1975).  Luttbeg (1981) claims 
that “… the most widely held conception of democracy is that government must serve its 
public.  Somehow the policies passed by government must reflect both the preferences of 
the governed and, most desirably, the public’s best interest” (1).  Indeed, the social 
welfare policy-making process and, by extension, its outputs are a product of the various 
attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs shared among citizens (Rochefort 1986). 
 The mass public exercises a great deal of clout with respect to policymaking 
(Jacobs 1992), particularly when the salience of a policy issue is elevated (Burnstein 
2003).  According to Kingdon (2011), “People in and around government believe quite 
firmly that something like a national mood has important policy consequences.  … A 
shift in climate, according to people who are actively involved in making or affecting 
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public policy, makes some proposals viable that would not have been viable before, and 
renders other proposals simply dead in the water” (144).   
This is true because public opinion influences elections, the fate of political 
parties, and the efforts of organized interests.  Along with the attitudes of public officials 
and other elites, public opinion can help to influence the twin processes of problem 
definition and agenda setting.  Thus, “Public opinion can be seen in this context as one 
among several simultaneously, mutually supportive forces in society that impel the social 
welfare policy-making process in a common direction” (Rochefort 1986: 140).   
 The conditions that exist throughout the world, known by the label “social 
problems,” are defined by a socially constructed meaning.  Cobb and Elder (1983) state, 
“Whether or not a situation is considered a public problem and what the problem is, if 
there is one, depends upon not just facts but upon beliefs and values – beliefs and values 
that determine what is taken to be fact, what facts are considered relevant, and how those 
facts are interpreted” (172-173).  As a result of this, social problems are very subjective 
and context dependent (Stone 2002).  Also, how problems are defined shapes the range 
and typology of solutions offered for confronting that particular difficulty (Kraft and 
Furlong 2010).   
 Ultimately, problem definition is a political exercise (Rochefort and Cobb 1994).  
According to Kingdon (2011), “For a condition to be a problem, people must become 
convinced that something should be done to change it” (114).  Stone (1989) claims that 
problem definition is chiefly concerned with attributing undesirable conditions to human 
factors.  Whether this occurs via a focusing event (Birkland 1997) or with the help of 
policy entrepreneurs and the media (Jones 1994), it is apparent that the attitudes held by 
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the masses concerning the definition of contemporaneous “social problems” play an 
important role in influencing policy agendas.   
A number of scholars have postulated how agenda setting takes place and by what 
means certain social problems achieve public awareness, and possibly, governmental 
action (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Downs 1972; Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 
2007; Kingdon 2011; Schattschneider 1960).  What remains consistent in all of their 
explanations is the influential role that the public plays in producing variations in policy.  
In a democracy, the people rule through the ballot box.  The policies that are formulated 
by policymakers create politics through the distribution of benefits and burdens within 
the population (Lowi 1979).  How people respond to the outputs of these policies in terms 
of their political participation, and perhaps most importantly through their vote choice, 
imbues the collective public with a tremendous amount of political clout.       
Svallfors (2010) argues that there are three primary reasons why studying public 
attitudes directed toward social welfare policies is important.  First, it helps researchers 
understand changes in public policy in this particular policy area.  Public perceptions are 
often resistant to alteration.  According to Schumpeter (1942), “…attitudes are coins that 
do not readily melt” (12).  Those who wish to reform or otherwise change existing public 
policies from the status quo must contend with normative expectations among citizens 
that have been created by previous policies and politics (Svallfors 2010).  As Kingdon 
(2011) clarifies, “Public opinion may sometimes direct government to do something, but 
it more often constrains government from doing something” (65).   
The second explanation offered by Svallfors (2010) is that a careful analysis of 
public perceptions of social welfare policies allows researchers to distinguish between 
21 
 
elite opinions versus the views of the general public.  Certainly, elites play a very 
influential role in not only influencing social welfare policies (Rochefort 1986), but also 
public opinions toward them (McClosky and Zaller 1984).  Where the dividing line 
between these two concepts falls is still in dispute.  Finally, Svallfors (2010) claims that 
the examination of public attitudes in this particular policy sphere allows social scientists 
to view social welfare policies from the perspective of their normative effects – 
specifically how people’s value preferences are translated into meaningful policies that 
can be implemented into reality.            
In addition to the reasons suggested above, it may also be true that a feedback 
loop exists in which the outputs of social welfare policies influence the inputs (Jordan 
2010; Kumlin 2007).  That is to say, it is not just public opinion which influences public 
policy, but also public policy outcomes which come to affect public opinion.  As Manza, 
Brooks, and Sauder (2005) point out, political participation influences the political 
process, but the outcomes of the process in turn affect those who tend to participate and 
by what means.  It may be that this analogy holds also in terms of support for various 
policies.  Despite this possibility, feedback effects have not yet received a great deal of 
scholarly attention and remain under-theorized (Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993).  
Instead, much of the focus still remains input-centered (Svallfors 2007a). 
Section 2.3: Influential studies of social welfare policy support 
 Within the broader literature that addresses the topic of public attitudes towards 
different types of public policies, a few studies stand out as worthy of specific mention.  
These investigations, perhaps more so than others, are particularly relevant to the 
research at hand, not only because they specifically focus on public support for different 
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types of social welfare policies, but also because they constitute some of the key 
landmark studies upon which other investigations are based.  Additionally, the 
chronology of these studies over the last several decades illustrates how research in this 
area of social scientific inquiry has progressed from single-nation studies with a relatively 
limited list of explanatory variables to works which consider social welfare policy 
support cross-nationally using advanced methods.  In what follows, I will discuss four 
studies which I consider influential to addressing the research questions presented in this 
dissertation. 
 It is perhaps not surprising, that early studies on public policy attitudes 
undertaken by political scientists began as an extension of research on voting behavior.  
In their seminal article published in the American Political Science Review, Sears, Lau, 
Tyler, and Allen (1980) consider how self-interest and symbolic attitudes influence 
voters’ views toward government in four controversial areas of public policy in the 
United States including: unemployment, national health insurance, busing, and law and 
order policy.  At issue in this research is determining which force – self-interest or 
ideology – is more influential in terms of predicting individuals’ policy support.  In the 
words of Sears et al. (1980), “Do people support those policies that further their private 
gains, or do policy preferences originate instead in political predispositions, which are 
largely the residue of an earlier political socialization that was ignorant of present self-
interest?” (671). 
 It had long been assumed that voters are rational actors driven by self-interest.  In 
the well-known words of V.O. Key (1966), “… voters are not fools” (7).  Research 
indicates that when making their electoral choices, individuals consider the performance 
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of incumbents and decide to reward or punish accordingly (Fiorina 1978; Kramer 1971; 
Tufte 1978).  Likewise, some studies suggest that utility-maximizing citizens support 
those candidates or parties that are closest to their views on campaign issues (Page 1977; 
Riker and Ordenshook 1973).  In contrast with this line of reasoning, Sears et al. (1980) 
suggest that it is not self-interest that matters so much, but rather what they label 
“symbolic attitudes.”  As they claim, “When confronted with new policy issues later in 
life, people respond to these new attitude objects on the basis of cognitive consistency.  
The crucial variable would be the similarity of symbols posed by the policy issue to those 
of long-standing predispositions” (Sears et al. 1980: 670).   
 Using the 1976 Center for Political Studies Presidential Election Survey, Sears et 
al. (1980) examine the influence of self-interest and symbolic attitudes on voters’ policy 
preferences in four controversial policy areas while controlling for relevant demographic 
variables.  Surprisingly, the researchers discovered that self-interest has little effect on 
people’s policy preferences, while symbolic attitudes such as ideology, party 
identification, and measures of racial prejudice had major effects – some of which were 
very robust.  These findings are quite revealing as they directly question self-interest 
assumptions apparent in much of political research.  According to the authors, “What we 
can say with some certainty is that … policy preferences are remarkably indifferent to the 
individuals’ current personal situation, even when it involves such very striking 
phenomena as personal unemployment, the threat of catastrophic medical expense, or 
having one’s own child bused to distant ghetto schools” (Sears et al. 1980: 681).     
 The work by Sears et al. (1980) did little to advance the self-interest argument.  
Instead, it suggested a world in which an individual’s political ideology was the primary 
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determinant of their public policy preferences.  However, theirs was certainly not the last 
word on this matter.  In response to what they saw as a shortage of studies that focused 
specifically on public opinion toward social welfare policies, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 
(1989) examined public support for welfare state programs in the United States.  In their 
study, the authors hypothesize that those who experience a greater sense of economic 
security such as whites, males, upper-income earners, etc. are more likely to support the 
ideals of economic individualism, and thus are inclined to be less supportive of welfare 
state programs.  In contrast, people who are economically vulnerable, including the 
nonwhites, women, and low income earners are more likely to subscribe to the notion of 
social equality and collective responsibility.  As a result, they are more supportive of 
welfare state programs.   
 Hasenfeld and Rafferty’s (1989) study utilized a 1983 survey of adults drawn 
from the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.  Respondents were asked 
whether government spending should be increased, decreased, or remain the same for 
both means-tested (AFDC and Food Stamps) and contributory (Social Security and 
Unemployment Compensation) welfare state programs.  Controlling for ideological 
variables, the researchers found that self-interest does appear to matter a great deal.  As 
Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) report, “Persons who are socioeconomically vulnerable 
and thus more likely to benefit from the welfare state tend to be more supportive of it.  … 
These status characteristics expose persons to economic hardship or risk and they look to 
the welfare state to cushion them from major insecurities and inequalities” (1041-1042).   
Additionally, the authors discovered that there was more support for contributory 
programs as opposed to those that were means-tested.  This finding suggests that 
25 
 
perceptions of “deservingness” appears to play a role, and is in line with other research 
which shows more support for providing benefits to those who are viewed by the public 
as worthy of public assistance such as the disabled, the elderly, and children (Cook 1979; 
Ogren 1973).  Overall, the results of Hasenfeld and Rafferty’s (1989) study are that 
support for social welfare policies is influenced not only by ideological variables, but also 
by self-interest.  To add to this point, certain forms of social welfare polices seem to 
enjoy more public support than others based on how the recipients of the benefits of those 
policies are socially construed.   
 For several years, the notion of public support for social welfare policies was 
construed as a phenomenon that was influenced by factors at the individual level.  
However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, that outlook slowly began to change.  
Beginning with work by Svallfors (1997) and Edlund (1999), a new perspective began to 
emerge.  These scholars postulated that public opinion concerning social welfare might 
be the result of the institutional structure of the welfare state itself.  In the words of 
Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), “In these studies, variations across nations in the 
configuration of social programs are viewed as a product of the history of class 
coalitions, which create various regime types of welfare state” (417).  That is to say, 
differing institutional characteristics at the national level influence people’s attitudes and 
opinions about social welfare programs.   
 In his seminal book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) first suggested the existence of differing welfare regimes based on the degree to 
which social welfare benefits are provided as a right of citizenship and the level of 
expenditures allocated for those services.  Thus, variations between countries followed a 
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pattern predicted by the differing arrangements construed between the state, the market, 
and the family (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26).  According to Esping-Andersen, three 
typologies exist:  “social democratic”, “conservative”, and “liberal” welfare regimes – 
each denoted by the extent and universality of social welfare programs provided by the 
state.  Social democratic regimes tend to offer the most generous benefits, while liberal 
regimes provide the least.     
 It was not until an article by Arts and Gelissen (2001) that support for this thesis 
was offered using methods more appropriate for examining the hypothesis.  While earlier 
studies by Svallfors (1997), Bean and Papadakis (1998), and Edlund (1999) were 
undertaken, they only comprised country comparisons for a limited number of nations.  
Using data from the 1996 International Social Survey Programme, Arts and Gelissen 
(2001) examined whether differing regime types influenced what the authors labeled 
“notions of solidarity” among people in 14 countries.  Here “solidarity” was 
operationalized in terms of support for seven forms of collective protections offered by 
the state.  Respondents were asked whether it should or should not be the government’s 
responsibility to provide a range of different services ranging from providing 
employment to the jobless to providing housing assistance for low-income people.  
Responses to this battery of items were used to generate factor scores.   
 Using multilevel modeling techniques, and controlling for a number of 
demographic and ideological variables at the individual level, Arts and Gelissen (2001) 
determined that there is evidence to suggest that welfare regime typology does influence 
public attitudes toward solidarity.  However, the authors also point out that there were 
only small differences between the different regimes types examined.  Thus, there still 
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remains some question as to how useful the welfare regime typology is as a constructive 
explanation for public support for social welfare policies.  Nevertheless, the work by Arts 
and Gelissen (2001) is notable because it helped to advance the study of the topic of 
social welfare public policy preferences from the realm of individual-level, single-nation 
studies to a truly comparative examination using advanced statistical methods.   
 After Arts and Gelissen (2001), a number of scholarly studies continued to 
examine the relationship between the institutional structure of the welfare state and public 
attitudes towards social welfare policies (e.g., Dallinger 2010; Jaeger 2006; Jakobsen 
2011; Jordan 2010; Koster and Kaminska 2012; Larsen 2008).  However, to date, little 
effort has been made by social science researchers to examine other causal factors at the 
country-level that might influence the public’s policy preferences.  A study by 
Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) serves as an exception to this trend.  In their article, the 
authors suggest that people’s attitudes toward welfare state policies are the result of 
situational and ideological variables at both the individual and country levels of analysis.   
According to Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), “… self-interest and ideology are 
two standard explanatory variables employed in studies of public attitudes toward welfare 
policies, but both are typically used at the individual level only.  When applied at the 
nation level, the definition of ‘self-interest’ no long refers solely to the interest of the 
individual but also to public interests/good” (418).  The authors’ argument rests on the 
notion that public support for social welfare policies is in part a reflection of feelings of 
self-interest and ideology on the part to the individual, as well as a result of contextual 
factors.  This is to say, public attitudes are both an individual and country-level 
phenomena.  Using data from 24 countries taken from the 1996 International Social 
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Survey Programme’s Role of Government III Module, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) 
illustrate this effect by estimating a series of multilevel models which include both self-
interest and ideology-based variables at both levels of analysis. 
 At the country-level, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) include measures for both 
national unemployment rates (self-interest) and egalitarian ideology (ideology).  As to the 
former, the authors reason that a high national unemployment rate is likely to increase 
public empathy for the unemployed.  This is made possible via a variety of means.  For 
instance, high levels of unemployment may engender fear among the larger population.  
“The greater the number of people who are unemployed, the more people are confronted 
with the possibility that they may become unemployed themselves and thus be more 
supportive of welfare state policies….” (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003: 418).  
Alternatively, people who encounter the unemployed regularly or who otherwise 
personally know people who are unemployed may be more likely to be concerned about 
their economic situation (Plotnick and Winters 1985).   
 With regard to the latter, the authors hypothesize that countries characterized by 
stronger egalitarian ideology among its people will result of more positive views directed 
toward welfare state policies.  The rationale for this notion is that “Beliefs and attitudes 
about the role of the (welfare) state may be organized by dominant political ideologies 
whose formation reflects national historical experiences and is embedded in national 
symbols and institutions such as the partisan political system” (Blekesaune and 
Quadagno 2003: 418).  In other words, a country’s collective political culture may 
influence individual policy preferences, particularly through public debate and traditions. 
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 Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that national context does appear to 
influence levels of public support for social welfare policies.  These results suggest that 
yes, situational and ideological factors at the country-level of analysis can have an effect 
with respect to shaping individuals’ public policy preferences.  Specifically, two 
implications loom large.  First, public attitudes are, at least in part, a function of societal 
problems – not just the personal predicaments of individuals.  Second, the shared, 
collective ideology of a country has the potential to also influence support for social 
welfare policies among individuals.  Overall, the work by Blekesaune and Quadagno 
(2003) is significant not only because it expands the cross-national research focus on 
social welfare policy support beyond the work of Arts and Gelissen (2001) and others, 
but more importantly because it creates a rationale for considering how other contextual 
factors found at the country-level influence individuals’ attitudes and opinions about the 
proper role of the state in the lives of its people. 
 The four works outlined in this section provide a useful means for surveying the 
quality and extent of the research undertaken to explain public support for social welfare 
policies.  The chronology of these studies illustrates the development of this line of 
inquiry over time.  Initially, investigations were single-nation studies and considered two 
primary determinants of social welfare policy support: (1) ideology, and (2) self-interest.  
In the decades since, cross-national research has progressed, aided by the advent of more 
rigorous statistical tools.  However, there is still much which has not been considered, 
and thus new opportunities exist for further research.   
While cross-national studies have become the norm in this area of inquiry, 
relatively few country-level contextual variables have been considered as determinants of 
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support for social welfare policies.  Likewise, with much of the focus in recent years 
being directed to variables at the national-level, there have been few attempts to move 
beyond ideological and self-interest based explanations of social welfare policy support 
at the individual-level.  In order to improve on this deficit, new research is necessary 
which considers additional correlates of people’s public policy preferences at both levels 
of analysis.  
Section 2.4:  Competing explanations for social welfare policy support 
Correlates of public support for social welfare policies exist at both the individual 
and country-levels of analysis.  To summarize the applicable literature, it is useful to 
think of individual-level explanations of social welfare policy support as falling into three 
distinct categories:  socio-demographic explanations, socio-psychological explanations, 
and the main contribution of this dissertation – attitudes toward the public sector (see 
Chapter 4).  While sparse, there have been a few scholarly attempts to examine country-
level correlates of social welfare policy attitudes (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; 
Gërxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Given the results of these studies, 
there is cause to believe that national context does matter, and thus, I include a number of 
country-level variables in the multilevel models (see Chapter 5).   
Section 2.4.i.:  Individual-level correlates 
Socio-demographic correlates 
 Much of the existing research on the topic of social welfare policy attitudes points 
to people’s political ideology and economic self-interest as the primary predictors of their 
level of support (Calzada et al. 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 
2011).  For organizational purposes, I prefer to label these types of variables as being 
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“socio-demographic.”  Socio-demographic explanations hold that social welfare policy 
attitudes are the product of socialization and social experiences.   
A person’s ideological orientations are expected to strongly influence their 
position on social welfare policies (Schneider and Jacoby 2005).  One’s ideology can act 
as a powerful force, as “… ideology is one of the few motivating forces that can be seen 
to induce a person to act in terms of interests other than his own” (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960: 206).  A variety of values have been suggested as possible 
influencers including egalitarianism (Breznau 2010; Calzada et al. 2014), 
humanitarianism (Feldman and Steenberger 2001), individualism, pragmatism (Feldman 
and Zaller 1992), multiculturalism, authoritarianism, traditionalism (Calzada et al. 2014), 
reciprocity (León 2012), etc.  Feldman and Zaller (1992) argue that rather than making a 
clear choice between competing values, individuals tend to emphasize one set of values 
over the other.   
However, when forced to choose between freedom and equality (Rokeach 1973), 
between capitalism and democracy (McClosky and Zaller 1984), or between achievement 
and equality (Lipset 1979), Feldman and Zaller contend that conservatives tend to prefer 
the former value, while liberals favor the latter (1992: 272).  Thus, partisan leanings are 
expected to cue support for social welfare policies (Zagórski 1999).  According to 
Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003), “Respondents who support leftist parties will endorse 
more responsibility for and spending on welfare policies than their right-leaning 
compatriots” (343). 
With regard to self-interest, those who are more economically and socially 
vulnerable are more likely to be supportive of social welfare programs (Andreβ and 
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Heien 2001; Salmina 2014; Schneider and Jacoby 2007).  As stated by Berinsky (2002), 
“… those who do not share fully in society’s benefits – are the natural supporters of the 
welfare state” (279).  According to this line of reasoning, it is the individual’s regard for 
their own personal situation which influences their public policy preferences.  Campbell 
et al. (1960) claim that “Political action is, in itself, a roundabout route to the fulfillment 
of most forms of self-interest” (204).  People, looking out for their own well-being, will 
attempt to maximize their own utility in political matters (Downs 1957).  Thus, the 
rational citizen “… knows her preferences or goals, can rank-order them, and when faced 
with a set of options to achieve those preferences will choose those expected to maximize 
individual benefits and minimize individual costs” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 195).   
According to the self-interest argument, certain groups, by virtue of their status 
and situation within society, will be more supportive of the welfare state.  People who are 
older in age are expected to be more supportive of social welfare policies (Cook and 
Barrett 1992; Edlund 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2001).  Those who make up this social 
group are likely to be dependent upon old-age pensions, and thus may need or expect 
these types of social welfare programs (Andreβ and Heien 2001).  Individuals who are 
female are also expected to be more supportive of social welfare policies (Cook and 
Barrett 1992; Reuter, Harrison, and Neufeld 2002; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001; 
Voicu, Vociu, and Strapcová 2007).  Schlesinger and Heldman (2001) argue that women 
are more likely than men to perceive that inequalities exist within society and less likely 
to blame social problems on existing government programs.   
People who have less educational attainment are also predicted to be more 
supportive of social welfare policies than those with more (Jackman and Muha 1984).  
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One’s level of education is ultimately a reflection of their socio-economic status 
(Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989).  Those who rely on the welfare state for economic 
assistance are expected to be more supportive (Andreβ and Heien 2001).  Similarly, those 
who are not currently employed (Cook and Barrett 1992; Owens and Pedulla 2014) are 
presumed to be more inclined to support social welfare policies.     
The consistent theme among these variables is that members of groups who are 
poorer in economic resources, in comparison to their counterparts, have a tendency to see 
a need for a very active state.  Generally speaking, those who experience economic strain 
are more likely to be supportive of public policies that promote a redistribution of 
resources (Blekesaune 2007; 2013).  Also, it is expected that government employees are 
more likely to harbor positive views of welfare policies since they themselves are 
dependent upon the government’s continued level of service provision for their own 
employment (Papadakis and Bean 1993).  As a producer of social welfare, the careers and 
working conditions of those employed in the public sector are tied to the long-term 
prosperity of the welfare state (Andreβ and Heien 2001).    
Socio-psychological correlates 
 Socio-psychological studies explain support for social welfare policies in terms of 
differing personality traits.  Some sociologists have suggested that interpersonal trust 
mediates the effect of self-interest and overall has a negative effect on attitudes toward 
the welfare state (Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Strong interpersonal bonds provide the 
opportunity for individuals to rely on each other, rather than the government, in order to 
achieve common goals and provide mutual aid (Coleman 1990; Welch, Rivera, Conway, 
and Yonkoski 2005).  These social relationships provide access to basic services and 
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benefits (Cohen, Underwood, and Gottlieb 2000).  Some also claim that the frequency of 
social interactions is also negatively related to support for the welfare state (Voicu and 
Voicu 2011).  Taken together, this suggests that individuals who maintain strong social 
networks with others may not see the need for a large, powerful state (Franzen and 
Hangartner 2006).  In times of difficulty, these individuals prefer to rely upon each other, 
and thus do not believe it is the responsibility of the state to ensure their continued 
livelihood (Gërxhani and Koster 2012).   
 However, not all scholars support this argument.  Taylor-Gooby (2005) indicates 
that trust is necessary in order to facilitate “… the running of a complex modern welfare 
state” (217).  Similarly, Calzada et al. (2014) claim that individuals who lack 
interpersonal trust will be reluctant to support social welfare policies for fear of free-
riding and abuse.  Hooghe, Reeskens, and Stolle (2007) state that “… if many people 
have the feeling that most others cannot be trusted, it will be more difficult for a 
community to pursue collective-action efforts and to provide for collective goods” (3).  
Thus, there is still some question as to how interpersonal trust and the frequency of 
contact with others influence social welfare policy attitudes. 
 Political efficacy is also believed to be a correlate of support for social welfare 
policies.  Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) argue that, “How respondents perceive the 
workings of democracy and their place in the process may have an effect on whether or 
not they want the government to be more involved in welfare activities” (343).  It is 
known that political efficacy plays a vital role in determining how the performance of 
public policies are perceived (e.g., Ariely 2013; DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990).  
Likewise, political efficacy is thought to influence levels of political trust (Houston and 
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Harding 2013).  Just the same, it may be that political efficacy guides citizen’s public 
policy preferences.      
Political efficacy can be thought of as being comprised of two separate 
components.  The first, internal political efficacy, refers to an individual’s belief in their 
ability to understand and influence the political process.  The second, external political 
efficacy, focuses on the individual’s confidence that their government is being responsive 
to the wishes of the citizenry.  It is expected that higher levels of political efficacy will 
have a negative effect on support for social welfare policies.  In this dissertation, I 
hypothesize that people who feel politically empowered are more likely to be satisfied 
with the status quo, feel that their needs are being met, and thus will not see a need for a 
more activist government.  This is consistent with arguments that levels of social trust 
negatively influence social welfare policy support via a “crowding out” mechanism 
(Voicu and Voicu 2011).    
Attitudes toward the public sector 
 The final category of correlates consists of attitudes toward the public sector.  
Prior studies on the topic of social welfare policy attitudes have largely ignored the role 
that trust in political actors and perceptions of government performance play in shaping 
policy preferences.  With regard to political trust, Gabriel and Trüdinger (2011) claim 
that, “… the more people trust in political institutions and actors, the more they would be 
willing to approve governmental policies and policy shifts; even if they do not bear 
positively on their own living conditions” (286).  It is the existence of trust, Gabiriel and 
Trüinger assert, which has been one of the primary driving forces behind welfare state 
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reforms.  Similarly, Rudolph and Evans (2005) find that opinions about welfare state 
expenditures are influenced by levels of political trust.   
When people see their public servants as trustworthy, honest, fair, and reliable, 
they are more likely to be supportive of an expanded role for the state.  “A population 
which retains faith in its system of government, and which believes it is reasonably 
democratic, is more likely to trust its government with a broad range of duties than a 
population which is alienated and distrustful” (Kaase and Newton 1995: 93).  As an 
example of this relationship, Hetherington (2005) points to a lack of political trust as one 
of the chief reasons why healthcare reform in the United States failed in the early 1990s 
during the Clinton Administration.  In this instance, there was not enough political trust 
available to sustain such a sweeping governmental transformation.    
According to Ruscio (1999), political trust involves “… weaving together 
judgments of the integrity and capability of public officials with confidence in the 
institutional structures in which they operate” (641).  Trust, in this context, is not only 
about making a calculative judgment as to the competence of public officials to 
implement public policy, but also “… having the service-user’s interests at heart” 
(Taylor-Gooby 2006: 19).  Inherent in the concept of political trust is the willingness of 
individuals to believe that public institutions are working to act on behalf of the greater 
good (Kim 2005; Kim 2010).   
In this dissertation, I argue that the level of trust that people place in civil servants 
influences their public policy preferences.  Here, the term civil servants refers to non-
elected, government administrators.  Specifically, I expect that stronger levels of political 
trust in civil servants will result in additional support for social welfare policies.  In 
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contrast, if trust is lacking, there should be less support for social welfare policies – a 
reflection of a shortage of confidence in civil servants to do their job in an effective and 
principled manner.  Civil servants, by virtue of their positions, are very influential 
political actors.  They serve on the frontlines of policy implementations in government 
offices around the world.  It is reasonable to anticipate that how they are viewed by the 
public in terms of both their competence to complete assigned tasks, as well as their 
intentions to benefit the greater public good, influences the level of support people 
maintain for different forms of public policy they help to provide.    
 Perceptions of government performance may also influence support for social 
welfare policies.  Research suggests that positive perceptions of public sector 
performance promote active citizenship and foster efficacious feelings toward 
government (Vigoda 2002).  Positive perceptions of performance have been linked to 
changes in ideology among adults based on evaluations of incumbent governments 
(Kumlin 2006).  Likewise, perceptions of competent public management are considered 
to be an indicator of a strong democracy and associated with satisfaction with public 
services (Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, and Vashdi 2010).   
 In addition to the studies mentioned above, it bears mentioning that evaluations of 
government output have long been known to influence their political opinions.  This is 
true in terms of citizens making voting decisions (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 
1988), as well as engendering political trust in institutions (Listhaug 1995; Holmberg 
1999; McAllister 1999; Huseby 2000).  Negative evaluations of social policy outputs 
have specifically been known to translate into less support for the political party in power 
(Huseby 2000; Kumlin 2004).  Additionally, public dissatisfaction with public policies 
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may encourage different forms of political participation and activism (Dalton 2002; 
Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979; Lyons and Lowery 1989).      
Given these findings, there is reason to suppose that perceptions of government 
performance play a key role in shaping people’s social welfare policy preferences.  In this 
dissertation, I argue that positive perceptions of government performance, similar to 
higher levels of interpersonal trust and political efficacy, “crowd out” the desire for a 
more activist government.  That is to say, it is expected that people who perceive 
government to be performing well are less likely to support social welfare policies. 
 This argument, although seemingly paradoxical, is not without academic support.  
Why would individuals who see government as performing well be more likely to view 
social welfare policies in a negative light?  Or put another way, why would people who 
perceive poor performance be willing to support policies that increase the size of failing 
institutions?  Interestingly, Calzada and del Pino (2008) find that individuals who tend to 
perceive public services as being ineffective are not likely to support cutting expenditures 
for those programs.  Rather, these people appear to blame performance shortcomings on a 
lack of sufficient resources.  This finding is consistent with literature that suggests that 
dissatisfaction with performance tends to increase support for more government spending 
(Johanssen, Nilsson, and Strӧmberg 2001).   
 The philosophical foundation for my contention is based in what has become 
known as “overload theory.”  The basic framework for overload theory was suggested by 
Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) in their book, The Crisis of Democracy.  The 
authors argue that the expansion of the welfare state during the postwar era was “… 
attributed not so much to the strength of government as to its weakness and the inability 
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and unwillingness of central political leaders to reject the demands made upon them by 
numerically and functionally important groups in their society” (Crozier et al. 1975: 164).  
Simply stated, as elected officials promised more and more to their constituents over the 
years, the size and role of government grew. 
 Positive experiences associated with this expansion of the welfare state led many 
to believe that any societal problem could be remedied via government action (Kaase and 
Newtown 1995).  New expectations were created that government had a responsibility to 
its citizens to meet an ever increasing list of needs (Crozier et al. 1975).  According to 
Kaase and Newton (1995), “… rising expectations makes today’s luxuries tomorrow’s 
necessities.  Experience of satisfactory government services may also fuel the demand for 
still more services.  As a result, claims on government both proliferate and escalate” (71).  
However, over the course of time, the new demands placed on the welfare state to solve 
social problems fail to keep pace with the capacity of government institutions to provide 
efficacious solutions (Kettl 2000).  In the long run, the inability of the public sector to 
meet ever expanding expectations results in perceptions of poor performance.   
 According to Kumlin (2007), overload theory predicts that public dissatisfaction 
with welfare state-related performance actually increases support for social welfare 
programs.  When poor performance becomes an issue, the masses instinctively call for 
additional governmental involvement.  “When performance problems appear in the shape 
of, say, more pupils per public school teacher, longer waiting time for specialist 
treatment, or raised medical fees, citizens will do what they always do according to 
overload theory: they will demand a political solution by means of (even more) 
expansionist policies” (Kumlin 2007: 84).  Rather than abandon the idea of public 
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solutions to pressing social and economic problems, those who perceive poor 
performance do the exact opposite.  Convinced that government can remedy the issue, 
they call for additional government intervention.         
 If it is true that public perceptions of poor performance engender support for 
social welfare policies, it may be reasonable to expect that the converse relationship is 
true as well:  Positive perceptions of government performance will decrease support for 
social welfare policies.  “According to overload theory, modern society generates an ever 
expanding range of special groups and interests each of which urgently presses its case 
for benefits and services on government” (Kaase and Newton 1995).  When government 
fails to provide satisfactory services, there are renewed calls from the public for 
additional governmental intervention.  However, I argue that when individuals see the 
government as being efficient, effective, and ultimately successful, they are more likely 
to be satisfied with the status quo, reason that government programs have been 
adequately funded, and thus, see no need for additional expansionist policies which 
extend the role of government. 
 While overload theory may prove to be a useful framework for explaining public 
support for different forms of social welfare policy, it is important to recognize what it 
does not capture.  Overload theory is helpful in explaining how public perceptions of 
policy outcomes, particularly the implementation of public programs, can influence levels 
of public policy support.  However, it may not be as suitable a structure for predicting 
how the public might feel about entirely new programs – programs for which there is no 
track record of governmental success or failure.  This is certainly a limitation of the 
theory.  That being said, completely new programs are relatively rare, and this 
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dissertation is mainly concerned with investigating the link between the implementation 
of public programs and people’s attitudes towards them.     
Section 2.4.ii.:  Country-level correlates 
 Beyond variation in attitudes within countries, there is likely to be differences in 
the average level of support for social welfare policies across countries.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that social welfare attitudes are conditioned by national context.  
While the extant literature suffers from a deficit of empirical studies that focus on 
country-level explanations, the broader literature that focuses on attitudes towards 
government more generally suggests a number of key variables that have particular 
import.  For this analysis, I will focus on four categories of country-level correlates:  
welfare regime type, economic conditions, inequality, and the quality of governmental 
institutions.   
Welfare Regime Type 
 Cross-national variation in public support for social welfare policies may be the 
result of dissimilarities in the institutional character of differing welfare regimes 
(Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997).  Jordan (2010) argues that once social 
welfare institutions are created, they “… transform political debate, generate new 
constituencies, and alter how individuals and interest groups interpret their preferences” 
(862).  The term “welfare regimes” in this context reflects the compatibility of different 
institutions within a country in terms of how social welfare policies are organized 
(Svallfors 2007b).  The configuration of these policies, “… influence the ways 
individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of a political 
community” (Mettler and Soss 2004: 61).     
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In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests the 
existence of three ideal types of welfare states:  social-democratic, conservative, and 
liberal.  The primary means of demarcation between these three groups of countries is the 
extent of decommodification by the state.  This concept refers to the degree to which 
welfare benefits are provided to citizens as a right of citizenship and the corresponding 
decrease in reliance on the private sector for essential services (Bean and Papadakis 
1998: 213).  Simply stated, it is a reflection of whether social welfare policies are more 
universal or more means-tested in nature. 
 Using the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) framework, different countries can be 
classified into three welfare regimes based on their level of decommodification.  Social-
democratic regimes are characterized by high decommodification and strong tendencies 
toward universalism.  Countries which fall into this category are distinguished by 
maintaining a comprehensive system for social protection, providing generous benefits, 
and requiring high levels of taxation (Deeming and Hayes 2012).  Scandinavian countries 
are classified in this typology.  Alternatively, conservative regimes tend to be located in 
Continental Europe and are considered to be mostly decommodified.  Conservative 
regimes tend to focus on equity rather than redistribution (Arts and Gelissen 2001).  
According to Jaeger (2009), “Corporatism is the organizing social principle in this regime 
type, and entitlement to the major social security programmes (unemployment, sickness, 
retirement, etc.) is based on occupational rather than on citizenship status” (726).   
Finally, liberal regimes are described as having low levels of decommodification, 
as well as predispositions towards individualistic self-reliance values.  A focus is placed 
on means-testing public assistance (Deeming and Hayes 2012; Jaeger 2009).  Here, the 
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term “liberal” is a reference to classical liberalism and limited government, as opposed to 
the contemporary use of the word liberal.  In liberal regimes, the state plays only a minor 
role in terms of social policy.  Instead, these governments tend to look to the market for 
solutions to public policy problems (Jaeger 2006).  In these countries, equality of 
opportunity and individualism is stressed, and as a result, the state is reluctant to provide 
benefits except for the deserving poor (Arts and Gelissen 2001).  Liberal regimes 
generally include countries with an Anglo-Saxon heritage.   
 Does regime type help account for cross-national support for social welfare 
policies?  The literature indicates mixed results.  According to Arts and Gelissen (2001), 
“Not all welfare states have wholeheartedly and equally embraced the notion of equality 
that reflects a redistributive justice or collective solidarity” (285).  They find that regime 
types do influence people’s views.  However, they also caution that there are only small 
differences between regime types.  Bean and Papadakis’ (1998) research reveals very 
weak support for the hypothesis.  Again, they cite little differences in social welfare 
policy support between different regime types.  That being said, Jaeger (2009) cautions 
that it is a mistake to dismiss the influence of welfare regimes.  Rather, more attention 
should be paid to how countries are classified into the various ideal typologies.  Using 
other indicators of welfare regimes, he is able to find modest support for the hypothesis 
(Jaeger 2006). 
 While the work of the aforementioned authors has done much to advance the 
study of public support for social welfare policies, it is still unclear as to whether 
differing welfare regimes make a significant difference.  One of the key limitations of 
these studies is that they are confined only to developed countries, mostly in Western 
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Europe.  Much remains unknown with respect to the influence of other welfare regime 
configurations which may exist in other parts of the world.   
Castles and Obinger (2008) find evidence which suggests that an additional 
welfare regime typology may exist among countries in Eastern Europe.  Using 
hierarchical cluster analysis techniques, they find that collectively the countries of 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, and Slovakia exhibit social 
welfare policy characteristics which are noticeably different from the more traditional 
welfare regime types.  Specifically, this “post-communist” regime type is distinguished 
by comparatively low levels of governmental financial support for social welfare policies, 
high rates of economic growth, but also difficult social problems (Castles and Obinger 
2008).    
While other studies have studied public support for social welfare policies in post-
communist states, most have either focused on a single country (e.g., Salmina 2014) or 
involve comparing a small number of post-communist countries to non-communist ones 
(e.g., Breznau 2010; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003).  It is generally observed that 
people living in post-communist countries maintain higher levels of public support for 
social welfare policies in comparison to capitalistic countries in Western Europe – a 
reflection of the residual effects of the communistic institutions that once dominated their 
societies (Breznau 2010).  However, to date, no known study has empirically tested the 
explanatory usefulness of a “post-communist” welfare regime type within a multilevel 
modeling context.  For that reason, this dissertation considers such a regime type along 
with the more traditional welfare regime types used so popularly in the field of political 
sociology by other scholars.                     
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Economic conditions 
 The state of a country’s economy is expected to influence social welfare policy 
attitudes (Blekesaune 2007, 2013; Gërxhani and Koster 2012).  Poor economic conditions 
may reinforce self-interested behavior and spur a shift in favor of more liberal policies 
that seek to reduce economic insecurity (Lipset 1968).  According to McClosky and 
Zaller (1984), the performance of capitalistic institutions plays a major role in 
determining support for social welfare policies.  Simply put, when economic 
opportunities are plentiful, the conflict between capitalistic and democratic values held by 
the public is relatively mild.  However, when “… the free enterprise system fails to 
deliver on the promises made by its proponents, new efforts to modify it seem inevitable” 
(McClosky and Zaller 1984: 301).  The result is increased levels of support for 
governmental solutions to alleviate what might be perceived as economic injustice.     
Evidence exists which supports this argument.  Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) 
find that the higher a country’s unemployment rate, the more supportive its people are of 
social welfare policies.  Blekesaune (2007) discovers that both lower unemployment rates 
and country-level measures of financial strain are correlated with support for social 
welfare policies.  Levels of economic strain have been shown to influence support for 
redistributive policies (Blekesaune 2013).  Dallinger (2010) also finds that public demand 
for a redistribution of resources decreases with economic prosperity, even when 
controlling for the level of social expenditures dispersed by the political system.    
That being said, not all studies are consistent on this point.  For example, Voicu 
and Voicu (2011) fail to witness a relationship between national unemployment figures 
and social welfare policy support.  Since the question of whether or not national 
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economic conditions are a factor in predicting levels of public support for social welfare 
policies has not been definitely settled, additional research on this relationship is 
necessary.  For that reason, a number of variables measuring national economic 
conditions are included in the country-level models (see Chapter 5).     
Inequality 
 It is also believed that income inequality may condition social welfare attitudes 
(Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Two theories exist.  The first suggests that inequality positively 
influences support for social welfare policies.  Higher levels of inequality lead to a 
greater demand among less affluent individuals for a redistribution of income (Meltzer 
and Richard 1981).  Koster and Kaminska (2012) claim that one of the key values of 
welfare states is to promote equality.  Their results reveal that greater inequality 
correlates with stronger preferences for income redistribution.  Dallinger (2010) also 
finds evidence that greater levels of pre-tax income inequality correlate with more public 
support for redistribution.   
In contrast, a second account holds that higher levels of income inequality 
actually reduce support for social welfare policies.  Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 
(2012) find evidence that higher levels of inequality lead to less support for social welfare 
policies.  One possible explanation is that the worse inequality is in a country, the lower 
the earnings of the median voter will be (Kenworthy and McCall 2008).  As a result, the 
median voter will be less likely to favor expenditures on welfare policies that must be 
financed with additional taxes.  Conversely, Rothstein and Uslander (2005) argue, “When 
resources and opportunities are distributed more equally, people are more likely to 
47 
 
perceive a common stake with others and to see themselves as part of a larger social 
order” (52).   
In the end, it may be that both explanations are not concurrent, but rather 
complementary (Voicu and Voicu 2011).  As a result, the contrasting effects of each may 
cancel each other out.  Just as greater levels of inequality leads to more demand for 
redistribution, as suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981), it may also be that at the 
same time the median voter will be reluctant to pay the additional taxes necessary to 
sustain a social welfare system (Kenworthy and McCall 2008).  While inequality may be 
perceived as a problem worthy of governmental intervention, people may not be inclined 
to pay the taxes necessary to attain the solution to the problem.  Thus, inequality at the 
country-level may have a very low or null effect on popular support for social welfare 
policies.     
Still yet, it bears mentioning that how social welfare policies are viewed by the 
public may influence levels of public support vis-à-vis the problem of inequality.  Moene 
and Wallerstein (2001; 2003) point out that public pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
health insurance are more likely to be perceived by the public as a type of insurance, as 
opposed to a redistribution of income.  This may also help to explain why inequality can 
have such seemingly mysterious effects on individuals’ public policy preferences.  As 
they state, “The demand for redistribution increases when income falls, but the demand 
for redistributive insurance increases when incomes rise” (Moene and Wallerstein 2003: 
510).  This suggests that in examining this relationship, perceptions matter a great deal.  
Clearly, additional research on this point is warranted in order to tease out how the public 
responds to the inequality endemic to a particular social group.      
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Quality of government institutions 
Political scientists have not systematically examined how institutional quality 
influences attitudes towards social welfare policies.  However, it is commonly recognized 
that the outputs of a political system are linked to fluctuations in public support (Easton 
1965).  According to Pettersson (2007), “… we possess knowledge about the way 
institutions matter for various kinds of policy output, and we also know a great deal about 
peoples’ opinions about the welfare state and welfare state output.  But the connection 
between the two – that is, the interplay between institutional theory and public opinion 
studies – demands more attention” (149).   
If, in fact, the central tenets of overload theory are correct that perceptions of 
performance influence support for social welfare policies at the individual-level, then it 
may also be true that the same relationship holds at the country-level.  Actual levels of 
performance, reflected in the form of institutional quality, may influence public support 
for social welfare policies.  As the work of Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) has 
demonstrated, public opinion is subject to more than just the personal situation of 
individual people.  Rather, it has the potential to be swayed also by collective 
phenomena, specifically living within a society.   
To this extent, I expect national context to play a decided role in influencing 
public attitudes.  Consistent with the implications drawn from overload theory (Crozier et 
al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007), I argue that a well-functioning 
government with high quality institutions is likely to reduce support for social welfare 
policies.  If government is functioning well, people may perceive that there is little need 
for social welfare policies.  Thus, it is expected that individuals living in countries where 
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the government is rated with higher levels of institutional effectiveness will be less 
supportive of social welfare policies. 
Summary 
In summary, public support for social welfare policies is commonly explained by 
both socio-demographic variables and socio-psychological attributes.  In addition to these 
correlates, I suggest the possibility that welfare attitudes are also influenced by people’s 
views and assessments of the public sector.  Furthermore, I suggest the testing of four 
categories of variables at the country-level:  welfare regime type, economic conditions, 
inequality, and the quality of government institutions.  Given that the extant literature 
fails to take into consideration the full range of explanations of public support for social 
welfare policies in a multilevel context, I feel this study is justified.  To fill this void, this 
dissertation tests the individual and country-level explanations of social welfare policy 
attitudes using data from 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and 
Oceania. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 Before an examination of people’s social welfare policy preferences can take 
place, it is necessary to consider both the data sources and the operationalization of key 
variables used in this research.  In what follows, the primary source of information for 
this analysis – the 2006 International Social Survey Program’s Role of Government IV 
Module – will first be discussed.  After that, the various countries examined in this 
dissertation are identified.  Next, the operationalization of the dependent variable, public 
support for social welfare policies, is described.  Likewise, the individual-level and 
country-level correlates used in the analysis found in Chapters 4 and 5 will be discussed, 
as well.  In addition, the data sources for the country-level variables will be examined.  
(Please note that all data sources are summarized in Appendix A.)  Finally, the estimation 
methods used in the statistical analysis, particularly multilevel modeling techniques, are 
described in detail.     
Section 3.1:  Data sources 
The individual-level data used in this research comes from the International 
Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2006 Role of Government IV Module (ISSP 
Research Group 2008).  According to Bechert and Quandt (2010), “The International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a coordinated effort of research institutes from many 
countries across the world.  Its annually repeated surveys are designed to cover various 
topics of high relevance to social science research” (13).  The ISSP began in 1985 as a 
collaboration between researchers in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the 
United States.  Each of these groups had been conducting national surveys for several 
years (i.e., the National Social Science Survey, British Social Attitudes, the Allbus 
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Survey, and the General Social Survey, respectively).  To facilitate the comparison of 
collected data, it was agreed that a common module would be added to each of these 
national surveys for cross-national comparison purposes (Bréchon 2009).  Beginning 
with the first ISSP survey in 1985, the “Role of Government” module focuses on the 
relationship that exists between governments and their people (Bechert and Quandt 
2010).  Subsequent “role of government” modules occurred in 1990, 1996, and 2006.  By 
the date of the most recent, the Role of Government IV Module, the ISSP had expanded 
to include national research groups from 33 countries (Scholz, Faaβ, Harkness, and 
Heller 2008).   
Standardized questionnaires are constructed by ISSP members with an emphasis 
on topics that are relevant to the constituent countries.  According to Smith (2009), “The 
ISSP has assisted the expansion of social-scientific knowledge by gathering data on 
important social topics in comparative perspective” (12).  National samples are drawn 
from the adult population in each participating country using multi-stage stratified 
probability sampling designs.  To ensure data quality, ISSP methodological groups 
consider the sampling and administration of the annual surveys in order to ensure the 
representativeness of the samples which are drawn (Scholtz, Faaβ, Harkness, and Heller 
2008).   
For this analysis, data for 23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, 
and Oceania are examined.  The standard sample size is at least 900 respondents for each 
country (ISSP Research Group 2008).  Standardized questionnaires were administered in 
these countries via face-to-face interviews or self-completion surveys with interviewer 
assistance (15 countries) and by mail (8 countries).  Fieldwork for the survey was 
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conducted between 2005 and 2008, depending on the specific country (see Appendix B) 
(Scholtz et al. 2008).   
Section 3.2:  Countries included 
The research undertaken in this dissertation relies on surveys considered in a 
cross-national perspective.  According to Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen (2005), 
public administration scholars have largely ignored people’s views, noting that “From the 
very beginning, the citizen has been neglected as an object of study in public 
administration, due to the discipline’s early focus on organization studies and political-
administrative relations” (232).  Hopefully, this study will help to lessen this scholarly 
deficit given the important role that people’s views play in democratic political systems.  
To this end, comparative public opinion research serves as a very useful tool, as it allows 
the researcher to distinguish between patterns which are specific to one country as 
opposed to those that are more universal in nature (Smith 2009).      
 In addition, by framing this investigation in a cross-national context, it is possible 
to determine the extent to which individuals’ policy preferences are influenced by 
national context.  According to Pedhazur (1997), “Social scientists, notably sociologists, 
social psychologists, and political scientists, have long been interested in the effects of 
social environments on the behavior of individuals” (687).  Despite this, and with very 
few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gerxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu 
and Voicu 2011), much of the research which focuses on social welfare policy attitudes 
has ignored the role that national context plays in influencing individuals’ opinions.  In 
order to overcome this shortcoming in the literature, this study examines 23 countries in 
Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania for which ISSP survey data is 
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available (see Table 1).  The countries included in the analysis vary considerably in terms 
of their political systems, economic development, and national culture.     
Section 3.3:  Individual-level variables 
 As mentioned above, the data source for all the individual-level variables used in 
this analysis is the 2006 ISSP, Role of Government IV Module.  In this section, the 
survey items used to construct the dependent and independent variables are discussed. 
Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable is created from responses to a battery of questions that 
asks: “On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s 
responsibility to … 1) Provide a job for everyone who wants one? 2) Keep prices under 
control? 3) Provide health care for the sick? 4) Provide a decent standard of living for the 
old? 5) Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed? 6) Reduce income 
differences between the rich and the poor? 7) Give financial help to university students 
from low-income families? and 8) Provide decent housing for those who can’t afford it?”  
All eight questions have four-point Likert-type response scales.  Responses include:  
“definitely should be,” “probably should be,” probably should not be,” and “definitely 
should not be.”  For each question, responses are coded so that the highest value indicates 
the most positive response.  The response “can’t choose” is also an option.   
 The battery of questions used to operationalize support for social welfare policies 
refers to respondents’ attitudes about government’s responsibility to provide aid to those 
members of society who are materially deprived.  This is consistent with the conceptual 
definition for social welfare polices offered in Chapter 2.  However, it bears mentioning 
that this definition, as well as the metric utilized here to measure it, fails to take into  
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Table 1. List of countries included in the study 
#   Country Geographical region 
1  Australia Oceania 
2 
 
Canada North America 
3 
 
Croatia Southern Europe 
4 
 
Czech Republic Eastern Europe 
5 
 
Denmark Northern Europe 
6 
 
Finland Northern Europe 
7 
 
France Western Europe 
8 
 
Germany Western Europe 
9 
 
Great Britain Northern Europe 
10 
 
Hungary Eastern Europe 
11 
 
Ireland Northern Europe 
12  Japan Eastern Asia 
13 
 
Latvia Northern Europe 
14 
 
Netherlands Western Europe 
15 
 
Norway Northern Europe 
16 
 
Poland Eastern Europe 
17 
 
Portugal Southern Europe 
18 
 
Russia Eastern Europe 
19 
 
Slovenia Southern Europe 
20 
 
Spain Southern Europe 
21 
 
Sweden Northern Europe 
22 
 
Switzerland Western Europe 
23   United States North America 
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consideration other elements of social welfare that a more expansive definition would 
include.  Social welfare could be construed to include more than just public aid to the 
poor.  Particularly, it could be interpreted to include other programs that serve as 
remedies for a variety of conditions perceived as social ills.  Unfortunately, these forms 
of social welfare cannot be considered using the 2006 ISSP survey.        
As has been done in previous studies of social welfare attitudes (i.e., Arts and 
Gelissen 2001; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Iida and Matsuayashi 2010), responses from 
the battery of questions are used to create factor scores with values ranging from -4.10 to 
1.24.  Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the responses strongly load on a single 
dimension, with an eigenvalue of 2.97.  The factor loadings for the distinct items in the 
scale are provided in Table 2.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the index among all 
observations is 0.82, which is above the standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability 
commonly used in social science research.  Among the specific country samples, the 
Cronbach’s alpha ranges from a low of 0.71 in Japan to a high of 0.86 in Portugal.   
The decision to generate factor scores was made not only to be consistent with 
previous studies – which typically measure public support for social welfare policies 
using this method, but also to construct a metric that is both comprehensive and 
parsimonious.  According to Rummel (1970), “To discover order, pattern, and regularity 
in phenomena is the raison ďêtre of science.  In this sense, factor analysis is a scientific 
tool par excellence” (10-11).  Factor analysis is a statistical method used to explain 
variation in a set of observed variables in terms of a set of unobserved, or latent, 
variables.  These underlying variables are known as factors, and they are assumed to be 
the sources for the variables which are observable (Kim and Mueller 1978).   
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Table 2. Factor loadings, reliability score, mean, and standard deviation for social        
     welfare policy support scale 
 
Factor loadings 
Government's responsibility to: 
1.  Provide a job for everyone who  
     wants one 
0.59 
2.  Keep prices under control 
 
0.54 
3.  Provide health care for the sick 
 
0.57 
4.  Provide a decent standard of living  
     for the old 
0.63 
5.  Provide a decent standard of living  
     for the unemployed 
0.62 
6.  Reduce income difference between  
     the rich and the poor 
0.63 
7.  Give financial help to university 
      students from low-income families 
0.58 
8.  Provide decent housing for those  
     who can't afford it 
0.71 
 Scale reliability score (Cronbach's alpha) 0.82 
Scale mean -5.84E-09 
Standard deviation 0.91 
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In the social sciences, researchers may wish to measure or explain variables that 
are not directly observable.  As Long (1983) explains, “While latent variables cannot be 
directly observed, information about them can be obtained indirectly by noting their 
effects on observed variables” (11).  Using factor analysis, factor scores can be generated 
which serve as estimates for an underlying factor created by a linear combination of 
observed variables (Kim and Mueller 1978).   
In the present research, the key variable of interest is public support for social 
welfare policies.  The 2006 ISSP does not survey respondents specifically as to their 
support or opposition to social welfare policies.  Instead, the survey asks respondents 
their opinion with regard to whether government has a responsibility to provide particular 
forms of social welfare to its residents (e.g., healthcare for the sick, living standards for 
the elderly, unemployment benefits for those out of work, housing assistance for the poor, 
etc.).  Via factor analysis, these observed variables can be used to create a measure of the 
latent concept that is the subject of the research questions.  By using responses to the 
battery of questions that gauge individuals’ preferences for governmental involvement in 
various activities, factor scores can be calculated which serve as an indicator of the level 
of support respondents possess for social welfare policies.              
Independent variables 
 A brief description of the independent variables used in this research can be found 
below.  A more detailed wording of the survey questions taken from the 2006 ISSP are 
presented in Appendix C.  As indicated in Chapter 2, the literature identifies a number of 
different predictors of welfare policy support.  These variables can be organized into 
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three broad categories:  socio-demographic explanations, socio-psychological 
explanations, and attitudes toward the public sector. 
Socio-demographic correlates 
 The following socio-demographic variables are included in the study:  Left 
political party affiliation, Right political party affiliation, Age, Female, Low education, 
Not employed, and Government employment.  To measure respondents’ membership in 
political parties, two variables, Left and Right political party affiliation, are constructed.  
ISSP surveys routinely ask respondents the political party they identify with.  Based on 
these responses, a left/right placement is derived by ISSP coders.  Individuals’ affiliations 
with political parties are classified based on the following scheme:  “far left,” “left, center 
left,” “center, liberal,” “right, conservative,” “far right,” “other,” and “no party 
preference.”  Left political party affiliation includes individuals who identify with a 
political party designated as either “far left” or “left, center left,” while Right political 
party affiliation includes those who identify with a party labeled as either “right, 
conservative” or “far right.” 
The variable Age is measured as a continuous variable.  The respondents’ age was 
determined by different means in different countries.  For instance, in some countries the 
respondent was asked to specify the year of their birth, and their age was calculated.  In 
other countries, the respondent was simply asked to indicate their age.  The binary 
variable Female distinguishes between females and males.  The process used to make this 
determination varies from one country to the next.  In some countries, the respondent was 
asked to self-identify as being either male or female (or man or woman).  In other 
countries, the question was coded by the interviewer based on their observation.   
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 The respondent’s level of education is measured by responses to questions in the 
various country surveys that ask about the highest education level completed.  While the 
specific response set varies from one country to the next, the responses are coded such 
that there are six categories ranging from “no formal qualification, incomplete primary” 
to “university degree completed, graduate studies.”  The binary variable Low education is 
created by assigning a value of ‘1’ to the following response categories:  “no formal 
qualification, incomplete primary,” “lowest formal qualification,” and “above lowest 
qualification,” and a value of ‘0’ to the other three responses.  In the United States, for 
example, Low education would include the categories: “less than high school, 1-5 years 
of education,” less than high school, 6-8 years of education,” and “less than high school, 
9-16 years of schooling.”     
 The variable Not employed is created based on responses to survey questions that 
gauge the current economic status of the respondent.  Categories of employment status 
include “employed, full-time,” “employed, part-time,” “employed, less than part-time,” 
“helping family member,”  “unemployed,” “student, school, vocational training, 
apprenticeship or trainee,” “retired,” “housewife, -man, home duties,” “permanently 
disabled,” and “other – not in labour force.”  In order to distinguish between those who 
are currently working from those who are not, the variable Not employed is coded to 
include all the categories listed above except those where the respondent is actually 
employed.  Thus, the responses “helping family member,”  “unemployed,” “student, 
school, vocational training, apprenticeship or trainee,” “retired,” “housewife, -man, home 
duties,” “permanently disabled,” and “other – not in labour force” are assigned a value of 
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‘1.’  The remaining responses, “employed, full-time,” “employed, part-time,” and 
“employed, less than part-time,” are given a value of ‘0.’          
 The Government employment variable is created based on survey questions that 
ask the respondent to identify the sector of the economy in which they are employed.  
The responses are coded based on the following categories:  “work for government,” 
“public owned firm,” “private firm,” “self-employed,” and “other, charity, voluntary 
sector.”  The binary variable Government employment is created by assigning a value of 
‘1’ to individuals who indicate they work for government and a value of ‘0’ for the 
remaining categories.  
Socio-psychological correlates 
 In this analysis, four socio-psychological variables are included:  Interpersonal 
trust, Contact with others, Internal political efficacy, and External political efficacy.  
Interpersonal trust is measured with responses to two questions:  “If you are not careful, 
other people will take advantage of you” and “There are only a few people I can trust 
completely.”  Both questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from 
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  For each dimension of interpersonal trust, 
responses are coded so that the highest value indicates the most trusting response. As has 
been done in other studies (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Flavin and Keane 2012; Schyns and 
Koop 2010), responses to these questions are summed to create an additive index with 
values ranging from 2 to 10.  The decision to construct an index was made in order to be 
consistent with the method used to measure this particular correlate in previous studies.    
The Cronbach’s alpha for the Interpersonal trust index is 0.70 for all 
observations, which is equal to the common standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability.  
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Among the country samples individually, the highest Cronbach’s alpha is observed in 
Denmark (0.80).  The lowest is witnessed in Russia (0.38), but this is an outlier, as the 
next lowest value is found in Poland (0.57).  The variable Contact with others is 
measured with responses to the question:  “On average, about how many people do you 
have contact with in a typical week day, including people you live with?”  This question 
has a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from “0-4 persons” to “50 or more.” 
 Responses to the following two questions are used to operationalize Internal 
political efficacy:  “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country” and “I think most people are better informed about 
politics and government than I am.”  Both questions have five-point Likert-type response 
scales ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  Responses are coded so that 
the highest value indicates the most efficacious response.  As has been done in other 
studies (e.g., Asher 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Dyck and Lascher 2009; Flavin and 
Keane 2012; Hayes and Bean 1993), the values are summed in order to create an additive 
index with values ranging from 2 to 10.   
This index, as well as its companion measuring external political efficacy below, 
was created in order to be consistent with the way this concept has been typically 
measured in the extant literature.   The Cronbach’s alpha for the Internal political 
efficacy index is 0.50.  However, it bears mentioning that the Cronbach’s alpha varies a 
great deal from one country to the next.  The highest values are witnessed in Switzerland 
(0.65), Germany (0.64), and Ireland (0.63).  The lowest are observed in Russia (0.04), 
France (0.05), and Japan (0.09).  These values suggest that this measure may be more 
appropriate in some countries than others.    
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External political efficacy is measured by responses to the statements:  “People 
like me don’t have any say about what the government does” and “The average citizen 
has considerable influence on politics.”  Both questions have five-point Likert-type 
response scales ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  Responses are 
coded so that the highest value indicates the most efficacious response and are summed to 
create an additive index with values ranging from 2 to 10.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
External political efficacy index is 0.55.  Similar to the Internal political efficacy index, 
there is some variation in the country specific Cronbach’s alpha values.  The highest 
values are seen in Canada (0.65), Finland (0.65), and Norway (0.64).  The lowest are 
observed in France (0.13), Japan (0.25), and Russia (0.31).  Again, these values are 
indicative of varying degrees of internal consistency for this variable from one country to 
the next.           
Attitudes toward the public sector 
 The final category of individual-level correlates used in this analysis is that which 
reflects respondents’ attitudes toward the public sector.  Two variables are specifically 
considered:  Trust in civil servants and respondent Perceptions of governmental 
performance.  The former is measured by responses to the survey item:  “Most civil 
servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.”  Respondents were presented 
with five response options ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.  A 
binary variable is created with a value of ‘1’ indicating either a “strongly agree” or 
“agree” response and a value of ‘0’ for all other responses. 
 In order to gauge how individuals come to assess public sector performance, a 
general measure is needed which reflects perceived success in a number of policy areas.  
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For this reason, the variable Perception of performance is operationalized using 
responses to the question:  “How successful do you think the government in [Country] is 
nowadays in each of the following areas:  1) Providing health care for the sick? 2) 
Providing a living standard for the old? 3) Dealing with threats to security? 4) Controlling 
crime? 5) Fighting unemployment? and 6) Protecting the environment?”   
All six questions have five-point Likert-type response scales ranging from “very 
successful” to “very unsuccessful.”  For each dimension, responses are coded so that the 
highest value indicates the most satisfactory response and are used to create factor scores 
ranging from -2.33 to 2.58.  Much like the dependent variable, the decision to generate 
factor scores was made in order to construct a parsimonious measure that reflects the 
latent concept of perceived government performance.  Confirmatory factor analysis 
indicates that the responses strongly load on a single dimension with an eigenvalue of 
2.30.  The factor loadings for the distinct items in the scale are provided in Table 3.  The  
Cronbach’s alpha for the six questions in the battery is 0.79 for all observations.  Among 
the country samples, the Cronbach’s alpha ranges from a low of 0.69 in Canada to a high 
of 0.86 in Russia.             
Section 3.4:  Country-level variables 
 In order to examine the influence of national context on public support for social 
welfare policies, several country-level variables are included in the multilevel analysis.  
Specifically, four categories of country-level variables are examined in this research: 
welfare regime type, economic performance, inequality, and the quality of government 
institutions.  The sources of these correlates include the welfare regime typology created 
by Castles and Obinger (2008) in their article, “Worlds, Families, Regimes: Country  
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Table 3. Factor loadings, reliability score, mean, and standard deviation for  
     perception of performance scale 
 
Factor loadings 
How successful is government in: 
1.  Providing health care for the sick 
 
0.72 
2.  Providing living standard for old 
 
0.76 
3.  Dealing with threats to security 
 
0.67 
4.  Controlling crime 
 
0.71 
5.  Fighting unemployment 
 
0.70 
6.  Protecting the environment 
 
0.64 
 Scale reliability score (Cronbach's alpha) 0.79 
Scale mean 3.67E-10 
Standard deviation 0.89 
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Clusters in European and OECD Area Public Policy,” published in the journal West 
European Politics, the World Bank, and the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) compiled by Solt (2014).  To the extent that these variables are 
revealed to be statistically significant in the multilevel models, a case can be made that 
public support for social welfare policies is not only dependent upon individual-level 
factors, but also on conditions that affect societies as collective entities.     
Welfare Regime Type 
Castles and Obinger’s (2008) classification scheme is used to identify the 
existence of different welfare regimes.  In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
Esping-Andersen (1990) classified 18 countries located around the world into three 
welfare state typologies.  Since its publication, other scholars have expanded the number 
of countries classified.  Many have renamed, reclassified, or created additional regime 
typologies (Ebbinghaus 2012; Arts and Gelissen 2010).  Castles and Obinger (2008) use a 
hierarchical cluster analysis of public policy outcomes in 20 OECD countries over the 
period 2000-2004 to distinguish between Scandinavian (social democratic), Continental, 
and English-speaking (liberal) welfare regimes.    
It may also be that a fourth regime type made up of transitioning democracies in 
Eastern Europe also exists.  Using an additional analysis of policy outcomes in 25 
member states of the European Union over the period 2001-2005, Castles and Obinger 
(2008) suggest that indeed a Post-communist welfare typology exists which is statistically 
distinct from the more traditional welfare regime classifications.  For this reason, a fourth 
welfare regime typology is created which includes the seven countries for which ISSP 
data are available that have a socio-economic history of communism.  For the remainder 
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of this dissertation, the welfare regime typologies suggested by Castles and Obinger 
(2008), as well as the labels they use: Scandinavian, Continental, English-speaking, and 
Post-communist, will be used consistently.  See Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Countries listed by welfare regime typology 
Scandinavian Continental English-speaking Post-communist 
Denmark Finland Australia Croatia 
Norway France Canada Czech Republic 
Sweden Germany Great Britain Hungary 
 
Netherlands Ireland Latvia 
 
Portugal Japan Poland 
 
Spain Switzerland Russia 
    United States Slovenia 
 
 
Economic Performance 
 The state of a country’s economy is expected to influence social welfare policy 
attitudes (Gërxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Three measures of 
economic performance are used to indicate economic performance:  Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita (PPP), the Unemployment rate for each country, and the 
measure of Inflation for each country.  GDP per capita (PPP) is used to represent the 
level of economic development of a country.  The GDP implicit inflator is the ratio of 
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency (World Bank 2016).  
GDP per capita (PPP) is measured in international dollars, which has the same 
purchasing power as U.S. dollars.  Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force 
that is without work but available for and seeking employment (World Bank 2016).  
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Inflation reflects the rate of price change in the economy as a whole, and it is measured 
by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator (World Bank 2016).     
The data sources for these variables are the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
of the World Bank for each country for the year in which the ISSP survey was 
administered.  Established in 1944, the World Bank was created to assist developing 
countries via financial and technical assistance in order to both reduce poverty and 
support development efforts (World Bank 2015b).  In addition to providing low-interest 
loans and grants, the World Bank works with multiple actors including multinational 
institutions, private sector investors, and public sector entities on various projects in order 
to support development goals.  This includes providing policy advice, as well as research 
analysis.   
Inequality 
The GINI inequality index calculated by Solt (2014) is used to measure income 
inequality.  The GINI index quantifies the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within a country’s economy deviates from a perfectly 
equal distribution.  The value can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect 
inequality).  The GINI index values for each country included in the analysis are used to 
match the applicable year of the ISSP survey data. 
Solt (2009) created the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
as a means of overcoming the limitations prevalent in a number of other inequality 
indexes.  Data issues created questions as to the comparability of observations when 
conducting cross-national research (Neckerman and Torche 2007).  Specifically, two 
inadequacies emerged: (1) the inclusion of only a small number of countries, and (2) the 
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usage of different definitions of income (e.g., gross or net) and reference units (e.g., 
households or people) when calculating inequality indexes.  Using a custom missing-data 
algorithm, Solt (2009) standardized the United Nations University’s World Income 
Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER 2008) using quality benchmarks established in the 
Luxembourg Income Study (Luxembourg Income Study 2008).  The SWIID attempts to 
maximize the comparability of inequality statistics for the largest possible number of 
countries.  According to Solt (2009), “… the SWIID is better suited to broad cross-
national research on income inequality than previously available sources” (231).   
Quality of Government Institutions 
The quality of governmental institutions is measured with the World Bank 
Government Effectiveness Indicator.  The measure is one of the six broad dimensions of 
“governance” routinely computed by the World Bank.  The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) are “… a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of 
governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries” (World Bank 2015a).  In recent years, 
scholars have come to recognize that good governance matters for sustained economic 
development (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).  WGI data offers a means of 
determining the status of government effectiveness in a cross-national perspective.  The 
World Bank provides WGI measures for 215 countries over the period 1996-2014.   
The World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator combines several measures 
into a single variable that reflects the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies 
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(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; World Bank 2015c).  The measure reflects data 
from a number of different sources, including international organizations, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, and entities in the private sector.  The Government 
Effectiveness Indicator ranges from a value of -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).  Indicator 
values for each country included in the analysis are used to match the appropriate year of 
the ISSP survey data.                  
Section 3.5:  Estimation methods 
The research for this dissertation is conducted in three stages.  The first stage 
includes a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables examined in 
the study.  In particular, descriptive statistics are provided to report the distribution of 
response items in the 2006 ISSP Survey.  Moreover, this inquiry illustrates the extent to 
which public support for social welfare policies varies from one country to the next.  In 
the second stage, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for each specific 
country included in the analysis is estimated in order to reveal whether attitudes toward  
social welfare policies are influenced by similar individual-level attributes across 
countries.   
The OLS regression model allows the researcher to examine the effects of a 
particular independent variable on a continuous dependent variable while holding other 
factors fixed (Wooldridge 2009).  When considered comparatively, this examination 
indicates how consistent the socio-demographic, socio-psychological, and public sector 
attitudinal variables are in determining levels of support for welfare policies from one 
country to the next.  The results from the first two stages of the analysis are found in 
Chapter 4.        
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 The final stage of this research considers the extent to which variation in social 
welfare policy support is a function of differences in country-level attributes.  
Specifically, national context will be considered as a potential influencer.  In addition to 
the individual-level variables included in the country-specific models, certain country-
level correlates identified in the extant literature are included, as well.  For this, 
multilevel regression models are estimated.  The results from this final stage of the study 
are found in Chapter 5. 
Multilevel Models 
 Increasingly, social science researchers have come to realize that an underlying 
hierarchical structure exists in much of their data (Goldstein 1987).  Typical examples of 
these arrangements include individuals nested within families, medical cases grouped 
within different hospitals, plots within fields, or students nested within different 
classrooms or schools, etc. (Longford 1995).  According to Hox (2002), “The general 
concept is that individuals interact within the social contexts to which they belong, 
meaning that individual persons are influenced by the social groups or contexts to which 
they belong, and that the properties of these groups are in turn influenced by the 
individuals who make up that group” (1). 
The existence of this organizational structure necessitates the need to take 
hierarchy into account when conducting data analysis.  Thus, multilevel modeling seeks 
to account for the relationships between different levels of data within the framework of a 
single model.  As stated by Courgeau (2003b), “Ignoring this relationship may lead to an 
incorrect analysis of individual behaviors and an equally incorrect analysis of the 
behaviors of the entire group.  Only by recognizing these reciprocal influences can we 
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arrive at a more correct analysis of behaviors” (3).  A multilevel approach allows the 
researcher to take into consideration how social phenomena are often the result of 
influences found at both the individual and social levels of analysis.           
Known by a variety of names, including “hierarchical linear model” (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992; Raudenbush and Byrck 1986, 1988), “mixed-effects model” (Littell, 
Milliken, Stroup, and Wolfinger 1996), “random coefficient model” (de Leeuw and Kreft 
1986; Longford 1993, 1995), or “variance component model” (Longford 1987), 
multilevel regression models examine a single dependent variable measured at the lowest 
hierarchical level using correlates at all levels.  Multilevel modeling has enjoyed 
extensive use in certain fields of study where a hierarchal structure is common to the data 
being examined.   
The first social science discipline to fully develop the technique was educational 
studies with a focus on students nested within classrooms nested within schools 
(Goldstein 2003).  This examination resulted in a number of influential works for the 
field (e.g., Aitkin, Anderson, and Hinde 1981; Goldstein and Sammons 1997; Hill and 
Goldstein 1998; Woodhouse and Goldstein 1988).  In addition to its use in education 
science, multilevel models have commonly been used in other fields including 
demography (Courgeau 2003a), epidemiology (Greenland 1998; Morgenstern 1998), and 
human geography (Jones 1991), among other studies.  
Methodologically, multilevel models should be used when analyzing data which 
is believed to be hierarchically structured.  This is done in order to overcome two 
problems – one conceptual and the other statistical (Hox 2002).  Conceptually, 
researchers want to avoid the hazards of making cross-level inferences.  According to 
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Pedhazur (1997), “When findings obtained from data collected on one level (e.g., 
individuals) are used to make inferences about another level (e.g., groups to which they 
belong), a cross-level inference is being made” (676).  Cross-level inferences can often 
be misleading, and a number of early scholars have pointed out the risks involved in 
making them (e.g., Lindquist 1940; Thorndike 1939).   
In his seminal paper on race and illiteracy, Robinson (1950) drew attention to 
what is now known as the ecological fallacy.  An ecological fallacy refers to interpreting 
aggregate data at the individual level.  Often, those who commit an ecological fallacy do 
so because aggregate data tends to be more easily available, whereas individual-level data 
may require collection, resulting in greater costs in terms of time and resources.  Consider 
the aggregate measures commonly made available by various organizations, 
governmental and not, for differing countries, states, counties, municipalities, census 
tracts, election districts, etc.  Similarly, another cross-level inference, the atomistic 
fallacy, refers to interpreting individual level data at the aggregate level.  While the 
atomistic fallacy is not as common as its counterpart, it is still problematic.  Both forms 
of statistical interpretation should be avoided because mismatching data to one’s selected 
unit of analysis can lead to dramatically differing, and potentially spurious, results.   
Multilevel models can help prevent researchers from making fallacious cross-
level inferences.  Moreover, they actually present the investigator with a clearer 
illustration of how both individual and contextual variables influence the object of study.  
As stated by Hox (2002), “A more general way to look at multilevel data is to realize that 
there is not one ‘proper’ level at which the data should be analyzed.  Rather, all levels 
present in the data are important in their own way” (4).  Multilevel modeling is able to 
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incorporate all available information from multiple levels of data in order to more fully 
explain variation in a dependent variable.    
 The second reason why multilevel models should be used when analyzing 
hierarchically structured data is for statistical reasons.  Standard regression methods, such 
as ordinary least squares regression, only allow for data analysis at a single level.  In the 
past, it has been common practice for some researchers, albeit mistakenly, to pool 
hierarchically structured data into a single level.  However, this is inappropriate.  When 
individual data from multiple groups is merged and used to estimate models using 
standard regression techniques it is assumed that the characteristics of those groups do 
not matter – which is implausible (Pedhazur 1997).   
Given that common regression methods assume that observations are independent 
of one another, this presents a distinct problem.  If the independence of observations 
assumption is violated, the standard errors of the regression coefficients will be 
underestimated, resulting in a greater likelihood of committing a Type I error in which 
results may appear statistically significant but in truth are not (Hox 2002).  According to 
Pedhazur (1997), “A least-squares solution ignores the fact that individuals belonging to 
a given group tend to be more alike than do individuals belonging to different groups” 
(692).  Alternatively, multilevel regression analysis takes the clustered nature of 
hierarchical data into account and estimates standard errors which are more accurate than 
those generated by standard regression methods.                              
In summary, multilevel models are appropriate for data which are hierarchically 
structured, such as data on individuals collected through surveys (level-1) that are 
clustered (or nested) within countries (level-2) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  The 
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advantage of this estimation approach over a simple pooled regression model is that a 
hierarchical linear model does not assume that respondents are independent of one 
another, as it is more appropriate to assume that individuals within each cluster (i.e., 
country) have attitudes that are correlated as a function of the national context in which 
they reside.  The multilevel estimator also more efficiently accounts for the heterogeneity 
across clusters (Gelman and Hill 2006).   
Overall, multilevel regression “…allows specification of each variable at the 
conceptually appropriate level.  Perhaps more important, the methods allow us to ask 
research questions which probably would otherwise have remained unasked” 
(Raudenbush and Willms 1991, xii).  For this study, multilevel models are used to 
examine public support for social welfare policies using the statistics software HLM 7.01.         
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICIES: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATES 
 
 In order to explain the extent of public support for social welfare policies as well 
as its causes, this chapter examines the phenomena at the individual-level.  First, a 
descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables for all of the 23 countries 
included in the study is offered.  This descriptive analysis includes an investigation of 
missing data, as well as a presentation of key statistics such as the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values, and sample sizes for each variable by country.  
The dependent variable is examined first, with the goal being to determine how levels of 
support for social welfare policies vary across countries.  Then a descriptive analysis of 
the socio-demographic, socio-psychological, and government attitudinal correlates 
follows.  After that, the focus of the chapter turns to explaining social welfare policy 
support at the individual-level.  For that, a series of country-specific OLS regression 
models are estimated and analyzed.        
Section 4.1: Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable 
 This section offers a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable, public support 
for social welfare policies, in 23 countries around the world.  First, an inspection of 
missing data is conducted, followed by an examination of key measures of central 
tendency.  Finally, an assessment is made as to how levels of public support for social 
welfare policies vary across the countries examined in this study. 
Section 4.1.i: Valid and invalid responses 
 When conducting statistical analysis with respect to survey data, it is essential to 
be aware of the distribution of valid and invalid responses.  An insufficient number of 
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responses may endanger the ability of the researcher to make valid claims about 
relationships that exist within the data.  Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of missing data 
for the dependent variable by country.  The full distribution of missing values by country 
is presented in Appendix D.     
 For the dependent variable, 5,079 or about 15.9% of the responses are missing 
data, indicating that the respondent either replied “can’t choose” or gave “no answer” to 
at least one of the eight questions that comprise the dependent variable.  These missing 
responses decrease the sample size from 31,944 to 26,865.  As indicated in Figure 1, the 
countries with the highest number of invalid responses include Japan (29.1%), Canada 
(22.8%), and Latvia (21.7%).  Each of those countries has missing values in excess of 
20%.  Countries with the fewest invalid cases include Slovenia (6.4%), the United States 
(7.4%), and Hungary (8.9%).   
Section 4.1.ii: Support for social welfare policies across countries 
 The first research question posed in this dissertation is: Across countries, what 
levels of support do people hold for social welfare policies?  Table 5 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the factor scores that comprise the dependent variable.  Recall 
from Chapter 3 that the dependent variable is created from responses to a battery of 
questions that asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to provide 
certain forms of assistance, reflecting eight different types of social welfare policies.  
Responses to these questions are used to generate factor scores with values ranging from 
-4.10 to 1.24.  The overall mean for all cases is -5.84E-9, and the overall standard 
deviation is 0.91.  Country averages and standard deviations indicate that there is 
variation in public attitudes about social welfare policies within countries, suggesting  
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Figure 1. Invalid responses for the dependent variable by country, % 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics: Support for social welfare policies 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia -0.32 0.85 -4.10 1.24 2,261 
Canada -0.32 0.89 -3.56 1.24 720 
Croatia 0.45 0.73 -2.75 1.24 1,007 
Czech Republic -0.45 0.94 -3.19 1.24 1,010 
Denmark -0.09 0.83 -3.43 1.24 1,139 
Finland 0.00 0.83 -3.47 1.24 979 
France -0.09 0.91 -4.10 1.24 1,522 
Germany -0.37 0.89 -3.33 1.24 894 
Great Britain -0.21 0.82 -2.92 1.24 756 
Hungary 0.08 0.75 -2.22 1.24 920 
Ireland 0.36 0.67 -2.41 1.24 882 
Japan -0.78 1.02 -4.10 1.24 873 
Latvia -0.06 0.91 -2.83 1.24 837 
Netherlands -0.23 0.86 -2.81 1.24 794 
Norway 0.17 0.74 -4.10 1.24 1,165 
Poland 0.28 0.84 -4.10 1.24 1,091 
Portugal 0.51 0.69 -3.52 1.24 1,654 
Russia 0.44 0.73 -3.28 1.24 1,965 
Slovenia 0.30 0.72 -3.11 1.24 939 
Spain 0.46 0.71 -4.10 1.24 2,238 
Sweden -0.19 0.92 -3.71 1.24 973 
Switzerland -0.66 0.77 -3.74 1.24 840 
United States -0.41 1.06 -4.10 1.24 1,406 
Total -5.84E-09 0.91 -4.10 1.24 26,865 
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the need to examine individual-level correlates in order to understand these attitudes.  
Perhaps more important, these summary statistics indicate variation in public attitudes 
across the countries examined and highlight the need to examine national context for 
explaining these views (see Chapter 5).   
The cross-national variation in social welfare policy support is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which reports the average factor score for each country ordered from lowest-to-
highest.  Respondents in Portugal (0.51), Spain (0.46), and Croatia (0.45) are the most 
supportive of social welfare policies, while people living in Japan (-0.78), Switzerland    
(-0.66), and the Czech Republic (-0.45) are, on average, the most critical.  A cursory 
glance at Figure 2 reveals that Eastern and Central European countries tend to be over-
represented in the bottom half of this chart.  Several of these countries have only recently 
transitioned to democratic governments and capitalistic economies.  This observation 
suggests that the quality of public institutions may influence respondents’ opinions about 
social welfare policies. 
Section 4.2: Descriptive analysis of the independent variables 
This section summarizes the statistical characteristics of the independent variables 
included in the analysis at the individual-level.  In addition to reporting the valid and 
invalid data for each correlate by country, it also provides important descriptive statistics 
such as range, distribution, and measures of central tendency.  Specifically, the amount of 
variation for each variable is considered comparatively by country.   
Section 4.2.i: Left political party affiliation        
 Appendix E reveals that there are 5,601 invalid responses for the Left political 
party affiliation variable, decreasing the pooled sample size of the data from 31,944 to  
80 
 
Figure 2. Mean factor score of support for social welfare policies by country 
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26,343, or by 17.5%.  Figure 3 indicates that all countries have at least some invalid 
cases, ranging from 0.6% in Japan to 37.1% in Hungary.  The number of invalid cases is 
in excess of 30.0% in four countries: Russia, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary.  However, 
it is less than 5.0% in seven: Japan, the United States, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Canada.   
 The Left political party affiliation variable is coded to include those individuals 
who belong to political parties identified as being either “far left” or “left, center left” by 
ISSP coders on an ideological left/right placement measure.  Accordingly, 8,045, or 
30.5%, of respondents for which valid data is available identify with a left political party.  
Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of respondents who are affiliated with a left political 
party by country.  The percentage varies from a low of 2.8% of respondents in Japan to a 
high of 54.3% of respondents in France.  Less than 15.0% of respondents are members of 
a left political party in Japan, Ireland, Croatia, Latvia, and Russia – using this coding 
scheme.  Meanwhile, more than 40.0% or respondents are affiliated with left political 
parties in France, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany.   
Section 4.2.ii: Right political party affiliation 
Appendix F reveals that there are 5,601 invalid responses for the right political 
party affiliation variable, the same number as for the Left political party affiliation 
variable.  This decreases the pooled sample size of the data from 31,944 to 26,343, or by 
17.5%.  Just as before with Left political party affiliation, Figure 5 indicates that all 
countries have at least some invalid cases, ranging from 0.6% in Japan to 37.1% in 
Hungary.  The number of invalid cases is in excess of 30.0% in four countries: Russia,  
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Figure 3. Invalid responses for left political party affiliation by country, % 
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Figure 4. Percentage distribution of left political party affiliation by country, % 
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Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary.  However, it is less than 5.0% in seven: Japan, the United 
States, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada.   
 The Right political party affiliation variable is coded to include those who belong 
to political parties identified as being either “right, conservative” or “far right” by ISSP 
coders on an ideological left/right placement measure.  Accordingly, 6,793, or 25.8%, of 
respondents identify with a right political party.  Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of 
respondents who are affiliated with a right political party by country.  The percentage 
varies from a low of 0.6% of respondents in Ireland to a high of 46.9% of respondents in 
Hungary.   
Less than 15.0% of respondents are members of a right political party in Ireland, 
Portugal, Latvia, Russia, and Spain.  Meanwhile, more than 40.0% of respondents are 
affiliated with right political parties in Norway, Denmark, and Hungary.  It bears 
mentioning that a total of only 6 people in Ireland belong to a right political party using 
this coding scheme.  This number being so small may have implications on the country-
specific regression model for the state of Ireland later in this chapter.   
Section 4.2.iii: Age 
 Appendix G indicates that 149 respondents, or about 0.47%, provided no answer 
when asked about their age.  Most of these missing cases are either in Canada (63 people) 
or Australia (44 people).  These missing data have decreased the overall sample size from 
31,944 to 31,795.  Cross-nationally, the smallest number of respondents in the country 
samples is 870 in Canada, while the maximum is 2,737 in Australia.  Table 6 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the Age variable.  Respondents’ ages range from 15 to 98 years.  
Five countries have respondents younger than 18 in their samples, including Finland 
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Figure 5. Invalid responses for right political party affiliation by country, % 
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Figure 6. Percentage distribution of right political party affiliation by country, % 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics: Age  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 50.51 16.65 17 97 2,737  
Canada 51.57 15.64 18 97 870  
Croatia 46.47 18.73 18 92 1,194  
Czech Republic 49.36 17.42 18 94 1,195  
Denmark 50.56 16.41 18 90 1,368  
Finland 46.04 16.45 15 75 1,189  
France 52.61 16.61 18 98 1,824  
Germany 48.96 17.06 18 94 1,107  
Great Britain 48.77 17.68 18 91 928 
Hungary 48.88 18.36 18 97 1,010  
Ireland 46.65 17.28 18 93 991  
Japan 49.91 17.78 16 96 1,231  
Latvia 44.59 16.63 18 74 1,069  
Netherlands 49.64 15.84 18 92 992  
Norway 46.85 15.66 18 79 1,330  
Poland 48.14 18.04 18 88 1,293  
Portugal 49.30 18.55 18 95 1,837  
Russia 44.69 18.48 16 90 2,407  
Slovenia 46.57 17.92 18 94 1,003  
Spain 47.24 17.83 18 97 2,515  
Sweden 48.11 16.04 17 79 1,194  
Switzerland 50.51 17.77 18 96 1,003  
United States 47.13 16.40 18 89 1,508  
Total 48.38 17.40 15 98 31,795 
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(15), Japan (16), Russia (16), Australia (17), and Sweden (17).  Overall, the mean age of 
respondents was 48.38 years, with a standard deviation of 17.40 years.  Within the 
samples, the average age of respondents varies from a low of 44.59 years in Latvia to 
52.61 years in France.  Within countries, the amount of variation ranges from a minimum 
standard deviation of 15.64 years in Canada to a maximum of 18.73 years in Croatia.   
Section 4.2.iv: Female 
Appendix H reveals that 44 respondents, or about 0.47%, provided no answer 
when asked about their sex.  Nearly all of these cases are in either Australia (27 people) 
or Canada (15 people).  These missing data slightly reduce the overall sample size from 
31,944 to 31,900.  The smallest number of respondents in the country samples is 918 in 
Canada, while the maximum is 2,754 in Australia.  Figure 7 provides the percentage 
distribution of the variable Female by country. 
 A closer inspection of Figure 7 indicates that there are more women than men in 
nearly all of the country samples.  The only exceptions are in France (44.4%), the 
Netherlands (46.1%), and Canada (49.2%).  It is noteworthy to point out that the share of 
women is over 55.0% in 8 countries including: Russia, Portugal, Latvia, Great Britain, 
Ireland, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, and Hungary. 
Section 4.2.v: Low education 
 Appendix I shows that there are 678, or 2.1%, invalid responses for the Low 
education variable.  These missing data reduce the sample size from 31,944 to 31,226.  
Cross-nationally, the percentage of invalid responses is less than 2.0% in each country 
sample with the exceptions of Denmark (6.1%), Finland (4.7%), and Sweden (2.4%).  
Notably, there are no missing data in Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, or Russia.  With  
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Figure 7. Percentage distribution of those female by country, % 
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respect to the sample size, the figures range from 914 cases in Canada to 2,728 in 
Australia.   
 The Low education variable is coded to reflect the educational attainment of those 
who took part in the survey.  Specifically, the variable includes those cases for which the 
respondent indicated that their highest level of education fell into one of the following 
three categories on a 6-point scale: (1)“no formal qualification, incomplete primary,” (2) 
“lowest formal qualification,” and (3) “above lowest qualification.”  Overall, 13,226 
respondents, or 41.9% of the pooled sample, are classified as possessing low educational 
attainment.      
Figure 8 reveals that the percentage of respondents with low educational 
attainment, as it is coded here, varies a great deal across the countries considered in this 
analysis.  Less than 25.0% of respondents are listed as having low educational attainment 
in eight countries: Denmark (12.1%), Canada (15.2%), the United States (16.4%), Latvia 
(18.1%), Russia (20.6%), Australia (20.9%), Norway (24.2%), and Japan (24.9%).  In 
contrast, over 60.0% of respondents are categorized as having low educational attainment 
in four countries, including Spain (61.2%), Switzerland (69.4%), Germany (74.8%), and 
Portugal (82.5%).  It is important to point out that educational attainment must always be 
considered in context, as educational systems tend to vary from one state to the next.  
However, ISSP coders have attempted to create categorizations of educational attainment 
that are comparable across different countries. 
Section 4.2.vi: Not employed 
 There are 456, invalid cases, or 1.4% of the pooled sample, for the Not employed 
variable (see Appendix J).  This decreases the overall sample size from 31,944 to 31,488.   
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Figure 8. Percentage distribution of low education by country, % 
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The percentage of invalid responses is less than 4.0% in each country sample with the 
exceptions of the Netherlands (6.0%) and Finland (4.4%).  Incidentally, there are no 
missing data in Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Russia, or Great Britain.  With respect 
to the sample size in each country, the number of cases range from 905 in Canada to 
2,701 in Australia.     
 The variable Not employed measures the economic status of the respondent vis-à-
vis their employment status.  To be not employed means that the respondent does not 
possess any employment, whether full-time or part-time.  In total, 13,767 respondents, or 
43.7% of the pooled sample, are classified as being not employed.  Figure 9 reveals that 
the percentage of respondents who are not employed varies somewhat across the 
countries examined.  Less than 35.0% of respondents are listed as being not employed in 
only two countries: Sweden (33.7%) and the United States (34.5%).  Alternatively, over 
50.0% of respondents are categorized as not working in four countries, including Croatia 
(58.4%), the Hungary (58.4%), Poland (51.7%), the Czech Republic (51.6%), and 
Germany (50.4%).  It is important to remember that the Not employed variable excludes 
those who are employed in any capacity.  Thus, the variable includes a number of people 
such as those who are unemployed, students, retired people, or the disabled, etc.   
Section 4.2.vii: Government employment 
 Appendix K indicates that there are 3,897 invalid responses for the Government 
employment variable, which reduce the overall sample size from 31,944 to 28,047, or 
12.2%.  Figure 10 indicates that the number of invalid cases is highest in Japan (39.1%), 
Croatia (24.6%), and Spain (19.9%).  It is lowest in Great Britain (3.3%), the United 
States (4.9%), and Switzerland (6.4%).    
93 
 
Figure 9. Percentage distribution of those not employed by country, % 
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Figure 10. Invalid responses for government employment by country, % 
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 Overall, 6,405 respondents report that they work for government, or 22.8% of 
those who offered valid responses.  Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of the 
Government employment variable across the countries considered in the analysis.  
Countries with the fewest respondents who say that they work for government include 
Hungary (4.6%), the Czech Republic (5.9%), and Japan (7.7%).  In sharp contrast, 
countries with the highest number of respondents who claim to be government workers 
include Russia (54.4%), Denmark (37.4%), and Norway (35.6%).      
Section 4.2.viii: Interpersonal trust 
 There are 1,250 invalid responses, or 3.9% of the pooled sample, for the variable 
Interpersonal trust (see Appendix L).  This decreases the overall sample size from 31,944 
to 30,694.  The percentage of invalid responses is less than 5.0% in each country sample, 
with the exceptions of Russia (12.2%), Sweden (7.5%), France (7.0%), and Japan (5.6%).  
The country sample sizes range from 900 cases in both Canada and Great Britain to 2,660 
in Australia.  Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the Interpersonal trust 
variable, which is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to measure the 
concept (see Chapter 3).  Index values range from 2 to 10.  Although, it bears mentioning 
that in the sample for Croatia, the maximum value observed was a 9.  The overall mean 
value for all respondents is 4.42, with a standard deviation of 1.88.  This indicates that the 
pooled distribution of index values is somewhat positively skewed.   
Cross-nationally, the average value for the index varies somewhat.  The lowest 
Interpersonal trust index scores are found in Hungary (3.36), Croatia (3.82), and Poland 
(3.88) – all former communistic countries.  Countries with the highest index values 
include Denmark (5.19), Switzerland (5.41), and Norway (5.19).  The standard deviations  
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Figure 11. Percentage distribution of government employment by country, % 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics: Interpersonal trust 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 4.38 1.86 2 10 2,660  
Canada 4.55 1.81 2 10 900  
Croatia 3.82 1.53 2 9 1,166  
Czech Republic 4.69 1.64 2 10 1,183  
Denmark 5.76 2.60 2 10 1,321  
Finland 4.98 2.13 2 10 1,130  
France 4.19 1.83 2 10 1,697  
Germany 4.47 1.82 2 10 1,065  
Great Britain 4.31 1.66 2 10 900 
Hungary 3.76 1.60 2 10 1,002  
Ireland 4.13 1.91 2 10  990  
Japan 4.49 2.17 2 10 1,162  
Latvia 4.35 1.56 2 10 1,021  
Netherlands 5.18 1.98 2 10 952  
Norway 5.19 1.88 2 10 1,300  
Poland 3.88 1.28 2 10 1,252  
Portugal 4.08 1.51 2 10 1,825  
Russia 4.04 1.56 2 10 2,113  
Slovenia 4.21 1.58 2 10 991  
Spain 3.94 1.68 2 10 2,451  
Sweden 5.02 1.99 2 10 1,105  
Switzerland 5.41 2.00 2 10 999  
United States 4.10 1.84 2 10 1,509  
Total 4.42 1.88 2 10 30,694  
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of the various country samples also vary from 1.28 in Poland to 2.60 in Denmark, 
indicating differing degrees of variance from one country to the next.    
Section 4.2.ix: Contact with others 
Appendix M shows that there are 883 or 2.8%, invalid responses for the variable 
Contact with others.  These missing data reduce the sample size from 31,944 to 31,061.  
Across countries, the percentage of invalid responses is less than 4.0% in each country 
sample, with the exceptions of Latvia (18.3%), Great Britain (5.3%), and Canada (4.8%).  
The country sample sizes range from 873 cases in Latvia to 2,684 in Australia.  Table 8 
offers the descriptive statistics for the Contact with others variable, which is an ordinal 
measure that summarizes the amount of interaction respondents have with others in a 
typical weekday.  The response scale includes five categories, ranging from “0-4 
persons” to “50 or more.”  Thus, index values range from 1 to 5.  
The overall mean value for all respondents is 2.73, with a standard deviation of 
1.21.  This indicates that the pooled distribution of index values is slightly negatively 
skewed.  Across countries, the average value for the correlate varies to some extent.  The 
lowest values for Contact with others are found in Hungary (2.06), Poland (2.24), and 
Latvia (2.37) – again, all former Eastern Bloc states.  Countries with the highest values 
include Ireland (3.08), Australia (3.08), and the Netherlands (3.05).  The standard 
deviations of the various country samples also vary slightly from 1.06 in Norway to 1.28 
in the United States. 
Section 4.2.x: Internal political efficacy 
 There are 2,654 invalid responses for the Internal political efficacy variable (see 
Appendix N).  This decreases the total pooled sample size from 31,944 to 29,654, or by  
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics: Contact with others 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 3.08 1.23 1 5 2,684 
Canada 3.02 1.28 1 5 888 
Croatia 2.42 1.10 1 5 1,154 
Czech Republic 2.61 1.18 1 5 1,189 
Denmark 2.64 1.13 1 5 1,333 
Finland 2.50 1.12 1 5 1,165 
France 2.86 1.17 1 5 1,774 
Germany 2.74 1.23 1 5 1,094 
Great Britain 2.96 1.28 1 5 881 
Hungary 2.06 1.13 1 5 1,005 
Ireland 3.08 1.25 1 5 998 
Japan 2.56 1.13 1 5 1,194 
Latvia 2.37 1.18 1 5 873 
Netherlands 3.05 1.16 1 5 961 
Norway 2.64 1.06 1 5 1,305 
Poland 2.24 1.18 1 5 1,267 
Portugal 3.03 1.17 1 5 1,803 
Russia 2.55 1.22 1 5 2,318 
Slovenia 2.42 1.16 1 5 989 
Spain 2.87 1.17 1 5 2,498 
Sweden 2.92 1.16 1 5 1,174 
Switzerland 2.69 1.17 1 5 1,000 
United States 2.92 1.28 1 5 1,514 
Total 2.73 1.21 1 5 31,061 
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8.3%.  Figure 12 indicates that the number of invalid cases is highest in Russia (18.2%), 
Japan (17.5%), and France (14.6%).  It is lowest in the United States (1.3%), Ireland 
(2.5%), and Spain (4.0%).  The country sample sizes range from 863 observations in 
Great Britain to 2,640 in Australia.    
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics for the Internal political efficacy 
variable, which is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to measure the 
concept (see Chapter 3).  Index values range from 2 to 10.  The overall mean value for all 
respondents is 6.16, with a standard deviation of 1.78.  This indicates that the pooled 
distribution of index values is negatively skewed.  Across countries, the average value for 
the index varies somewhat.  The lowest index values are found in Latvia (5.17), Portugal 
(5.43), and Russia (5.45).  Countries with the highest index values include Denmark 
(7.37), Australia (6.94), and Norway (6.81).  The standard deviations of the various 
country samples also vary slightly from 1.41 in Norway to 1.93 in the United States.   
Section 4.2.xi: External political efficacy 
Appendix O indicates that there are 1,730 invalid responses for the External 
political efficacy variable.  As a result, the total pooled sample size falls from 31,944 to 
30,214, or by 5.4%.  Similar to Internal political efficacy, Figure 13 illustrates that the 
number of invalid cases for the External political efficacy variable is highest again in 
Russia (10.3%), Japan (9.3%), and France (9.5%).  However, it is lowest in the United 
States (1.4%), Hungary (1.5%), and Switzerland (2.3%). The country sample sizes range 
from 880 cases in Great Britain to 2,653 in Australia.      
The descriptive statistics for the External political efficacy variable are presented 
in Table 10.  This variable is an index of responses to two questions that attempt to  
101 
 
Figure 12. Invalid responses for internal political efficacy by country % 
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics: Internal political efficacy 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 6.94 1.47 2 10 2,640 
Canada 6.77 1.64 2 10 877 
Croatia 5.77 1.87 2 10 1,097 
Czech Republic 5.85 1.69 2 10 1,135 
Denmark 7.37 1.73 2 10 1,265 
Finland 6.14 1.69 2 10 1,034 
France 5.83 1.54 2 10 1,558 
Germany 6.28 1.89 2 10 1,006 
Great Britain 6.63 1.47 2 10 863 
Hungary 5.75 1.76 2 10 964 
Ireland 6.58 1.90 2 10 976 
Japan 5.80 1.58 2 10 1,016 
Latvia 5.17 1.51 2 10 929 
Netherlands 6.76 1.49 2 10 924 
Norway 6.81 1.41 2 10 1,237 
Poland 5.63 1.60 2 10 1,213 
Portugal 5.43 1.81 2 10 1,754 
Russia 5.45 1.54 2 10 1,968 
Slovenia 5.65 1.72 2 10 930 
Spain 5.76 1.88 2 10 2,416 
Sweden 6.59 1.49 2 10 1,029 
Switzerland 6.31 1.76 2 10 961 
United States 6.57 1.93 2 10 1,498 
Total 6.16 1.78 2 10 29,290 
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measure the concept (see Chapter 3).  Just as before with Internal political efficacy, the 
index values range from 2 to 10.  The overall mean value for all respondents is 5.03, with 
a standard deviation of 1.98.  The mean for the index varies somewhat across countries.  
The lowest index values are found in Croatia (4.00), Hungary (4.05), and Latvia (4.14).  
In contrast, countries with the highest index values include Japan (6.94), France (6.47), 
and Switzerland (6.03).  Also, the standard deviations of the various country samples 
vary somewhat from 1.58 in Latvia to 2.13 in the United States. 
Section 4.2.xii: Trust in civil servants 
 There are 1,973 invalid cases for the variable Trust in civil servants (see 
Appendix P).  This missing data reduces the number of valid observations from 31,944 to 
29,971, or by 6.1%.  Figure 14 shows that the number of invalid cases is highest in 
Russia (11.1%), Latvia (10.0%), and Spain (9.2%).  The number is lowest in the United 
States (1.6%), the Czech Republic (2.1%), and Ireland (2.8%).  The country sample sizes 
range from 867 observations in Great Britain to 2,671 in Australia.         
In total, 7,816 respondents indicate that they either “agree” or “strongly agree” 
that “most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.”  This amounts 
to approximately 26.1% of the total number of respondents in the pooled sample.  The 
distribution of the Trust in civil servants variable across the countries considered in the 
analysis is illustrated in Figure 15.  Countries with the fewest trusting respondents 
include Russia (8.6%), Japan (10.6%), and Croatia (10.8%).  Alternatively, countries with 
the highest number of people who indicate trust in civil servants include Ireland (56.7%), 
Denmark (56.5%), and Switzerland (52.9%).   A quick glance at the ordering of  
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Figure 13. Invalid responses for external political efficacy by country, % 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics: External political efficacy 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 5.12 1.83 2 10 2,653 
Canada 5.27 1.90 2 10 887 
Croatia 4.00 1.71 2 10 1,128 
Czech Republic 4.20 1.66 2 10 1,173 
Denmark 5.82 2.08 2 10 1,298 
Finland 4.71 1.94 2 10 1,128 
France 6.47 1.88 2 10 1,651 
Germany 4.62 1.77 2 10 1,069 
Great Britain 4.98 1.64 2 10 880 
Hungary 4.05 1.77 2 10 995 
Ireland 5.18 1.97 2 10 978 
Japan 6.94 1.96 2 10 1,116 
Latvia 4.14 1.58 2 10 1,000 
Netherlands 4.97 1.75 2 10 950 
Norway 5.36 1.83 2 10 1,297 
Poland 4.27 1.76 2 10 1,246 
Portugal 5.08 1.93 2 10 1,731 
Russia 4.14 1.68 2 10 2,158 
Slovenia 4.24 1.60 2 10 971 
Spain 5.07 1.90 2 10 2,326 
Sweden 5.04 1.78 2 10 1103 
Switzerland 6.03 1.72 2 10 980 
United States 5.58 2.13 2 10 1,496 
Total 5.03 1.98 2 10 30,214 
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Figure 14. Invalid responses for trust in civil servants by country, % 
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Figure 15. Percentage distribution of trust in civil servants by country, % 
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states in Figure 15 seems to suggest that trust in civil servants tends to be higher in 
developed countries and lower among those that are transitioning democracies.       
Section 4.2.xiii: Perception of governmental performance 
There are 5,340 invalid responses for the Perception of governmental 
performance variable (see Appendix Q).  This decreases the total sample size from 
31,944 to 26,604, or by 16.7%.  Figure 16 indicates that the number of invalid cases is 
highest in Croatia (32.3%), Sweden (26.0%), and Poland (22.1%).  The amount of 
missing data is lowest in the United States (7.2%), the Czech Republic (7.9%), and 
Switzerland (10.1%).  The country sample sizes range from 812 cases in Croatia to 2,468 
in Australia once the missing data is omitted. 
The descriptive statistics for the Perception of governmental performance 
variable are presented in Table 11.  Remember that this particular variable is created from 
responses to a battery of questions that asks how successful government is with respect to 
six areas of public policy.  Responses to these questions are used to generate factor scores 
with values ranging from -2.33 to 2.58.  The overall mean for all cases is 3.67E-9, and the 
overall standard deviation is 0.89.  Cross-nationally, the average factor score varies from 
one country to the next.  The lowest country means are found in Croatia (-0.65), Portugal 
(-0.56), and Russia (-0.56).  In contrast, countries with the highest mean factor scores 
include Switzerland (0.84), Denmark (0.50), and Finland (0.34).  The standard deviations 
of the various country samples vary somewhat from 0.66 in Switzerland to 0.94 in 
Russia. 
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Figure 16. Invalid responses for perception of performance by country, % 
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics: Perception of performance 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Australia 0.32 0.76 -2.33 2.58 2,468 
Canada 0.26 0.71 -2.33 2.23 766 
Croatia -0.65 0.84 -2.33 1.70 812 
Czech Republic -0.04 0.82 -2.33 2.58 1,106 
Denmark 0.50 0.81 -2.33 2.58 1,150 
Finland 0.34 0.78 -2.33 2.40 963 
France 0.07 0.80 -2.33 2.58 1,608 
Germany 0.24 0.81 -2.33 2.58 942 
Great Britain 0.03 0.90 -2.33 2.58 827 
Hungary -0.15 0.75 -2.33 2.58 849 
Ireland -0.11 0.88 -2.33 2.10 867 
Japan -0.31 0.81 -2.33 2.58 961 
Latvia -0.39 0.79 -2.33 2.58 854 
Netherlands 0.09 0.69 -2.33 2.58 863 
Norway 0.13 0.78 -2.33 2.58 1,101 
Poland -0.21 0.84 -2.33 2.58 1,007 
Portugal -0.56 0.84 -2.33 2.58 1,491 
Russia -0.56 0.94 -2.33 2.58 1,895 
Slovenia 0.09 0.66 -2.33 2.18 858 
Spain 0.20 0.81 -2.33 2.58 2,021 
Sweden -0.10 0.86 -2.33 2.58 884 
Switzerland 0.84 0.66 -1.55 2.58 902 
United States -0.07 0.91 -2.33 2.58 1,409 
Total 3.67E-10 0.89 -2.33 2.58 26,604 
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Section 4.2.xiv: Summary 
 The preceding descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables 
reveal a number of significant and interesting findings.  With respect to public support for 
social welfare policies, indeed there is variance both within countries, as well between 
countries.  Based on the factor scores generated to indicate social welfare policy support, 
it appears that more supportive views tend to be found in states in Eastern and Southern 
Europe.  Lower levels of support seem to be more prevalent in countries located in North 
America, as well as in Western Europe.  People living in Northern Europe appear to be 
located somewhere in between, generally speaking.   
 In terms of the independent correlates of social welfare policy support, the 
descriptive statistics presented in this section indicate that there is variation, at times 
substantial, across the 23 countries considered in this study.  The prevalence of 
individuals holding leftist political party affiliations is highest in France at 54.3% and 
lowest in Japan at 2.8%.  In contrast, the number of people belonging to a right political 
party varies from 46.9% in Hungary to 0.6% in Ireland.  Overall, the average age of 
respondents in the ISSP surveys is 48.4 years with a standard deviation of 17.4 years.   
On average, there are more female respondents than males across countries, 
although there are some key exceptions.  Low educational attainment varies 
tremendously cross-nationally with a low of 12.1% in Denmark and a high of 82.5% in 
Portugal.  The variable not working also fluctuates from 33.7% of respondents in Sweden 
to 58.4% in Croatia.  The number of individuals who are employed by government also 
varies considerably from 4.6% in Hungary to 54.4% in Russia.   
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With respect to the socio-psychological correlates, there is also a great deal of 
variation.  Respondents of Hungary, Croatia, and Poland are the most interpersonally 
trusting, while people living in Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway are the least.  
Respondents who indicate they have the most contact with others tend to be located in 
Ireland, Australia, and the Netherlands.  Meanwhile, those with the least amount of 
contact with others seem to be concentrated in Hungary, Poland, and Latvia.  Measures of 
internal political efficacy appear to be highest in Denmark, Australia, and Norway.  
Countries with the lowest levels include Latvia, Portugal, and Russia.  With respect to 
external political efficacy, the greatest levels are witnessed in Japan, France, and 
Switzerland.  Alternatively, the smallest amounts appear in Croatia, Hungary, and Latvia.      
Overall, 26.1% of respondents in the ISSP surveys indicated that they “agree” or 
“strongly agree” that civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for their country.  
The percentage varies from 8.6% of respondents in Russia to 56.7% of those in Ireland.  
Finally, the factor scores generated to measure public perceptions of governmental 
performance indicate that government is viewed most successfully by people in 
Switzerland, Denmark, and Finland and least successful in Croatia, Portugal, and Russia.  
Overall, it appears that perceptions of governmental performance are strongest in 
developed democracies and weakest in transitioning states located in Eastern Europe.         
Section 4.3: Individual-level regression models 
 In this section, OLS regression models for each of the 23 countries for which 
sample data is available will be examined in order to determine the predictors of public 
support for social welfare policies.  The primary research question that this section 
addresses pertains to what attributes and attitudes at the individual-level correlate with 
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social welfare policy support.  Not only am I concerned with assessing the extent to 
which social welfare policy support is determined by similar variables across different 
countries, but, more specifically, I am also interested in determining how people’s 
attitudes toward the public sector compare with the more traditional correlates of social 
welfare policy support. 
 Tables 12-17 report distinct OLS regression models for each of the 23 countries 
considered in this dissertation.  The dependent variable is a measure of public support for 
social welfare policies created by generating factor scores from a battery of questions in 
the ISSP’s 2006 “Role of Government IV” module.  The questions in this battery 
specifically concern the degree to which government has a responsibility to provide 
differing forms of social welfare policies.  The models are estimated using the statistics 
package Stata 12.  Model diagnostics indicate that heteroskedasticity is present in 15 out 
of 23 country models (see Appendix R).  For this reason, and in order to be consistent, all 
23 country-specific models are estimated using robust standard errors.  The variance 
inflation factors were calculated for each correlate in the various country-specific models.  
Multicollinearity is only problematic for the Left and Right political party affiliation 
variables in the model for Hungary.  This is likely due to the lack of a sizable reference 
category for that particular country sample and may account for the variable’s lack of 
statistical significance.     
 In terms of the different models, the sample size for each country varies from 404 
(Latvia) to 1,778 (Australia).  In most cases, the sample size for each of the models has 
decreased as a result of missing data attributed to the Left and Right political party 
affiliation variables.  The F statistic for all 23 models is statistically significant.  This 
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suggests that each of the country-specific models, respectively, fit the data statistically 
better than a model with no predictors.  With respect to explained variance, the R
2
 values 
are provided for each of the models.  Variation in the dependent variable is best explained 
in France (0.3213), Latvia (0.3040), and the United States (0.2840).  In contrast, the 
lowest R
2
 values are observed in Spain (0.0491), Ireland (0.0847), and Switzerland 
(0.0870). 
Interestingly, the analyses reveal that there are considerable differences in the 
efficacy of the different variables based on the particular country that is examined.  In 
terms of socio-demographic attributes, there is reason to believe that political attitudes 
condition opinions on social welfare policies.  On the one hand, respondents who are 
affiliated with left-leaning political parties are more likely to be supportive of welfare 
policies in 13 out of 23 countries.  On the other hand, respondents who identify with 
right-leaning political parties are more likely to be opposed to social welfare policies in 
13 countries.  However, it should be noted that in both Poland and Russia, being a 
member of a right-leaning political party is positively associated with support for welfare 
policies when compared to the centrist/nonpartisan reference group.  Taken together, 
these results suggest that one’s political party affiliation does matter a great deal in 
determining individual’s support for welfare policies, consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Zagórski 1999). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that people take their own self-interest into 
account with respect to their support for social welfare policies, although the results are 
somewhat mixed.  Age is statistically significant in 6 out of 23 countries and is signed in 
the expected positive direction, with the exception of the United States.  Being female is 
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an influential predictor of support for social welfare policies in 12 countries.  People who 
report having lower levels of education are more likely to support social welfare policies 
in 13 out of 23 countries.  Likewise, being a member of the workforce is statistically 
significant in 11 countries.  However, it appears that being a government employee is not 
as powerful a predictor of support for social welfare policies cross-nationally, being 
statistically significant in only 4 countries (the Czech Republic, Demark, the Netherlands, 
and Poland).   
Overall, these results suggest that those people who are more economically 
vulnerable, and thus more likely to benefit from welfare policies - older respondents, 
females, and people with low levels of education - are more likely to be supportive of 
welfare policies.  The same is true for those who are not currently in the labor force, 
albeit in a smaller subset of countries.  Similarly, government employees, who are 
dependent on the welfare state’s mission for their continued employment, are also more 
likely to support social welfare policies in a handful of states.  
In terms of the socio-psychological correlates, as hypothesized, respondents with 
higher levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to support welfare policies than those 
with lower levels.  This relationship is observed in 13 out of 23 countries.  The frequency 
of contact a person has with others on a daily basis has a negative relationship with 
support for social welfare policies in 8 countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and the United States).  Taken together, these findings lend 
some support to the theory that people who maintain a strong social network do not see a 
pressing need for expansive government (Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Gërxhani and 
116 
 
Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Rather, they are more likely to rely on each other 
in times of crisis (Coleman 1990; Welch et al. 2005). 
It was hypothesized that people who feel more politically empowered are less 
likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than those who are not.  Both those 
respondents who are confident in their knowledge about government and politics (i.e., 
internal political efficacy), as well as those who believe that they can influence the 
political system (i.e., external political efficacy) express lower levels of support for social 
welfare policies than those who do not.  People with higher levels of political efficacy 
may not see the need for welfare state policies because they are satisfied with the status 
quo.  However, it should be noted that the influence of these two variables is somewhat 
weak.  Internal political efficacy is significant in only seven countries (Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Spain, Switzerland and the United States).  External political 
efficacy is significant in eight countries, (Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States).  However, it bears mentioning that in Japan 
the effect is positive.   
The analysis reveals that respondents’ attitudes toward government do in fact 
influence their public policy preferences.  People who are trusting of civil servants are 
more likely to support welfare policies than those who are not as trusting.  A positive 
relationship is found in 11 countries (Australia, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United States).  
This finding is consistent with Gabriel and Trüdinger’s (2011) assertion that trusting 
citizens perceive political actors to be honest and fair, and are, as a result, are more likely 
to approve of government policies.   
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In stark contrast, respondents who perceive government to be performing well are 
less likely to be supportive of social welfare policies than those who see it as performing 
poorly.  In 14 out of 23 countries, a negative relationship exists.  Overall, it appears that 
public sector performance may have a “crowding out” effect, similar to the relationship 
between political efficacy, as well as interpersonal trust and contact with others, and 
support for social welfare policies.  Respondents who see government as performing well 
are less likely to perceive a need for social welfare policies, and thus are less likely to 
believe that providing aid to society’s most vulnerable is a responsibility of government, 
consistent with the implications of “overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and 
Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007).          
 In sum, public attitudes toward social welfare policies vary both within countries 
and between countries.  The OLS models indicate that explanations for public support for 
social welfare policies are often context-dependent.  A cursory glance of the estimates 
show that certain variables tend to be more influential in some countries and less useful 
in others.  The results also demonstrate that variation in social welfare policy preferences 
is not only a function of people’s personal attributes, personality traits, and political 
attitudes – as indicated by the literature, but also of their views towards governmental 
actors and the quality of the work they perform in the public sector.  These results lend 
support to the hypotheses that people’s opinions concerning social welfare policies are 
influenced by both trust in the civil service and perceptions of public sector performance.      
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Table 12. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Australia, Canada, 
Croatia, Czech Republic) 
 
 
Australia Canada Croatia 
Czech 
Republic 
     
     Socio-demographic correlates:     
Left political party 
0.2280*** 
(0.05) 
0.2963*** 
(0.11) 
0.0137 
(0.11) 
0.2646*** 
(0.09) 
Right political party 
-0.3700*** 
(0.05) 
-0.2532*** 
(0.09) 
-0.0291 
(0.08) 
-0.4490*** 
(0.08) 
Age 
0.0019 
(0.00) 
0.0023 
(0.00) 
0.0009 
(0.00) 
-0.0016 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.1709*** 
(0.04) 
0.1489* 
(0.08) 
-0.0203 
(0.07) 
0.0119 
(0.07) 
Low education 
0.0797 
(0.05) 
0.4026*** 
(0.12) 
0.1197 
(0.08) 
0.1357* 
(0.07) 
Not employed 
0.1431*** 
 (0.04) 
0.0619 
 (0.11) 
0.2156*** 
 (0.09) 
0.3614*** 
 (0.09) 
Government employment 
0.0715
 
(0.05) 
-0.0639
 
(0.09) 
-0.0422
 
(0.13) 
0.2549**
 
(0.13) 
     
Socio-psychological correlates:     
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0231** 
(0.01) 
-0.0334 
(0.02) 
-0.0369 
(0.03) 
-0.0753*** 
(0.02) 
Contact with others 
-0.0635*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0534 
(0.04) 
-0.0027 
(0.04) 
-0.0274 
(0.04) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0102 
(0.01) 
-0.0079 
(0.03) 
0.0179 
(0.02) 
-0.0318 
(0.02) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0056 
(0.01) 
-0.0234 
(0.02) 
-0.0824*** 
(0.02) 
0.0161 
(0.02) 
     
Attitudes toward government     
Trust in civil servants 
0.0928** 
(0.04) 
0.2830*** 
(0.09) 
0.2036** 
(0.10) 
0.3562*** 
(0.10) 
Perception of performance 
-0.1162*** 
(0.03) 
-0.0579 
(0.06) 
-0.1027** 
(0.05) 
-0.1340*** 
(0.04) 
 
 
  
 
Constant 
-0.1295 
(0.13) 
-0.1681 
(0.28) 
0.5717** 
(0.23) 
-0.0430 
(0.26) 
     
N 1,778 492 407 656 
F 30.08*** 5.46*** 4.48*** 15.12*** 
R
2 
0.1733 0.1213 0.1247 0.2344 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 13. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany) 
 
 
Denmark Finland France Germany 
     
     Socio-demographic correlates:     
Left political party 
0.4747*** 
(0.08) 
0.1814** 
(0.08) 
0.7034*** 
(0.09) 
0.3480*** 
(0.10) 
Right political party 
-0.2485*** 
(0.08) 
-0.4424*** 
(0.09) 
-0.0523 
(0.10) 
-0.0031 
(0.10) 
Age 
0.0023 
(0.00) 
0.0012 
(0.00) 
0.0058** 
(0.00) 
-0.0016 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.0892 
(0.06) 
0.2490*** 
(0.07) 
0.2716*** 
(0.06) 
0.0194 
(0.08) 
Low education 
0.0559 
(0.12) 
0.2134*** 
(0.08) 
0.2723*** 
(0.06) 
0.0513 
(0.09) 
Not employed 
-0.0038 
 (0.06) 
0.1836** 
 (0.08) 
0.1313* 
 (0.08) 
0.1991* 
 (0.10) 
Government employment 
0.1851***
 
(0.06) 
0.0984
 
(0.08) 
0.0740
 
(0.06) 
-0.0840
 
(0.11) 
     
Socio-psychological correlates:     
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0042 
(0.01) 
-0.0033 
(0.02) 
-0.0270* 
(0.01) 
-0.0598*** 
(0.02) 
Contact with others 
-0.0561** 
(0.03) 
-0.0901*** 
(0.03) 
0.0182 
(0.03) 
0.0264 
(0.04) 
Internal political efficacy 
0.0046 
(0.02) 
0.0079 
(0.02) 
-0.0168 
(0.02) 
-0.0886*** 
(0.02) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0021 
(0.01) 
-0.0305 
(0.02) 
0.0186 
(0.01) 
-0.0426* 
(0.02) 
     
Attitudes toward government     
Trust in civil servants 
0.1898*** 
(0.06) 
0.0570 
(0.08) 
0.0894 
(0.07) 
0.2798*** 
(0.09) 
Perception of performance 
-0.0498 
(0.04) 
-0.1324*** 
(0.05) 
-0.1900*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0894 
(0.05) 
 
 
  
 
Constant 
-0.3508* 
(0.20) 
-0.0467 
(0.24) 
-1.0433*** 
(0.25) 
0.2391 
(0.29) 
     
N 749 505 804 526 
F 20.89*** 12.74*** 32.33*** 6.30*** 
R
2 
0.2432 0.2477 0.3213 0.1379 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 14. OLS regression models: Social Welfare Policy Support (Great Britain, 
Hungary, Ireland, Japan) 
 
 
Great Britain Hungary Ireland Japan 
     
     Socio-demographic correlates:     
Left political party 
0.0425 
(0.08) 
0.2774 
(0.22) 
0.0832 
(0.09) 
0.2568 
(0.25) 
Right political party 
-0.3160*** 
(0.09) 
0.3017 
(0.23) 
-0.1778 
(0.27) 
-0.2632** 
(0.12) 
Age 
0.0047* 
(0.00) 
-0.0010 
(0.00) 
0.0015 
(0.00) 
0.0059 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.1944*** 
(0.07) 
0.1291** 
(0.06) 
0.0929* 
(0.05) 
0.0766 
(0.10) 
Low education 
0.1347* 
(0.07) 
0.1502** 
(0.07) 
0.1511** 
(0.06) 
0.1524 
(0.17) 
Not employed 
0.2254*** 
 (0.08) 
0.1988** 
 (0.08) 
0.0189 
 (0.06) 
-0.0190 
 (0.19) 
Government employment 
-0.0139
 
(0.07) 
-0.0646
 
(0.14) 
0.0893
 
(0.06) 
0.1521
 
(0.15) 
     
Socio-psychological correlates:     
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0223 
(0.02) 
-0.0669*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0153 
(0.01) 
-0.0081 
(0.02) 
Contact with others 
0.0057 
(0.03) 
-0.0623** 
(0.02) 
-0.0424* 
(0.03) 
0.0147 
(0.05) 
Internal political efficacy 
0.0045 
(0.03) 
-0.0599*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0107 
(0.01) 
-0.0460 
(0.03) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0027 
(0.02) 
-0.0346** 
(0.02) 
-0.0098 
(0.01) 
0.0539** 
(0.03) 
     
Attitudes toward government     
Trust in civil servants 
-0.0133 
(0.08) 
0.0515 
(0.08) 
-0.0033 
(0.05) 
-0.0465 
(0.16) 
Perception of performance 
0.0175 
(0.04) 
-0.1515*** 
(0.04) 
-0.1219*** 
(0.03) 
-0.2979*** 
(0.08) 
 
 
  
 
Constant 
-0.5610** 
(0.24) 
0.4528 
(0.28) 
0.4441** 
(0.18) 
-1.2627*** 
(0.32) 
     
N 584 478 683 440 
F 4.59*** 9.25*** 4.89*** 4.00*** 
R
2 
0.1061 0.1969 0.0847 0.1087 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 15. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland) 
 
 
Latvia 
The 
Netherlands 
Norway Poland 
     
     Socio-demographic correlates:     
Left political party 
0.0500 
(0.11) 
0.3190*** 
(0.07) 
0.2537*** 
(0.08) 
0.0217 
(0.10) 
Right political party 
-0.1009 
(0.13) 
-0.3053*** 
(0.08) 
-0.1161 
(0.07) 
0.1659* 
(0.09) 
Age 
0.0053 
(0.00) 
0.0067** 
(0.00) 
0.0061*** 
(0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.0881 
(0.08) 
0.1425** 
(0.07) 
0.1699*** 
(0.06) 
0.0132 
(0.08) 
Low education 
0.1366 
(0.12) 
0.3123*** 
(0.07) 
0.2499*** 
(0.07) 
0.2134** 
(0.08) 
Not employed 
0.0348 
 (0.10) 
0.1763* 
 (0.09) 
0.1692*** 
 (0.06) 
0.1260 
 (0.10) 
Government employment 
-0.0550
 
(0.11) 
0.2358***
 
(0.08) 
0.0749
 
(0.05) 
0.1836*
 
(0.10) 
     
Socio-psychological correlates:     
Interpersonal trust 
-0.1084*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0426** 
(0.03) 
-0.0039 
(0.02) 
-0.0645* 
(0.03) 
Contact with others 
-0.1206*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0450 
(0.03) 
-0.0230 
(0.03) 
-0.0117 
(0.04) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.1193*** 
(0.03) 
0.0036 
(0.02) 
-0.0278 
(0.02) 
-0.0916*** 
(0.03) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0295 
(0.03) 
0.0205 
(0.02) 
-0.0278 
(0.02) 
-0.0524** 
(0.02) 
     
Attitudes toward government     
Trust in civil servants 
-0.0339 
(0.09) 
0.1371* 
(0.07) 
0.1046* 
(0.06) 
0.2394** 
(0.10) 
Perception of performance 
-0.2733*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0898* 
(0.05) 
-0.0132 
(0.04) 
-0.1238*** 
(0.05) 
 
 
  
 
Constant 
1.0267*** 
(0.26) 
-0.7231*** 
(0.24) 
-0.1440 
(0.23) 
0.9093*** 
(0.32) 
     
N 404 602 733 482 
F 13.08*** 19.09*** 7.31*** 6.08*** 
R
2 
0.3040 0.2741 0.1381 0.1308 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 16. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Portugal, Russia, 
Slovenia, Spain) 
 
 
Portugal Russia Slovenia Spain 
     
     Socio-demographic correlates:     
Left political party 
0.0381 
(0.05) 
0.2281*** 
(0.07) 
-0.0029 
(0.08) 
0.0591 
(0.04) 
Right political party 
0.0228 
(0.22) 
0.1554* 
(0.08) 
0.0609 
(0.09) 
-0.2491*** 
(0.08) 
Age 
0.0033** 
(0.00) 
-0.0003 
(0.00) 
0.0025 
(0.00) 
0.0026 
(0.00) 
Female 
-0.0075 
(0.04) 
0.0582 
(0.05) 
0.0842 
(0.06) 
0.1149*** 
(0.04) 
Low education 
-0.0250 
(0.06) 
0.0841 
(0.07) 
0.2552*** 
(0.07) 
0.0674 
(0.05) 
Not employed 
0.0147 
 (0.06) 
0.1012 
 (0.07) 
0.1571* 
 (0.09) 
0.0392 
 (0.06) 
Government employment 
-0.0273
 
(0.06) 
0.0341
 
(0.05) 
0.0408
 
(0.10) 
-0.0110
 
(0.07) 
     
Socio-psychological correlates:     
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0018 
(0.01) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0546** 
(0.02) 
-0.0402*** 
(0.01) 
Contact with others 
0.0572*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0045 
(0.03) 
-0.0365 
(0.03) 
0.0166 
(0.02) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0223 
(0.01) 
0.0143 
(0.02) 
-0.0345 
(0.02) 
-0.0244** 
(0.01) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0169 
(0.01) 
0.0043 
(0.02) 
-0.0093 
(0.02) 
0.0026 
(0.01) 
     
Attitudes toward government     
Trust in civil servants 
0.0752 
(0.05) 
0.0651 
(0.11) 
0.0865 
(0.08) 
0.0153 
(0.05) 
Perception of performance 
-0.2278*** 
(0.03) 
-0.2283*** 
(0.03) 
-0.0630 
(0.05) 
-0.0018 
(0.03) 
 
 
  
 
Constant 
0.2568 
(0.16) 
0.1333 
(0.17) 
0.5367** 
(0.22) 
0.5033*** 
(0.14) 
     
N 987 802 470 1,155 
F 9.65*** 6.19*** 5.75*** 4.76*** 
R
2 
0.1019 0.1072 0.1476 0.0491 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 17. OLS regression models: Social welfare policy support (Sweden, 
Switzerland, United States) 
 
 
Sweden Switzerland United States 
    
     Socio-demographic correlates:    
Left political party 
0.1723** 
(0.08) 
0.2038*** 
(0.07) 
0.3072*** 
(0.06) 
Right political party 
-0.5554*** 
(0.10) 
-0.1457** 
(0.07) 
-0.4019*** 
(0.07) 
Age 
0.0034 
(0.00) 
-0.0034 
(0.00) 
-0.0144*** 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.0698 
(0.08) 
0.1155** 
(0.06) 
0.2188*** 
(0.05) 
Low education 
0.2275*** 
(0.08) 
-0.0085 
(0.06) 
0.5082*** 
(0.08) 
Not employed 
0.2452** 
 (0.10) 
0.0741 
 (0.08) 
0.1810*** 
 (0.07) 
Government employment 
0.1076
 
(0.08) 
0.1027
 
(0.06) 
0.0669
 
(0.07) 
    
Socio-psychological correlates:    
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0271 
(0.02) 
-0.0308** 
(0.01) 
-0.0643*** 
(0.01) 
Contact with others 
0.0103 
(0.04) 
-0.0109 
(0.03) 
-0.0558** 
(0.02) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0274 
(0.03) 
-0.0410** 
(0.02) 
-0.0680*** 
(0.01) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0427* 
(0.02) 
-0.0432*** 
(0.02) 
-0.0308** 
(0.01) 
    
Attitudes toward government    
Trust in civil servants 
0.1684* 
(0.10) 
-0.0015 
(0.06) 
0.0997* 
(0.06) 
Perception of performance 
-0.0354 
(0.05) 
-0.0402 
(0.05) 
-0.2278*** 
(0.03) 
 
 
  
Constant 
-0.1489 
(0.28) 
0.1358 
(0.19) 
1.0139*** 
(0.15) 
    
N 582 704 1,232 
F 10.60*** 5.43*** 39.29*** 
R
2 
0.2050 0.0870 0.2840 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Section 4.4: Summary 
 This chapter has examined the phenomenon of public support for social welfare 
policies via both a descriptive analysis, as well as through the estimation of a series of 
country-specific regression models.  The investigation reveals that the dependent variable 
varies considerably among respondents both within countries and between countries.  
People residing in Portugal, Spain, Croatia, and Russia are, on average, the most 
supportive of social welfare policies.  Alternatively, individuals in Japan, Switzerland, 
the Czech Republic, and the United States are the least supportive.  The data suggests that 
people living in states in Southern and Eastern Europe are likely to harbor greater levels 
of support, while those in Western Europe and North America are comparatively less 
likely to hold supportive attitudes.  Individuals who live in Northern Europe, on average, 
have a tendency to be placed somewhere between these two extremes.    
The regression analyses conducted in this chapter at the individual-level indicate 
that support for social welfare policies is a reflection of peoples’ socio-demographic 
attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public sector.  However, 
these results are not necessarily uniform across all countries, as certain variables are more 
or less influential given the national context.  These findings generally confirm that both 
political ideology and self-interest considerably influence social welfare policy attitudes.  
Still, the analysis also suggests that levels of interpersonal trust, the frequency of contact 
with others, and both internal, as well as external, political efficacy play important roles 
as well.  Notably, both trust in civil servants and perceptions of governmental 
performance also influence public support for social welfare policies, lending credence to 
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the key thesis of this dissertation that public attitudes toward the public sector are 
noticeably influential in explaining the phenomena.     
Several implications can be drawn from this examination.  First, the existing 
literature on the topic of individual’s social welfare policy attitudes is largely confirmed.  
Second, national context does appear to matter in explaining social welfare policy 
preferences, as the explanatory power of the variables differs from one country to the 
next when considered cross-nationally.  Finally, people’s views toward the public sector 
do appear to shape how they come to assess government’s level of responsibility in 
solving societal problems. 
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CHAPTER V 
EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICIES: COUNTRY-LEVEL CORRELATES AND  
MULTILEVEL MODELS 
 
 Whereas the previous chapter explored the individual-level correlates of support 
for social welfare policies, this chapter examines possible influences at the country-level.  
Particularly, this chapter considers the research question: Does national context account 
for variation across countries in terms of the level of support?  In addition, the question of 
whether the public sector plays a role in determining social welfare policy support will 
also be investigated.  In order to answer these questions, this chapter unfolds via a 
sequence of incremental steps.  First, a descriptive analysis of the country-level variables 
included in this analysis will be given.  Next, scatter plots will be provided which will 
help to illustrate the relationship between these correlates and the mean factor score for 
the dependent variable in the 23 country samples examined in this dissertation.  Finally, a 
series of multilevel regression models will be estimated and inspected in order to assess 
how useful country-level predictors are in explaining support for social welfare policies 
in addition to variables at the individual-level.     
Section 5.1: Descriptive analysis of the country-level variables 
 In this section, each of the country-level variables is examined via the 
presentation of descriptive statistics.  Overall, this segment attempts to provide a better 
understanding of how the correlates considered vary across the countries included in the 
analysis.  First, the classification of countries with respect to their welfare regime type 
will be given.  Then, the economic conditions and levels of inequality for the range of 
countries included will be assessed.  Finally, variations in the quality of government 
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institutions will be considered cross-nationally.  In order to accomplish this, the mean, the 
standard deviation, as well as the minimum and maximum values for each correlate is 
provided.  Additionally, the distribution of the country-level variables will be illustrated 
where appropriate.    
 For this dissertation, the characteristics of 23 countries in Europe, North America, 
Eastern Asia, and Oceania are examined (see Appendix B for a comprehensive list of 
countries).  Table 18 gives the descriptive statistics for the country-level variables used in 
this analysis.  
        
Table 18. Descriptive statistics: Country-level variables 
Country-level variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Scandinavian regime 0.13 0.34 0 1 23 
Continental regime 0.26 0.45 0 1 23 
English-speaking regime 0.30 0.47 0 1 23 
Post-communist regime 0.30 0.47 0 1 23 
GDP per capita (PPP), thousand USD 32.78 10.69 16.65 54.69 23 
Unemployment, % 6.35 2.18 3.40 11.10 23 
Inflation, % 4.00 4.60 -1.12 20.13 23 
Gini index 29.94 4.65 23.07 40.80 23 
Government effectiveness 1.36 0.66 -0.38 2.24 23 
 
 
Section 5.1.i: Welfare regime type  
The first four country-level variables reflect the welfare regime typology into 
which the different countries in this study are classified.  Recall from Chapter 2 that 
cross-national support for social welfare policies may be the result of differences in the 
institutional characteristics of social welfare institutions (Jakobsen 2011; Larsen 2008; 
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Svallfors 1997).  It has been hypothesized that these institutions transform the political 
system, and thus may influence public opinion (Jordan 2010; Mettler and Soss 2004).  
The classification scheme used in this dissertation follows that which is suggested by 
Castles and Obinger (2008) (see chapter 3 for more information).  Table 19 reflects this 
coding.  In the multilevel models presented later in this chapter, these welfare regimes are 
included as dichotomous variables.      
Section 5.1.ii: Economic conditions 
 The second set of country-level correlates – GDP per capita (PPP), 
Unemployment, and Inflation – indicate the economic conditions present in the various 
countries for the year in which the ISSP survey was conducted.  The first, GDP per 
capita, is a measure of a country’s economic wealth.  Figure 17 presents the relative 
levels of GDP per capita measured in thousands of U.S. dollars, ranging from lowest to 
highest, for the countries included.  GDP per capita varies substantially from a low of 
$16.6 thousand in Russia to $54.7 thousand in Norway.  Overall, the average GDP per 
capita amount is $32.8 thousand, and the standard deviation is $10.7 thousand.  A cursory 
glance at Figure 17 reveals that, as expected, developing nations concentrated in Eastern 
and Southern Europe tend to be overrepresented in the top half of the chart, while 
developed democracies in Northern and Western Europe tend to be located in the bottom.   
 The second measure, Unemployment, refers to the portion of the labor force that is 
without work but is available for and seeking employment (World Bank 2016).  The 
respective unemployment rates are illustrated in Figure 18.  Levels of unemployment 
vary from a low of 3.4% in Norway to a high of 11.1% in Croatia.  The unemployment 
rate is below 4.0% in four countries:  Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and the  
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Table 19. Welfare regime typology by country 
Regime Classification Country 
Scandinavian 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Continental 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
English-speaking 
Australia 
Canada 
Great Britain 
Ireland 
Japan 
Switzerland 
United States 
Post-communist 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Poland 
Russia 
Slovenia 
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Figure 17. GDP per capita (PPP) by country, thousand USD 
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Figure 18. Unemployment rate by country, % 
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Netherlands.  In contrast, it exceeds 8.0% in four also: Croatia, Germany, France, and 
Spain.  Overall, the average unemployment rate for the selection of countries is 6.4%, and 
the standard deviation is 2.2%.  The distribution is slightly negatively skewed.       
The final indicator of prevailing economic conditions is the level of Inflation.  
The inflation rates provided here reflect price changes in the economy, and it is measured 
by the annual growth rate (or decline) of the GDP implicit deflator (World Bank 2016).  
Figure 19 illustrates the inflation rates across the range of countries included in the 
analysis, ordered from lowest to highest.  It is interesting that in 2006, Japan actually 
experienced a negative inflation rate of 1.1%, indicating deflation in its economy.  The 
highest inflation rate is observed in Latvia at 20.1%.  Overall, five countries report 
inflation rates under 2.0%: Japan, Germany, the Czech Republic, Finland, and Sweden.  
Alternatively, five countries also have inflation rates exceeding 4.0%: Latvia, Russia, 
Norway, and Australia.  The average inflation rate is 4.0%, and the standard deviation is 
4.6%.  The presence of such large inflation rates in Latvia (20.1%), Russia (13.8%), and 
Norway (8.8%) negatively skews the distribution.          
Section 5.1.iii: Inequality 
The third category of country-level correlates is the level of income inequality 
present in a given country.  The GINI index, as measured by Solt (2014), quantifies the 
extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within a 
country’s economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.  Theoretically, the value 
can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality).   For the country samples, 
the GINI index ranges from a low of 23.1 in Slovenia to a high of 40.8 in Russia.  Figure 
20 presents the GINI index for each country.  Four countries have GINI index values  
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Figure 19. Inflation rate by country, % 
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Figure 20. GINI index by country 
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under 25.0: Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.  In contrast, five countries have 
values that exceed 35.0: Russia, the United States, Latvia, Great Britain, and Portugal.  
Overall, the average index value is 29.9, and the standard deviation is 4.7.  
Section 5.1.iv: Quality of government institutions 
 The final classification of country-level correlates signals the quality of 
government institutions.  The Government Effectiveness Indicator calculated by the 
World Bank combines several measures into a single figure that reflects the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; World 
Bank 2015c).  Theoretically, the Government Effectiveness Indicator ranges from a value 
of -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).  However, in this analysis it ranges from a low of -0.38 in 
Russia to a high of 2.24 in Denmark.  Higher scores are indicative of better quality 
government institutions. 
 Figure 21 outlines the distribution of the Government Effectiveness Indicator 
across countries.  Only one country has a negative value – Russia (-0.38).  Three 
countries have values less than 0.50, including: Russia, Poland, and Latvia.  
Alternatively, three countries have values exceeding 2.00, such as: Denmark, Finland, 
and Switzerland.  Overall, the average Government Effectiveness Indicator score is 1.36, 
and it has a standard deviation of 0.66.  This suggests that the distribution is somewhat 
positively skewed.  A cursory examination of Figure 21 reveals that Eastern and Southern 
European countries tend to be characterized by having lower quality public institutions.   
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Figure 21. Government effectiveness indicator by country 
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Alternatively, developed countries in Northern and Western European countries appear to 
retain higher indicator values. 
Section 5.2: Cross-country differences in the level of support for social 
welfare policies – scatter plots 
 The primary research question with which this chapter is tasked with answering is 
explaining what conditions present at the country-level influence levels of public support 
for social welfare policies.  In order to make progress towards this end, this section offers 
a series of scatter plots which clarify the relationships that exist between the country-
level correlates previously described and the mean factor score of the dependent variable 
for each country, respectively.  This analysis is undertaken mainly for illustration 
purposes, and it serves as a necessary first step before moving on to the multilevel models 
which are estimated and analyzed later in this chapter.  A trend line has been 
superimposed onto each scatter plot to help facilitate the interpretation of possible 
relationships that may exist.  In this section, the strength and direction of relationships 
made apparent from the figures is discussed in accordance with the hypotheses offered in 
previous chapters.  
Section 5.2.i: Welfare regime type 
 At the country-level, the extant literature on public support for social welfare 
policies indicates that the level of support is often dependent upon a country’s 
classification into different welfare regime typologies (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Jakobsen 
2011; Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997).  In this dissertation, four different types of welfare 
regimes are considered: (1) the Scandinavian, (2) the Continental, (3) the English-
speaking, and the (4) Post-communist regime.  Figures 22-25 illustrate how these 
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groupings of countries compare to the overall sample of countries when contrasted with 
respect to the mean factor score for the dependent variable.   
 More specifically, Figure 22 shows how countries classified as being in the 
Scandinavian welfare regime compare to the remainder of countries considered in the 
analysis.  The Scandinavian regime type only comprises three countries: Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden.  Theory suggests that people living within countries characterized 
by Scandinavian regimes are distinguished by a willingness to maintain a comprehensive 
system for social protection, provide generous benefits, and require high levels of 
taxation (Deeming and Hayes 2012).  In short, people within these countries should be 
among the most supportive of social welfare policies.   
 Consistent with this hypothesis, it does appear that the three countries that 
comprise the Scandinavian regime type are, collectively, more supportive than other 
countries in the sample.  The average factor score for the three countries is -0.0381, 
whereas the overall mean for all countries is -0.0494.  However, it does bear mentioning 
that the factor scores for both Denmark (-0.0945) and Sweden (-0.1931) are below the 
average mean factor score for all countries.  Thus, there is some reasonable cause for 
skepticism that respondents of Scandinavian regimes are more supportive of social 
welfare policies than others – at least using comparative country means as the indicator.                
 The country mean factor scores for the dependent variable for those countries 
included in the Continental regime type are presented in Figure 23.  Conceptually, 
individuals residing in Continental regimes should be less supportive than those in 
Scandinavian regimes, but more so than those in English-speaking regimes.  These types 
of welfare regimes tend to focus on equity rather than redistribution (Arts and Gelissen  
139 
 
Figure 22. Social welfare policy support and Scandinavian welfare regime type 
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Figure 23. Social welfare policy support and continental welfare regime type 
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2001), but they also tend to be more generous with respect to the decommodification of 
social welfare services than English-speaking regimes.  Accordingly, their levels of 
support should be somewhere towards the middle of the overall distribution.  A cursory 
glance at Figure 23 reveals this to be somewhat true.  The six countries that comprise the 
Continental regime type tend to be placed toward the middle of the distribution with 
respect to the indicator of social welfare policy support used here.  Overall, the average 
of country mean factor scores for the Continental regimes is 0.0482, which is greater than 
the overall mean for all countries of -0.0494.  However, it is also more than the average 
of the Scandinavian regime of 0.0467, which is inconsistent with the literature.   
 Figure 24 shows how countries classified as being in the English-speaking 
welfare regime compare to the remainder of countries considered in the analysis.  In these 
types of regimes, the state plays only a minor role with respect to social policy.  Rather, 
the governments in these countries often look to the market for solutions to public policy 
problems (Jaeger 2006).  It is hypothesized that support for social welfare policies will be 
lower in countries that comprise the English-speaking regime type than in either the 
Scandinavian or Continental typologies.        
 Figure 24 reveals that there is a large range of country mean factor scores for the 
seven countries in the English-speaking regime type, varying from a low of -0.7841 in 
Japan to a high of 0.3576 in Ireland.  Overall, the average country mean factor score for 
the subset of countries is -0.3350, which quite a bit lower than the overall average 
country mean factor score of -0.0494 for all countries.  Likewise, and consistent with the 
hypotheses offered, the average country mean factor score for countries included in the 
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Figure 24. Social welfare policy support and English-speaking welfare regime type 
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English-speaking regime is noticeably lower than for either the Scandinavian (-0.0381) or 
Continental (0.0482) regimes. 
 The final classification of the welfare regimes is the Post-communist typology. It 
is commonly understood that people living in post-communist countries maintain higher 
levels of support for social welfare policies in comparison to capitalistic countries in 
Western Europe (Breznau 2010).  This is most likely the result of the residual effects of a 
legacy of communism.  That being said, to date, no known study has empirically tested 
the explanatory usefulness of a Post-communist welfare regime type with respect to 
analyzing public support for social welfare policies.  However, according to Castles an 
Obinger (2008), evidence does suggest that a Post-communist regime type may exist, as 
social welfare policies in post-communist states differs from those in other, more 
traditional, welfare regimes.   
 In order to make this determination, I include a Post-communist regime type 
alongside the previous typologies.  Figure 25 reveals that there is quite a bit of variation 
in the country mean factor scores for the seven countries that comprise the Post-
communist regime type.  The values vary from a low of -0.4523 in the Czech Republic to 
a high of 0.4451 in Croatia.  Overall, the average country mean factor score for the Post-
communist countries is 0.1477, which is higher than the average country mean factor 
score of -0.0494 for all countries.  The average country mean factor score for the 
countries that make up the Post-communist regime is noticeably higher than those in the 
Scandinavian regime (-0.0381), higher than those in the Continental regime (0.0482), and 
much higher than those in the English-speaking regime (-0.3353).  For comparison  
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Figure 25. Social welfare policy support and post-communist welfare regime type 
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purposes, Figure 26 illustrates the country mean factor scores across all four welfare 
regime typologies.    
 The averages indicated above suggest the possible existence of a rank-ordering 
among the different welfare regimes.  However, there are some inconsistencies with the 
literature.  While it is true that people who reside in Scandinavian regimes appear to 
harbor more supportive views toward social welfare policies in comparison to the overall 
average country mean, they also appear to be less supportive than people in Continental 
regimes.  Overall, the scatter plots suggest that the residents of  Post-communist regimes 
are the most supportive of all welfare regime typologies, surpassing every other category.  
People living in English-speaking regimes are the least.  Generally speaking, the previous 
series of scatter plots leave the hypothesis that welfare regime types play a role in 
explaining support for social welfare policies open to question. 
Section 5.2.ii: Economic conditions 
 Economic conditions are also thought to affect social welfare policy support.  
Three correlates are considered in this chapter: GDP per capita (PPP) in thousands of 
U.S. dollars, the Unemployment rate (%), and the Inflation rate (%) of the countries 
included in the study.  Figures 27-31 illuminate the relationships that exist between these 
variables and the country mean factors scores used to signify support for social welfare 
policies.  Figure 27 illustrates how GDP per capita and support for social welfare 
policies co-vary across the various countries.  The Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient, also known as Pearson’s r, for the two variables is -0.38, indicating a 
moderate negative relationship between GDP per capita and social welfare policy 
support.  Generally speaking, countries with higher levels of economic wealth tend to be 
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Figure 26. Social welfare policy support and welfare regime type 
 
Australia Canada 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Japan 
Latvia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Great Britain 
United States 
-0.9
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
M
ea
n
 f
a
ct
o
r 
sc
o
re
 
Welfare regime type 
Scandinavian Continental English-speaking Post-communist 
147 
 
Figure 27. Social welfare policy support and GDP per capita (PPP) (thousand USD) 
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less supportive of social welfare policies, on average.  Conversely, countries with lower 
levels of wealth tend to be more supportive – using country mean factor scores of support 
for social welfare policies as an indicator.   
This may lend some evidence to the argument that poorer economic conditions 
engender more supportive attitudes toward social welfare policies in response to the 
needs of society’s most vulnerable.  However, the scatter plot does reveal the appearance 
of some outliers which may contravene this argument.  For instance, the Czech Republic 
is characterized by both relatively low levels of economic wealth and also a low country 
mean factor score for social welfare policy support.  Accordingly, it is difficult to 
definitively say if the hypothesized relationship is present or not.  
 The second measure of prevailing economic conditions is the Unemployment rate 
of the country.  Figure 28 reveals the relationship between the unemployment rate and 
support for social welfare policies.  Here, Pearson’s r is equal to 0.36.  This indicates a 
moderate positive relationship.  Greater levels of unemployment seem to be correlated 
with more support for social welfare policies, consistent with arguments made by other 
scholars (Blekesaune 2007; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003).  While the relationship is 
not incredibly strong, the correlation is signed in the hypothesized direction.  Thus, the 
variable may still yet influence levels of support for social welfare policies.      
 The third and final correlate which reflects economic conditions is the Inflation 
rate for each country.  Figure 29 illustrates the relationship between the inflation rate and 
support for social welfare policies.  For this association, the Pearson’s r is equal to 0.31, 
which is indicative of a moderate positive relationship.  This suggests that greater levels 
of national inflation result in more support for social welfare policies.  This finding is  
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Figure 28. Social welfare policy support and unemployment (%) 
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Figure 29. Social welfare policy support and inflation (%) 
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consistent with hypotheses that comparatively worse economic conditions prompt greater 
levels of public support for social welfare policies.   
That being said, it is important to point out that the case of Latvia may be 
distorting the correlation coefficient.  In this data, Latvia’s extraordinarily high inflation 
rate of 19.0% recorded in 2007 may be an outlier.  In fact, if Latvia is removed from the 
sample, Pearson’s r jumps to 0.49, which is a much stronger relationship.  For this reason, 
it is difficult to determine the exact relationship between the inflation rate and support for 
social welfare policies using scatter plots and correlation coefficients alone.     
Section 5.2.iii: Inequality 
Levels of income inequality present within a country are also thought to be a 
potential correlate of social welfare policy support.  Figure 30 shows how levels of 
inequality, measured by the GINI index, and support for social welfare policies co-vary 
across the countries in the study.  Pearson’s r for the two variables is 0.07, indicating a 
very weak positive relationship between the GINI index and social welfare policy 
support.  Generally speaking, countries with higher levels of income inequality tend be 
more supportive of social welfare policies.  Alternatively, countries with lower levels of 
income inequality tend to be less supportive, on average.   
Recall from Chapter 2, that there have been mixed findings with respect to the 
influence of inequality on public support for social welfare policies (see Chapter 2).  
Whereas some researchers find a positive effect (e.g., Dallinger 2010; Koster and 
Kaminska 2012; Meltzer and Richard 1981), others note a negative one (e.g., Rehm, 
Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012).  Still yet, others contend that the end result of conflicting  
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Figure 30. Social welfare policy support and inequality 
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mechanisms may lead to no apparent effect at all (Voicu and Voicu 2011).  The results 
presented here in this particular section do little to diminish this ambiguity.  
Section 5.2.iv: Quality of government institutions 
The final correlate of public support for social welfare policies considered in this 
study is the quality of government institutions.  In this dissertation, I have argued that the 
existence of well-functioning governments distinguished by high quality institutions is 
likely to reduce support for social welfare policies.  Figure 31 shows how levels of 
institutional quality, measured by the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Indicator, 
and support for social welfare policies co-vary across the countries in the study.  
Pearson’s r for the two variables is -0.57, indicating a moderate negative relationship 
between the Government Effectiveness Indicator and social welfare policy support.   
On average, people who live in countries whose governments are characterized as 
having higher levels of institutional quality tend be less supportive of social welfare 
policies than those with lower levels.  This finding provides some support to my 
contention that levels of performance, in this case manifested in terms of better 
institutional quality, has the capacity to influence public opinion – specifically with 
respect to the level of social welfare provision desired by the public.  Likewise, this result 
seems to suggest that the implications of overload theory (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and 
Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007) may be used as a viable framework for explaining different 
forms of contemporary public opinion.   
Section 5.2.v: Summary 
 This section considers the possible relationships that may exist between public 
support for social welfare policies, expressed in terms of country mean factor scores, and  
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Figure 31. Social welfare policy support and government effectiveness 
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a series of country-level correlates.  Among the variables that have been analyzed include 
those that classify the 23 countries of this study into four distinct welfare regime types, 
those that measure prevailing economic conditions, as well as indicators of national 
income inequality and the quality of government institutions.  The scatter plots reveal that 
some of these relationships appear to be stronger than others.   
With respect to differing welfare regime types, a rank-ordering of regimes appears 
to be possible, although the specific ordering observed in this analysis is somewhat 
inconsistent with what others scholars have suggested.  Overall, higher levels of support 
are reported in Post-communist, Continental, and Scandinavian regimes.  Less support is 
offered in English-speaking regimes.  In terms of economic conditions, a moderate 
positive relationship was discovered between GDP per capita and support for social 
welfare policies, while a slightly weaker association was found between unemployment 
levels and social welfare policy support.   
Interestingly, a moderate positive relationship exists between national inflation 
rates and social welfare policy support.  However, if an outlier is omitted from the 
analysis, the relationship becomes much stronger, which is more consistent with the 
hypotheses generated in Chapter 2.  A weak positive relationship is also witnessed 
between levels of inequality and social welfare policy support.  Unfortunately, this 
finding does little to resolve the debate with respect to the direction of the impact of 
income inequality on levels of the dependent variable.   
Finally, a moderate negative relationship appears to exist between the quality of 
government institutions and levels of support for social welfare policies.  This last finding 
is particularly meaningful as it provides some support for one of the main arguments of 
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this dissertation that the performance of the public sector plays a role in influencing 
public opinion in the realm of public policy.  In the following section, both the individual 
and country-level correlates of support for social welfare policies are examined using 
multilevel modeling techniques.   
Section 5.3: Multilevel models of support for social welfare policies 
 To explain public support for social welfare policies, a series of multilevel models 
are estimated and presented in Tables 21-23.  Multilevel models are used here because of 
the hierarchical nature of the data.  For this analysis, my primary goal is to explain 
individual attitudes.  However, those individuals are nested within different countries 
around the world.  It is likely that the views of people within the same country correlate 
with one another as a result of the national context in which they find themselves.  As a 
result, it is methodologically appropriate to control for this occurrence.  Additionally, 
multilevel modeling affords researchers the opportunity to examine hypotheses about 
various phenomena at both the individual and country-levels simultaneously.   
 The dependent variable in this chapter remains the factor scores generated from a 
battery of questions in the ISSP survey which measure public support for social welfare 
policies (see Chapter 3).  Given the structured nature of the data, a two-level model is 
appropriate for this research.  Accordingly, the level-1 model considers the relationships 
that exist between the individual-level correlates previously discussed in Chapter 4, and 
the level-2 model reflects the influence of the country-level variables that have been 
described in this chapter.  Written more formally (see Hox 2002: 12), there are 
 i = 1, …, nj level-1 units (i.e., individuals) nested within 
 j = 1, …, J level-2 units (i.e., J = 23 countries).   
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The Null Model and Interclass Correlation 
Prior to conducting multilevel analysis, it is first necessary to measure whether 
there is sufficient variation between countries to justify the inclusion of country-level 
effects (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  In order to make this determination, a null model 
is estimated that excludes any individual-level or country-level variables.   
The level-1 model is written as:  
(Social welfare policy support)ij = β0j + rij 
The level-2 model is written as: 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
In this instance, the estimated null model has an intercept variance component of 
0.1386 that is statistically significant, which means that the intercept of the outcome 
variable (i.e., support for social welfare policies) is significantly affected by its 
predictors, which in this case are the country-level attributes.  The country effect is 
smaller than the residual variance component of 0.6868, suggesting that there is still 
considerable residual variation in the dependent variable yet to be explained and that a 
model with additional predictors may be needed.   
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) indicates the proportion of variation in 
the dependent variable explained by the structured nature of the data (Hox 2002).   
 
𝐼𝐶𝐶 =
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
=
0.1386
0.1386 + 0.6868
= 0.2018 
 
The intraclass correlation coefficient for the null model is 0.2018, which can be 
interpreted to mean that 20.18% of the variation in the dependent variable is attributable 
to country-level characteristics.  This number demonstrates that there is a significant 
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country-level effect on public support for social welfare policies, and justifies not only 
the estimation of multilevel models, but also the examination of country-level correlates.   
Fixed and Random Coefficients in Multilevel Regression 
 When using multilevel regression, it is assumed that the predictors at both level-1 
and level-2 are fixed (Snijders and Bosker 2012).  That being said, both the intercept and 
the slope coefficients at level-1 could be specified as either fixed or random.  When the 
intercept and the slope coefficients are assumed to vary across classes, a random 
coefficients model is appropriate (Hox 2002).  However, the researcher is left to decide 
when coefficients should be fixed and when they should be allowed to vary.  In order to 
make this determination, the model development strategy outlined by Snijders and 
Bosker (2012) is employed.  First, a multilevel model including all of the individual-level 
variables is estimated with random intercepts and slopes (see Table 20). 
 Table 20 indicates that the variance components for the Not working and 
Government employment variables are not statistically significant.  This suggests that 
there is no between-country variability in the slopes for these particular correlates.  
Accordingly, these variables should be specified has having fixed coefficients.  Since the 
variance components for the remainder of the individual-level variables and the intercept 
are statistically significant, these slopes should be allowed to vary.  
 The model described above was estimated once again after removing random 
effects for the Not working and Government employment variables.  The between-country 
variability remains at a statistically significant level for the other eleven individual-level 
correlates.  As such, random effects are included for the estimation of the multilevel 
models for the intercept, as well as for the following individual-level variables: Left  
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Table 20. Variance components for multilevel random coefficient model (all slopes  
     random) 
  
Random Effect 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Component 
df χ2 P-value 
Intercept, u0   0.37685 0.14202 22 606.46 <0.001 
Left political party slope, u1 0.16679 0.02782 22 89.18 <0.001 
Right political party slope, u2 0.20042 0.04017 22 135.77 <0.001 
Age slope, u3 0.00410 0.00002 22 132.05 <0.001 
Female slope, u4 0.06146 0.00378 22 38.52 0.016 
Low education slope, u5 0.10436 0.01089 22 67.36 <0.001 
Not working slope, u6 0.06049 0.00366 22 29.39 0.134 
Government employment slope, 
u7 
0.04575 0.00209 22 24.27 0.333 
Interpersonal trust slope, u8 0.02138 0.00046 22 52.87 <0.001 
Contact with others slope, u9 0.03077 0.00095 22 46.26 0.002 
Internal political efficacy slope, 
u10 
0.02833 0.00080 22 64.07 <0.001 
External political efficacy 
slope, u11 
0.02138 0.00046 22 51.18 <0.001 
Trust in civil servants slope, u12 0.08079 0.00653 22 39.00 0.014 
Perception of performance 
slope, u13 
0.08467 0.00717 22 124.49 <0.001 
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political party affiliation, Right political party affiliation, Age, Female, Low education, 
Interpersonal trust, Contact with others, Internal political efficacy, External political 
efficacy, Trust in civil servants, and Perception of performance.  It should be noted, that 
the variance components for these variables are also reported in Tables 21-23 alongside 
each of the multilevel models estimated.    
Multilevel Models 
 The multilevel models analyzed in this chapter are estimated using the statistics 
software package HLM 7.01.  As is the norm, continuous predictors at the individual and 
country-level are grand-mean centered.  Intercepts in any type of multiple regression 
analysis are interpreted when all of the independent variables take on a value of zero.  
Since zero is not a possible value for many variables, this transformation is appropriate 
(Hox 2002).  Thus, the following individual-level variables are grand-mean centered: 
Age, Interpersonal trust, Contact with others, Internal political efficacy, External 
political efficacy, and Perception of performance.  Likewise, the country-level variables 
GDP per capita, Unemployment rate, Inflation rate, GINI index, and Government 
effectiveness are also grand-mean centered.  These particular correlates are denoted in 
boldface below in the following equations. 
 Written in mathematical notation, the two-level models examined in this 
dissertation are: 
Level-1 model 
(Social welfare policy support)ij = β0j + β1j(Left political party)ij + β2j(Right political  
party)ij + β3j(Age)ij + β4j(Female)ij + β5j(Low education)ij + β6j(Not working)ij + 
β7j(Government employment)ij + β8j(Interpersonal trust)ij + β9j(Contact with 
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others)ij + β10j(Internal political efficacy)ij + β11j(External political efficacy)ij + 
β12j(Trust in civil servants)ij + β13j(Perception of performance)ij + rij           
Level-2 models 
For the Scandinavian welfare regime model: 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01(Scandinavian welfare regime)j + u0j   
For the continental welfare regime model: 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01(Continental welfare regime)j + u0j   
For the English-speaking welfare regime model: 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01(English-speaking welfare regime)j + u0j   
For the post-communist welfare regime model: 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01(Post-communist welfare regime)j + u0j   
For the composite welfare regime types model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Scandinavian welfare regime)j + γ02(Continental welfare regime)j  
+ γ03(Post-communist welfare regime)j + u0j   
For the economic conditions model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(GDP per capita)j + γ02(Unemployment rate)j + γ03(Inflation rate)j  
+ u0j   
For the inequality model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(GINI index)j + u0j   
For the governmental institutional quality model: 
  β0j = γ00 + γ01(Government effectiveness)j + u0j   
For the composite non-welfare regimes model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Inflation rate)j + γ02(GINI index)j + γ03(Government  
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effectiveness)j + u0j   
For the composite model:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Scandinavian welfare regime)j + γ02(Continental welfare regime)j  
+ γ03(Post-communist welfare regime)j + γ04(Inflation rate)j + γ05(GINI 
index)j + γ06(Government effectiveness)j + u0j   
For all models: 
 β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + u2j 
β3j = γ30 + u3j 
β4j = γ40 + u4j 
β5j = γ50 + u5j 
β6j = γ60  
β7j = γ70  
β8j = γ80 + u8j 
β9j = γ90 + u9j 
β10j = γ100 + u10j 
β11j = γ110 + u11j 
β12j = γ12 + u12j 
β13j = γ13 + u13j 
Section 5.4: Empirical findings 
The multilevel regression models reported in Tables 21-23 consider the correlates 
of public support for social welfare policies at both the individual and country-levels of 
analysis.  Model diagnostics indicate that heteroskedasticity is present in all of the 
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multilevel models (see Appendix S).  For this reason, all of the models are estimated 
using robust standard errors.  Additionally, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) were 
calculated for each of the variables in the country-level models.  These values are 
reported in Appendix T.  Multicollinearity is an issue in only two variables found in 
Model 7, which is discussed later in the chapter.      
The basic (individual-level correlates only) model is the first model reported in 
Table 21.  It is notable that the individual-level variables perform similarly across each of 
the models, indicating the robustness of these findings.  In terms of the socio-
demographic attributes, there is evidence which suggests that political attitudes play a 
crucial role in shaping public opinion on social welfare policies.  The results indicate that 
respondents who are affiliated with left-leaning political parties are more likely to be 
supportive of social welfare policies, while respondents who identify with right-leaning 
political parties are more likely to be less supportive of social welfare policies.  This 
suggests that one’s membership in an ideologically-based political party is a principal 
influencer of public social welfare policy preferences – in line with the literature on this 
topic (e.g., Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Zagórski 1999).   
The results also indicate that people take their own self-interest into account vis-á-
vis their support of social welfare policies.  Those who belong to classes of society that 
tend to be more economically vulnerable, and therefore more likely to benefit from social 
welfare policies - females, individuals with low levels of education, and those who are 
not currently in the workforce - are also more likely to be supportive of social welfare 
policies.  However, it should be noted that the respondent’s age does not appear to be a 
useful predictor of social welfare policy preferences.  Model 1 reveals that government 
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employees are more likely to support social welfare policies in comparison to those who 
are not.  These people’s livelihoods are tied to the continued delivery of public services 
(Andreβ and Heien 2001; Papadakis and Bean 1993).  Therefore, it is sensible that they 
would be supportive of government playing a more expansive role in this area of public 
policy.    
With respect to the socio-psychological correlates, as hypothesized, people with 
higher levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to support social welfare policies than 
those with lower levels.  Likewise, the amount of contact a person has with others on a 
daily basis negatively influences levels of support for social welfare policies.  These 
findings give further credence to the theory that those who maintain strong social 
networks may not see as great a need for governmental intervention in their lives 
(Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Gërxhani and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011).   
Model 1 also suggests that people who feel more politically empowered are less 
supportive of social welfare policies than those who do not.  Respondents who are 
confident in their knowledge about government and politics (i.e., internal political 
efficacy), as well as those who believe that they can influence the political system (i.e., 
external political efficacy), indicate lower levels of support for social welfare policies 
than those who do not.  Those who express higher levels of political efficacy may be 
satisfied with the status quo and thus do not desire expansive governmental programs. 
The findings show that people’s attitudes toward political actors appear to 
influence their social welfare policy preferences, echoing the results discussed in Chapter 
4.  Those who express trusting attitudes towards civil servants are more likely to support 
social welfare policies than those who do not.  This result is consistent with literature that 
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argues that trusting citizens are more likely to approve of governmental policies because 
they maintain faith in those performing the duties involved in governing (Kaase and 
Newton 1995; Gabriel and Trüdinger 2011).   
Alternatively, people who perceive higher levels of governmental performance 
are less supportive of social welfare policies than those who see government as operating 
poorly.  This suggests that a “crowding out” effect may be at work.  People who perceive 
government as being more successful in terms of public policy outcomes are less likely to 
be supportive of social welfare policies because they may be satisfied with the status quo.  
This finding is consistent with the results discovered in Chapter 4, and it is in accordance 
with the implications drawn from “overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and 
Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007).  When poor performance is encountered, people tend to 
instinctively call for a governmental solution to ameliorate the problem.  However, when 
performance is perceived as suitable, people may not recognize an apparent need for 
additional governmental programs, resulting in lower levels of support for them.              
Beyond the individual-level correlates, the multilevel models included in this 
analysis consider the influence that national context has on public attitudes.  A total of six 
models are presented in addition to the basic model which examine separate explanations 
for the differing opinions about social welfare policies between countries.  A final 
composite model, Model 7, is included which combines the statistically significant 
country-level indicators from the previous models.   
 In order to test the theory that cross-national variation in support of social welfare 
policies is attributable to dissimilarities in the institutional character of differing welfare 
regimes, Model 2 considers the effects of the various welfare regimes side-by-side.  
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Consistent with Arts and Gelissen’s (2001) work, the English-speaking welfare regime 
type was chosen as the reference category.  The results reveal that all three categories, the 
Scandinavian, the Continental, and the Post-communist, are all statistically significant 
with respect to public support for social welfare policies when compared to the reference 
of the English-speaking welfare regime.  An examination of the size of the coefficients 
appears to reveal a rank-ordering of welfare regimes.  People who live in Scandinavian 
welfare regimes appear to be the most supportive of social welfare policies.  They are 
followed by those located in Continental welfare regimes.  People who reside in Post-
communist countries are ranked next.  Finally, the respondents of countries in the 
reference category, the English-speaking welfare regime tend to be the least supportive of 
social welfare policies. 
 These findings seem, at first glance, to reveal some support to the thesis that 
different welfare regime typologies are capable of explaining support for social welfare 
policies, in accordance with the literature (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Jakobsen 2011; 
Larsen 2008; Svallfors 1997).  However, little has been done to move beyond these 
correlates and to consider the explanatory power of other types of country-level variables.  
For that reason, this study also considers additional multilevel models which examine the 
influence that prevailing economic conditions, levels of income inequality, and the 
quality of government institutions have on levels of public support for social welfare 
policies.  
Model 3 examines the impact of economic conditions on the dependent variable.  
Of the three indicators of economic performance, only the Inflation rate is significantly 
related to public support for social welfare policies.  As hypothesized, the higher the level 
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of inflation in a country, the more support there is for social welfare policies.  This may 
lend some support to the notion that people are self-interested beings who are capable of 
shifting their policy positions based on changing economic circumstances (Lipset 1968; 
McClosky and Zaller 1984).  However, it should be pointed out that the substantive size 
of the effect is fairly low when one considers the typical range of inflation rates that 
characterize the 23 countries examined in this analysis.  
Model 4 in Table 22 examines the effect of income inequality on people’s social 
welfare policy attitudes.  The GINI index indicator is statistically significant and shows 
the existence of a negative relationship.  This finding leaves open the possibility that the 
more unequal the distribution of wealth there is in a country, the less likely people will be 
supportive of social welfare policies, consistent with the findings of Rehm, Hacker, and 
Schlesinger (2012).  This result may also lend some support to the arguments of 
Kenworthy and McCall (2008) who claim that this negative association exists because the 
median voter in those countries characterized by higher levels of income inequality is 
more reluctant to pay the additional tax money necessary to sustain a social welfare 
system than those in countries where income inequality is not so high.   
The second model in Table 22, Model 5, considers the effect of institutional 
quality on respondents’ social welfare policy positions.  The World Bank’s Government 
Effectiveness Indicator is statistically significant and reveals a negative relationship 
between institutional quality and the dependent variable.  That is to say, people who 
reside in countries characterized by better quality public institutions are less likely to be 
supportive of social welfare policies than those in countries with poorer quality public 
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institutions.  Indeed, the outputs of a political system appear to be linked to fluctuations 
in public support, in agreement with the arguments of Easton (1965).   
This finding at the country-level dovetails very nicely with the findings at the 
individual-level vis-á-vis perceptions of government performance and reinforces the 
argument that public sector performance matters – whether perceived or actual.  
Likewise, it leaves open the possibility that the implications of “overload theory” are not 
only confined to the individual-level.  As the results demonstrate, the work of Crozier et 
al. (1975) can be utilized as a useful framework for considering how performance, or its 
lack thereof, at the country-level influences public support for social welfare policies.    
A composite model, Model 6, which considers all of the correlates from Models 
3, 4, and 5 that emerge as statistically significant, is reported in Table 23.  This model 
permits testing the utility of each country-level explanation of public support for social 
welfare policies, excluding the welfare regime variables, while also controlling for the 
other country-level variables.  The coefficients for all of the country-level variables retain 
their signs from the previous models.  Likewise, the Inflation rate, the GINI index, and 
the Government Effectiveness Indictor all remain statistically significant.   
Another composite model, Model 7, which includes all of the correlates that arise 
as being statistically significant from all of the models, including those that estimate the 
influence of differing welfare regime typologies, is also presented in Table 23.  In this 
final composite model, the Inflation rate remains a statistically significant predictor, as 
does the GINI index variable.  Both retain their signs from the previous models.  The 
World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator not only remains statistically 
significant, but the size of its effect more than doubles in comparison to its impact in 
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Model 5 or Model 6.  Again, a negative relationship is observed between the quality of 
public sector institutions and support for social welfare policies.  Interestingly, none of 
the welfare regime typologies are statistically significant in Model 7 when controlling for 
the inflation rate, income inequality, or measures of government effectiveness with one 
important exception.   
The Post-communist welfare regime type is statistically significant, but it now 
carries a negative sign.  Using English-speaking welfare regimes as the reference 
category, this finding reveals that the residents of post-communist countries are actually 
less supportive of social welfare policies when the variables included in Model 7 are 
controlled.  Bear in mind that Model 2, reported in Table 21, seemed to imply that people 
residing in post-communist countries were statistically more likely to be supportive of 
social welfare policies than people living in English-speaking countries.  This result 
seems to cast some doubt on the use of welfare regime typologies as a useful means for 
explaining public support for social welfare policies.   
Appendix T indicates that multicollinearity may be an issue for both the Post-
communist and Government effectiveness variables in Model 7.  However, even with 
multicollinearity present, both variables remain statistically significant.  This does much 
to indicate the robustness of these findings.  When controlling for other variables, notably 
measures reflecting national economic conditions, levels of income inequality, or the 
quality of government institutions, much of explanatory power of the welfare regime 
typologies as a class of predictors is either lost or distorted.   
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Table 21. Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support (Basic Model, 
Welfare Regime Type Model, Economic Conditions Model) 
 
 
(1) Basic Model 
(2) Welfare 
Regime Type 
(3) Economic 
Conditions 
Fixed Effects    
    
Individual-level variables    
Intercept 
-0.3281*** 
(0.08) 
-0.5141*** 
(0.10) 
-0.3289*** 
(0.07) 
Left political party 
0.2075*** 
(0.04) 
0.2032*** 
(0.04) 
0.2041*** 
(0.04) 
Right political party 
-0.1716*** 
(0.04) 
-0.1723*** 
(0.04) 
-0.1723*** 
(0.04) 
Age 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.1116*** 
(0.02) 
0.1102*** 
(0.02) 
0.1111*** 
(0.02) 
Low education  
0.1725*** 
(0.03) 
0.1708*** 
(0.03) 
0.1725*** 
(0.03) 
Not working 
0.1355***
 
(0.02) 
0.1354***
 
(0.02) 
0.1357***
 
(0.02) 
Government employment 
0.0711*** 
(0.01) 
0.0705*** 
(0.01) 
0.0709*** 
(0.01) 
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0371*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0372*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0374*** 
(0.01) 
Contact with others 
-0.0270*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0266*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0269*** 
(0.01) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0301*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0304*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0298*** 
(0.01) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0144** 
(0.01) 
-0.0143** 
(0.01) 
-0.0143** 
(0.01) 
Trust in civil servants 
0.1104*** 
(0.02) 
0.1110*** 
(0.02) 
0.1113*** 
(0.02) 
Perception of performance 
-0.1199*** 
(0.02) 
-0.1202*** 
(0.02) 
-0.1201*** 
(0.02) 
    
Country-level variables    
Scandinavian welfare regime -- 
0.3381*** 
(0.09) 
-- 
Continental welfare regime -- 
0.2884*** 
(0.09) 
-- 
Post-communist welfare regime -- 
0.2226** 
(0.08) 
-- 
GDP in thousand $s per capita -- -- 
-0.0046 
(0.00) 
Unemployment rate -- -- 
0.0297 
(0.02) 
Inflation rate -- -- 
0.0211*** 
(0.01) 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 21 (continued). Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support 
(Basic Model, Welfare Regime Type Model, Economic Conditions Model)  
 
 
(1) Basic Model 
(2) Welfare 
Regime Types 
(3) Economic 
Conditions 
Random Effects (Variance Components) 
    
Intercept (level-2 variance) 0.13023*** 0.12450*** 0.12360*** 
Left political party 0.02749*** 0.02577*** 0.02499*** 
Right political party 0.04031*** 0.04049*** 0.04034*** 
Age 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
Female 0.00394** 0.00386** 0.00389** 
Low education  0.01070*** 0.01078*** 0.01091*** 
Interpersonal trust 0.00048*** 0.00047*** 0.00048*** 
Contact with others 0.00119*** 0.00119*** 0.00118*** 
Internal political efficacy 0.00082*** 0.00084*** 0.00079*** 
External political efficacy 0.00046*** 0.00047*** 0.00044*** 
Trust in civil servants 0.00622** 0.00601** 0.00608** 
Perception of performance 0.00732*** 0.00736*** 0.00729*** 
    
Level-1 N 16,255 16,255 16,255 
Level-2 N 23 23 23 
Log likelihood function -18,803.77 -18,805.15 -18,813.21 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  
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Table 22. Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support (Inequality 
Model, Institutional Quality Model) 
 
 
(4) Inequality 
(5) Institutional 
Quality 
Fixed Effects   
   
Individual-level variables   
Intercept 
-0.3282*** 
(0.08) 
-0.3291*** 
(0.07) 
Left political party 
0.2078*** 
(0.04) 
0.2070*** 
(0.04) 
Right political party 
-0.1715*** 
(0.04) 
-0.1735*** 
(0.04) 
Age 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.1112*** 
(0.02) 
0.1110*** 
(0.02) 
Low education 
0.1722*** 
(0.03) 
0.1732*** 
(0.03) 
Not working 
0.1356***
 
(0.02) 
0.1357***
 
(0.02) 
Government employment 
0.0713*** 
(0.01) 
0.0712*** 
(0.01) 
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0371*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0376*** 
(0.01) 
Contact with others 
-0.0271*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0270*** 
(0.01) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0301*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0300*** 
(0.01) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0145** 
(0.01) 
-0.0139** 
(0.01) 
Trust in civil servants 
0.1107*** 
(0.02) 
0.1117*** 
(0.02) 
Perception of performance 
-0.1198*** 
(0.02) 
-0.1202*** 
(0.02) 
   
Country-level variables 
  
Gini index 
-0.0138** 
(0.01) 
-- 
Government effectiveness -- 
-0.1966*** 
(0.05) 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 22 (continued). Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support 
(Inequality Model, Institutional Quality Model) 
 
 
(4) Inequality 
(5) Institutional 
Quality 
Random Effects (Variance Components) 
   
Intercept (level-2 variance) 0.13883*** 0.10801*** 
Left political party 0.02731*** 0.02636*** 
Right political party 0.04058*** 0.04013*** 
Age 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
Female 0.00394** 0.00390** 
Low education  0.01074*** 0.01048*** 
Interpersonal trust 0.00048*** 0.00047*** 
Contact with others 0.00119*** 0.00119*** 
Internal political efficacy 0.00083*** 0.00078*** 
External political efficacy 0.00046*** 0.00043*** 
Trust in civil servants 0.00616** 0.00610*** 
Perception of performance 0.00740*** 0.00718*** 
   
Level-1 N 16,255 16,255 
Level-2 N 23 23 
Log likelihood function -18,807.96 -18,805.66 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  
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Table 23. Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support (Composite 
Non-Welfare Regime Model, Composite Model) 
 
 
(6) Composite 
Non-Welfare 
Regime 
Variables 
(7) Composite 
Model 
Fixed Effects   
   
Individual-level variables   
Intercept 
-0.3301*** 
(0.07) 
-0.1712 
(0.15) 
Left political party 
0.2071*** 
(0.04) 
0.2078*** 
(0.04) 
Right political party 
-0.1746*** 
(0.04) 
-0.1715*** 
(0.04) 
Age 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.1105*** 
(0.02) 
0.1112*** 
(0.02) 
Low education  
0.1728*** 
(0.03) 
0.1722*** 
(0.03) 
Not working 
0.1359***
 
(0.02) 
0.1356***
 
(0.02) 
Government employment 
0.0710*** 
(0.01) 
0.0713*** 
(0.01) 
Interpersonal trust 
-0.0374*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0371*** 
(0.01) 
Contact with others 
-0.0273*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0271*** 
(0.01) 
Internal political efficacy 
-0.0300*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0301*** 
(0.01) 
External political efficacy 
-0.0140** 
(0.01) 
-0.0145** 
(0.01) 
Trust in civil servants 
0.1122*** 
(0.02) 
0.1107*** 
(0.02) 
Perception of performance 
-0.1199*** 
(0.02) 
-0.1198*** 
(0.02) 
   
Country-level variables  
 
Scandinavian welfare regime -- 
-0.1048 
(0.16) 
Continental welfare regime -- 
0.0403 
(0.12) 
Post-communist welfare regime -- 
-0.5063** 
(0.22) 
Inflation rate 
0.02360*** 
(0.01) 
0.0326*** 
(0.01) 
Gini index 
-0.0289*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0539*** 
(0.01) 
Government effectiveness 
-0.1683*** 
(0.05) 
-0.4679*** 
(0.13) 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.) 
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Table 23 (continued). Multilevel regression models:  Social welfare policy support 
(Composite Non-Welfare Regime Model, Composite Model) 
 
 
(6) Composite 
Non-Welfare 
Regime 
Variables 
(7) Composite 
Model 
Random Effects (Variance Components) 
   
Intercept (level-2 variance) 0.11490*** 0.10498*** 
Left political party 0.02537*** 0.02554*** 
Right political party 0.04002*** 0.04009*** 
Age 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
Female 0.00388** 0.00393** 
Low education  0.01072*** 0.01068*** 
Interpersonal trust 0.00048*** 0.00048*** 
Contact with others 0.00123*** 0.00119*** 
Internal political efficacy 0.00080*** 0.00086*** 
External political efficacy 0.00044*** 0.00044*** 
Trust in civil servants 0.00594*** 0.00723** 
Perception of performance 0.00726*** 0.00740*** 
   
Level-1 N 16,255 16,255 
Level-2 N 23 23 
Log likelihood function -18,810.24 -18,809.30 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  
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Section 5.5: Summary 
 In summary, public attitudes toward social welfare policies vary both within 
countries, as well as between countries.  The multilevel models indicate that variation in 
social welfare policy preferences is not only a function of individuals’ personal attributes, 
personality traits, and political attitudes – as indicated by the literature, but also of their 
perceptions of governmental actors and the quality of the work they perform in the public 
sector.  Across-country variation is largely a function of public sector institutional 
quality, and, to a lesser extent, levels of inflation and inequality.  While differences with 
respect to welfare regime types do appear to exist, once the preceding variables are 
introduced to the analysis alongside them, their influence diminishes.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION 
OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES 
 
Section 6.1: Overview 
 
Van Riper (1999) observes that “… when in desperation we turn to the 
government, not to the marketplace.  The marketplace is for you or me.  Our government 
is for us” (369).  Over the course of the last century, people around the world have 
become more reliant upon government to solve societal problems.  In particular, we have 
fashioned policies which promote equality and guard against economic risk.  Rochefort 
(1986) observes that “Every level of government is significantly involved in this effort to 
identify, treat, and prevent social ills” (1).  Undeniably, the size and reach of the state has 
grown in recent decades.  However, while volumes have been written describing the rise 
of the welfare state, far less scholarly attention has been paid to explaining why people 
support or oppose the subset of laws, programs, and initiatives collectively known as 
social welfare policies.  It is for this reason why this dissertation was written.     
Social welfare policies exist in order for governments to meet their residents’ 
most basic needs for income, health, education, and housing (Gangl 2007; Gërxhani and 
Koster 2012).  It is commonly acknowledged that social welfare policies are designed to 
offer opportunities to the disadvantaged.  However, these programs are fashioned not 
only to care for the destitute, but also to provide a “safety net” for all people living in 
society (Segal 2010).  According to Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989), “The principle of 
social equality and collective responsibility implies … that government has a major role 
in providing equal economic opportunities to all its people, and has an obligation to 
ensure that each resident enjoys a minimally acceptable standard of living” (1030).   
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The rationale behind the development of the welfare state is clear: government 
has a responsibility to its people to provide public services to those who need them.  
What remains to be answered is why people either support or oppose this expansive view 
of governmental intervention to bring about desired social ends.  The research literature 
strongly implies that there is scholarly import to knowing why these views vary.  Public 
opinion can have a dramatic influence on the public policies that are enacted by 
governments (Burnstein 2003; Jacobs 1992).  Specifically, alterations in the level of 
public support for redistribution have been found to precede policy change (Manza et al. 
2002; Stimson et al. 1995).  Work by Kingdon (2011) also suggests that public opinion 
has the ability to constrain the range of possible actions taken by government.  Thus, it is 
imperative that researchers study the views of the public in order to gain a better 
understanding of the policy process.    
While it is true that a number of social scientists have addressed the topic of 
social welfare policy support, it is important to acknowledge how much was previously 
unknown.  The political sociology literature indicates that support for social welfare 
policies is mainly a function of either ideological preferences or personal self-interest 
(Calzada, Gómez-Garido, Moreno, and Moreno-Fuentes 2014; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 
1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011).  Additionally, the extant literature on this topic largely 
fails to take national context into consideration as a possible influencer of social welfare 
policy support.  With the exception of those studies that focus on differing welfare 
regime types (e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2001; Edlund 1999; Svallfors 1997), little has been 
done to examine how varying conditions cross-nationally influence levels of support for 
social welfare policies.   
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Finally, the most blatant omission from the scholarly record with respect to this 
line of research is the conspicuous lack of attention given to the role that the public sector 
plays in either promoting or inhibiting public support for social welfare policies.  In the 
modern world, governments, and by extension public administrators, exercise a great deal 
of influence.  According to Kettl (1999), “Wherever one looks, administrative agencies 
determine who gets what from government – and how well government works” (127).   
It is only reasonable to suggest that how people come to view public 
administrators and assess the quality of the work that they perform has an impact on the 
level of support that various public policies enjoy.  My argument throughout this work 
has consistently been that support for social welfare policies is dependent not only upon 
one’s ideology or personal self-interest, but also on a number of other factors at the 
individual and country-levels.  Chief among them is both the attitudes people hold 
towards the public sector and the quality of governmental institutions, cross-nationally.       
Throughout the preceding chapters of this study, four primary research questions 
have been addressed: First, across countries, what levels of support do people hold for 
social welfare policies?  Second, what individual-level attributes and attitudes correlate 
with these levels of support?  Third, does national context account for variation across 
countries in terms of the level of support?  Finally, does the public sector play a part in 
determining levels of social welfare policy support at either the individual or country-
level?  The research presented in this dissertation specifically answers each of these 
questions by comparing and analyzing variations in social welfare policy support across 
23 countries in Europe, North America, Eastern Asia, and Oceania.  In the following 
section, a summary of the results of the statistical analysis is presented.      
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Section 6.2: Summary 
It was found that variation in the level of support for social welfare policies does 
take place both among people within countries, as well as between countries.  People 
living in Portugal, Spain, Croatia, and Russia are, on average, the most supportive of 
social welfare policies.  In contrast, the residents of Japan, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, and the United States are the least supportive.  Overall, it appears that a rank-
ordering of countries with respect to their levels of support can be arranged.  Generally 
speaking, people living in countries located within Southern and Eastern Europe tend to 
be more supportive of social welfare policies, while people in Western Europe and North 
America are comparatively less likely to hold supportive attitudes.  Those who live in 
Northern European countries, on average, appear to have levels that are somewhere 
between these two limits. 
A series of country-specific OLS models were estimated and analyzed in Chapter 
4.  These models provide some evidence that support for social welfare policies is in fact 
a result of people’s socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and 
views toward the public sector.  However, these results are not necessarily uniform across 
all countries.  Certain correlates are more or less useful from one country to the next.  
Overall, both ideology-based political party affiliation and economic self-interest appear 
to considerably affect social welfare policy attitudes, consistent with the prevailing 
literature on this topic (e.g., Calzada et al. 2014; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; 
Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Voicu and Voicu 2011; Zagórski 1999).   
That being said, the models also imply that levels of interpersonal trust, the 
frequency of contact with others, and both internal, as well as external, political efficacy 
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play important roles as well, reaffirming the work of other scholars (e.g., Coleman 1990; 
Franzen and Hangartner 2006; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Gërxhani and Koster 
2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011; Welch et al. 2005).  Likewise, both trust in civil servants 
and perceptions of governmental performance also influence public support for social 
welfare policies, offering some evidence that social welfare policy support is swayed by 
people’s views of the public sector.    
A close examination of the dependent variable indicates that there is substantial 
variation in levels of support for social welfare policies cross-nationally.  The 
computation of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
approximately 20% of variation in social welfare policy support is attributable to 
variation at the country-level of analysis.  This being the case, a number of multilevel 
models were estimated in order to determine possible predictors that reflect differing 
national contexts.     
The multilevel analysis echoes the results discovered in Chapter 4 with respect to 
the individual-level correlates.  In fact, all of the variables that measure respondents’ 
socio-demographic attributes, socio-psychological attitudes, and views toward the public 
sector are statistically significant and signed in the hypothesized direction.  The only 
exception to this pattern is the variable age, which does not appear to influence social 
welfare attitudes.  The strong performance of the individual-level variables in Chapter 5 
is perhaps due to the large sample size used when estimating the multilevel models.  As 
the sample size rises, there is a corresponding increase in the power of a statistical test, 
making it easier to illuminate the existence of key differences in the data.  
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 Beyond variables at the individual-level, multilevel models allow the researcher 
to simultaneously consider the effect that country-level correlates may have on social 
welfare attitudes.  Four categories of country-level variables were analyzed: welfare 
regime typology, economic conditions, income inequality, and the quality of government 
institutions.  The results strongly indicate that there is utility in considering differing 
national contexts as an explanatory factor with respect to the levels of support for social 
welfare policies.  With few exceptions (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Gërxhani 
and Koster 2012; Voicu and Voicu 2011), the vast majority of the literature has 
concentrated on employing differing welfare regime typologies to make sense of the 
public’s social welfare attitudes.  Since this study considers both welfare regime 
typologies alongside other categories of country-level correlates, it offers an opportunity 
to consider the comparative usefulness of each category of variables. 
 With respect to the welfare regime typologies, the findings presented in Chapter 5 
suggest mixed results.  It is true that when considered alone as a single category of 
correlates, differing welfare regime types appear to explain variation in social welfare 
policy support across countries.  In fact, the models even imply the existence of a rank-
ordering of countries vis-á-vis their respective level of support.  The residents of 
Scandinavian regimes appear to be the most supportive of social welfare policies.  People 
living in English-speaking regimes seem to be the least supportive, comparatively.  
Individuals residing in Continental and Post-communist regimes tend to fall somewhere 
in between these two extremes.   
However, it is vital to point out that when considered in conjunction with other 
correlates, the usefulness of the welfare regime types is seriously called into question.  
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Model 7 of Chapter 5 illustrates the performance of the differing welfare regime 
typologies, controlling for the effects of national inflation rates, levels of income 
inequality, and the quality of public institutions.  It is notable that all three of the 
aforementioned variables are statistically significant, while only the Post-communist 
welfare regime type is.   
Also, consider that the sign for this particular welfare regime type flips its sign, 
indicating the possibility that the residents of Post-communist countries are hold less 
supportive social welfare attitudes than people living in the reference category, English-
speaking regimes, once the researcher controls for other variables.  This, of course, is 
contrary to the results of the earlier models.  For this reason, there is cause to be 
somewhat skeptical of the efficacy of welfare regime typologies to give a clear account of 
why levels of support for social welfare policies tend to vary across countries when 
considered in the light of other country-level factors.   
 As indicated above, correlates in addition to the welfare regime types were 
investigated in this dissertation.  The analysis reveals that certain economic conditions 
may influence social welfare policy attitudes.  Specifically, the national inflation rate was 
found to be a statistically significant correlate in several models.  However, it bears 
noting that the substantive effects of fluctuations of the inflation rate are somewhat small 
when one considers the typical range of this measure across countries.  Evidence was also 
discovered that levels of income inequality may have an impact on levels of support for 
social welfare policies.  Multilevel models point to the existence of a negative 
relationship, which is consistent with the hypotheses of other scholars (e.g., Kenworthy 
and McCall 2008; Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012).  
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 Finally, the multilevel analysis indicates that the quality of government 
institutions influences public support for social welfare policies.  The findings 
demonstrate that the residents of countries characterized by having higher levels of 
government effectiveness are less supportive of social welfare policies than those 
residing in countries with lower levels.  This seems to imply that actual levels of 
performance measured at the country-level influence public opinion.   
The relationship observed is very similar to that witnessed with respect to the 
perceptions of performance residents hold at the individual level.  Better performance – 
either perceived or actual – appears to result in less social welfare policy support.  Poorer 
performance leads to more.  The results of Chapter 5 appear to give further credence to 
“overload theory” (Crozier et al. 1975; Kaase and Newton 1995; Kumlin 2007) and 
suggest that it may be a useful framework for explaining support for social welfare 
policies in the modern era.              
Section 6.3: Implications 
 The purpose of this study was not to craft a compelling case either for or against 
the development of social welfare policies – that is a task best left to political theorists, to 
politicians, and to the public itself.  The primary objective of this dissertation has been to 
offer a more complete explanation as to why some individuals express support for social 
welfare policies and other do not.  There is reason to believe this is an important concern, 
as changes in public policy are often paralleled in time by fluctuations in public opinion.  
The preceding chapters have provided a comprehensive study of social welfare policy 
attitudes and have attempted to determine useful correlates of support at both the 
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individual and country-levels of analysis.  Several implications can be drawn from the 
results presented in this study.   
 One of the central claims of this work is that a number of different factors affect 
people’s social welfare policy preferences – not just one’s ideological-based partisan 
orientations or personal self-interest.  In fact, the explanation is far more complex and 
multifaceted than much of the existing literature seems to indicate.  The findings suggest 
that many socio-psychological variables play a role, particularly levels of interpersonal 
trust, the amount of contact people have with others, as well as the extent of political 
empowerment people feel with respect to their role in the political system.  Additionally, 
people’s views toward the public sector also appear to influence public opinion.  Two 
variables were considered: whether or not people trust civil servants and how individuals 
rate the performance of government.  Both correlates were found to affect levels of social 
welfare policy support.  
 In addition to suggesting new correlates at the individual-level, this study has also 
tested a number of competing explanations at the country-level, many of which had only 
been used only sparsely before – economic conditions and income inequality, and one 
that had never before been examined – the quality of government institutions.  The results 
imply that these correlates of social welfare policy support perform just as well, if not 
better, than those used in previous research.  Not only that, but the results of Chapter 5 
cast some doubt on the efficacy of using welfare regime typologies as a means for 
explaining public support for social welfare policies.  Overall, these findings highlight the 
usefulness of cross-national research and the ability of multilevel modeling techniques to 
reveal important relationships previously hidden.   
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 The results suggest that national economic conditions may influence social 
welfare policy preferences.  Specifically, the inflation rate emerges as a significant 
predictor.  As hypothesized, persons living in countries experiencing higher levels of 
inflation are more supportive of social welfare policies.  This finding implies that levels 
of social welfare policy support are not just affected by economic insecurity experienced 
on a person-to-person basis, but also at a societal level.  Simply put, social welfare policy 
support appears, at least in part, to be a collectivist response to economic strain.   
The same can be said with respect to levels of income inequality across countries.  
What is perplexing is that the findings of this analysis indicate that people living in 
countries characterized by greater levels of income inequality are actually less supportive 
of social welfare policies than those with less inequality.  An implication of this 
relationship is that there appears to be less support for social welfare policies precisely in 
those countries where more people need them.  This is indeed a paradox that deserves 
further examination.      
 Throughout this study, I have also argued that the public sector plays a role in 
shaping the policy preferences of the people they serve.  The results certainly provide 
additional support for this assertion.  At the individual-level, it was found that people 
who are more trusting of civil servants express higher levels of support for social welfare 
policies in comparison to those who are less trusting.  This implies that the engendering 
of trust between people and public servants has the capacity to alter the public’s views, 
with respect to the welfare state.  If greater levels of trust among residents can be 
successfully promoted, the result may be an unintentional, yet corresponding, increase in 
support for social welfare policies.     
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Alternatively, the findings also reveal that people who perceive higher levels of 
governmental performance express less support for social welfare policies, while those 
who sense lower levels of performance indicate more.  These results seem to question the 
role of good governance in the modern era with respect to the continued existence of the 
welfare state.  “Overload theory” predicts that public dissatisfaction with public sector 
performance actually increases support for more government (Kumlin 2007).  When poor 
performance becomes a problem, people instinctively call for additional governmental 
intervention to remedy the situation.  In this way, more government becomes the antidote 
for all social ills – even if government itself proves unsuccessful in ameliorating them.   
The implications of this phenomenon are very interesting.  Satisfactory 
performance, as interpreted by residents, results in either an acceptance of the status quo 
or possibly even calls for less government.  In contrast, poor performance, as perceived 
by residents has the potential to generate public demands for an ever-increasing state in 
both size and scale.  The ultimate result of this predicament may hinge on whether 
expansionary policies ever lead to perceptions of governmental success.  If ever judged to 
be effective, government would eventually stop growing as a result of satisfaction with 
current levels of performance.  However, if perceptions of performance remain 
consistently poor, then there may always be calls for more governmental intervention.  
These are all possible scenarios that could become reality.   
The country-level findings mirror the results at the individual-level.  The people 
of countries characterized by high quality government institutions are significantly less 
likely to support social welfare policies than those where institutional quality is low.  
This offers substantial support to the argument that government performance – either 
188 
 
actual at the country-level or perceived at the individual-level – alters public opinion.  
More specifically, it influences individuals’ views with respect to social welfare policy 
attitudes.   
Another interesting puzzle that I will briefly comment on pertains to the interplay 
between performance and trust.  In recent years, governments around the world have 
attempted to increase government performance by enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector (Ariely 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  One of the 
ultimate goals of this endeavor has been to restore levels of trust in government 
(Bouckaert 2008; Radin 2006; Van Ryzin 2011).  While a number of different empirical 
analyses support the hypothesis that positive evaluations of public sector performance 
leads to more trust in government (e.g., Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004; 
Mischler and Rose 1997; Van Ryzin 2011; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003), much less is 
known about the impact of these efforts with respect to public policy attitudes.   
As the results demonstrate, trust in civil servants positively influences support for 
social welfare policies.  However, positive perceptions of governmental performance at 
the individual-level, as well as residing in countries characterized by better quality 
institutions at the country-level, has the opposite effect – it reduces support for social 
welfare policies.  Interestingly enough, it appears that if bureaucratic reforms are 
successful in achieving their goals, the positive effect on social welfare policy attitudes 
which results from increasing trust in government may be offset by the negative effect 
that comes with better evaluations of governmental performance.  Clearly, future research 
which examines this fascinating, but apparent, dynamic is warranted.    
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Overall, the notion that the public sector plays a role in crafting the public’s 
policy attitudes should not be terribly surprising.  After all, in many ways people are 
consumers of public goods.  Ultimately, public administrators are those who implement 
public policy.  Therefore, it is only sensible that people would care if those with whom 
they rely on are judged to be trustworthy, honest, fair, or reliable.  Likewise, as recipients 
of goods and services, it is only natural that people make evaluative assessments which 
influence their policy preferences.   
In the end, this study has advanced an argument, which is supported by evidence 
that a feedback loop exists within the policy process that connects the outputs of public 
policy to its inputs – in accordance with other scholars (e.g., Jordan 2010; Kumlin 2007).  
Namely, the trust that people feel, the perceptions that they hold, and the levels of 
performance that exist all affect individuals’ social welfare attitudes.  These views have 
the ability to sway public officials, and in turn, create new public policies (Kingdon 2011; 
Rochefort 1986).   
Section 6.4: Limitations and future research 
When considering the findings and implications of this research, it is important to 
be cognizant of its limitations.  While this examination is one of the most comprehensive 
studies of public support for social welfare policies to date, the results are based on an 
analysis of samples from only 23 countries throughout the world.  The ISSP Role of 
Government IV Module does include data for additional countries, however the subset of 
those analyzed in this study was limited by using a welfare regime typology classification 
scheme that was constrained to include only the countries used (see Chapter 3 for more 
information).  Admittedly, most of these countries are economically developed 
190 
 
democracies located mainly in Europe.  Even though a number of transitioning countries 
from Eastern Europe are included, this hardly mitigates the potential for bias.  Thus, it is 
difficult to generalize the findings of this study to other countries that are either less 
developed or non-European.   
Also, the relatively low number of country samples analyzed creates another 
potential problem.  The multilevel models reported in Chapter 5 are estimated using a 
sample size of only 23.  The lack of statistical power in these models could possibly 
result in a “false negative” decision in which a true hypothesis is rejected as incorrect.  A 
broader range of countries would increase the amount of variation in both the dependent 
and country-level variables, permitting a more trustworthy test.  While this is definitely a 
hindrance, it should be pointed out that previous studies of social welfare policy support 
that employ country-level correlates have estimated multilevel models with even fewer 
observations than those used in this analysis.   
Another limitation of this study, broadly speaking, is that the focus is only limited 
to public support for one particular type of public policy.  Only public attitudes toward 
social welfare policies have been examined.  Thus, it may be inappropriate to over-
generalize the relationship between the specifically tailored dependent variable used in 
this research and its respective correlates to all forms of public policy.  Indeed, support 
for one form of public policy versus another may be context-dependent.   
A somewhat related concern is that the models estimated in both Chapters 4 and 5 
fail to take into consideration certain country-specific variables that have been found to 
influence social welfare attitudes.  For example, in the United States, racial attitudes are 
known to be a powerful source of opposition to particular forms of social welfare policies 
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(Frederico 2005; Gilens 1995).  In order to account for this, customized models of social 
welfare policy support would need to be developed for each country sample that reflect 
the idiosyncrasies that characterize the attitudinal viewpoints of people within their 
particular political system.     
With respect to the survey, its content, and its timing, there are additional 
limitations that should be highlighted.  First, it bears mentioning that it is not possible to 
know exactly what respondents are thinking when they indicate that it is (or is not) the 
government’s responsibility to remedy a particular social problem.  While the battery of 
questions in the ISSP survey that are used to construct the dependent variable are clearly 
written to elicit a very general response, it may be that they are too general.  For example, 
nothing is mentioned as to how government is to provide the various social welfare 
policies listed.  Indeed, there are a number of different means to provide public services.  
Also, no mention is made as to how government should pay for them.  All that is asked is 
whether government has a responsibility to provide certain forms of assistance.  Thus, 
there may be some concern as to whether the respondents offered well-reasoned decisions 
that reflect their true feelings on the matter.      
The same can be said for some of the independent variables.  For instance, the 
variable Trust in civil servants is measured using a question in the 2006 ISSP survey that 
ask respondents whether they believe civil servants can be trusted to act in the country’s 
best interest.  While the ISSP does give some guidance as to how the phrase “civil 
servants” should be interpreted (see Chapter 3), the question remains as to how 
encompassing respondents construe the term when completing a survey.  Likewise, the 
correlate Perception of performance consists of factor scores generated from a battery of 
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questions that ask how successful government is in providing different forms of public 
policy.  This analysis has treated this series of questions as a measure representing an 
assessment of policy implementation.  However, it is possible that respondents’ answers 
are more a reflection of their political beliefs rather than an evaluation of public service 
provision.     
Indeed, question wording is an issue – one which is even more pronounced in 
cross-national research.  Since the same basic survey is administered in different 
countries around the world, its content had to be translated into several languages.  This 
presents a challenge with respect to the comparability of responses as different words and 
phrases are used to represent similar constructs across vastly different contexts.  A similar 
limitation is that the method used for data collection varies from one country to the next.  
In some countries, the survey is administered via face-to-face interviews, self-completion 
with interviewer assistance, or mail.  The means used to collect survey data may 
influence the answers given by respondents.  This also presents an issue in terms of the 
comparability of responses.      
Also, it is important to point out that many of the variables used in this analysis at 
the individual-level are composite measures that are generated using a variety of data 
items.  For instance, the dependent variable itself consists of factor scores which quantify 
public support for social welfare policies based on responses to a battery of questions.  
The same is true of the variable Perception of performance.  Many of the socio-
psychological correlates are indexes, reflecting responses to different questions in the 
2006 ISSP survey.  While there are advantages to using composite measures, there are 
also some drawbacks.  Whenever composite variables are generated, a certain amount of 
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information is lost, and a certain amount of measurement error is introduced.  This being 
the case, it is appropriate to disclose that the size of the effect of these variables may be 
influenced by the act of generating composite measures.                   
Another potential issue is what is known as common-source bias.  According to 
Meier and O’Toole (2013), “Common source bias exists when some of the common 
variation of two concepts is a function of common measurement and/or source used to 
gather the data” (431).  All of the individual-level variables in the analysis are taken from 
the same basic survey – the 2006 ISSP Role of Government IV Module.  As a result of 
this, it is possible that the relationships that appear to exist between public views on 
social welfare policies and other concepts measured using questions from the ISSP 
survey may be biased as a result of both items originating from the same source.  This is 
certainly a limitation of the analysis, and the only means to overcome this potential 
concern is to use other measures independent of the ISSP survey that are tied to the same  
respondents.  To my knowledge, no such data exist. 
 A final limitation that should be noted is that the fieldwork for the Role of 
Government IV Module was completed in either the year 2006, 2007, or 2008, depending 
on the country.  As such, the country samples provide cross-sectional data that only 
reflect a snapshot in time.  Accordingly, it is difficult to make causal claims without 
information with respect to time order.  Also, the respective surveys were administered 
prior to economic instability caused by the Great Recession.  Since this event radically 
altered people’s lives and livelihoods, it is difficult to say if the responses offered when 
the various surveys were completed are comparable to views held in more contemporary 
times.  Additional research with updated data is worthwhile. 
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 The limitations discussed above cause a moment for pause, but also suggest future 
avenues of research.  Certainly, the analysis would benefit from adding additional 
country samples that are reflective of differing contexts found throughout the world.  
Likewise, it may prove useful to consider other types of variables measured at the 
individual and country-levels to determine their explanatory import.  Perhaps in the 
future, additional measures will be available that tap other concepts previously ignored 
by the research literature.  As of this writing, the fieldwork for the 2016 Role of 
Government V Module is being conducted by the ISSP, which partially replicates the 
2006 survey (ISSP – News 2016).  Once this data is made available, a comparison of 
public support for social welfare policies can be made which not only examines cross-
national variation in levels of social welfare policy support, but also changes in public 
opinion that are made manifest over time.              
Section 6.5: Final thoughts 
 As the foregoing analysis has shown, public support for social welfare polices 
varies from person to person, and from place to place.  This dissertation has attempted to 
test competing claims as to why those differences exist.  The results reveal that support 
for social welfare polices is explained by a number of different factors – not just one’s 
ideologically partisan leanings or personal self-interest.  Rather, several variables come 
into play at both the individual and country-levels of analysis.  Throughout this work I 
have advocated that both public views toward the public sector and the quality of 
government institutions influence these levels of support.  Those arguments are supported 
by the findings of this study.   
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 The examination of public views with respect to social welfare policies is an 
important endeavor.  The key defining characteristic of a democracy is the notion of self-
rule.  For that reason, the wants and desires, the hopes and dreams, and the fears and 
anxieties of people matter a great deal.  They are worthy of scholarly study because those 
attitudes and opinions are used to make decisions about the direction of one’s country via 
the ballot box.  In January of 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed what has 
become known as “An Economic Bill of Rights” for the American people – a set of 
sweeping reforms that promoted the tenets of social welfare.  In a speech, he said, “We 
have come to a clear realization of fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without 
economic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free men.’  People who 
are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made” (Roosevelt 
2010: 466).   
Less than forty years later in his First Inaugural Address, President Ronald 
Reagan enthusiastically declared, “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to 
our problem; government is the problem” (Reagan 2010: 542).  While the debate over the 
efficiency, or the effectiveness, or even the appropriateness of the modern welfare state 
continues to rage, what is clear is that the will of the public influences policy outcomes.  
Regardless of whether social welfare policies should be either adopted or rescinded as a 
matter of governing philosophy, their establishment and continued existence is tied to the 
support that the public gives them.   
This dissertation began with a simple question: What role should government play 
in the lives of its people?  Nowhere are the differences between liberals and conservatives 
on this question perhaps more pronounced than in the realm of social welfare policies.  It 
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remains as one of the key points of disagreement which divides our society into 
competing factions – those who favor expansive government and those who oppose it.  
Ultimately, it is a question that each person must answer for themselves.  However, as 
this study suggests, certain factors may lead individuals to answer the query one way and 
others another.   
In spite of the limitations noted above in the preceding section, several 
implications can be drawn from this examination of support for social welfare policies.  
First, there appears to be substantial variation in levels of public support for social 
welfare policy cross-nationally.  The greatest levels of support are found within Southern 
and Eastern Europe countries.  In contrast, people who live in Western Europe and North 
America are comparatively less supportive.  Second, the existing literature on the topic of 
the public’s social welfare attitudes is largely confirmed.  However, it should be noted 
that a number of different factors appear to influence social welfare policy support – not 
just one’s ideologically-based political party affiliation or personal self-interest.   
Third, national context appears to matter in explaining social welfare policy 
preferences.  A country’s inflation rate, its level of income inequality, and the quality of 
its public institutions all seem to sway people’s attitudes.  In contrast, welfare regime 
typologies do not emerge as a significant predictor of social welfare policy support when 
controlling for other factors.  Finally, it appears that the public sector plays a decided role 
in influencing how people come to assess government’s level of responsibility in solving 
societal problems – thus confirming Frederickson’s (1996) assertion that “Any serious 
student of government or public administration would likely argue that it is difficult if not 
impossible to unbundle politics from governance” (267).   
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Appendix A. Variable sources and descriptions 
Variable name Description Source 
Individual-level 
variables 
See Appendix C International Social Survey 
Programme 2006  
(Role of Government IV) 
http://www.gesis.org/issp/mod
ules/issp-modules-bytopic/role-
of-government/2006/ 
 
Welfare regime 
type 
Classification of countries with 
respect to differing social welfare 
policy outcomes 
 
Coding scheme based on work 
of Castles and Obinger (2008) 
GDP per capita, 
thousand USD 
Gross domestic product per capita 
adjusted for purchasing power 
parity 
 
World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Unemployment 
rate, % 
Share of the labor force that is 
without work but available for and 
seeking employment 
 
World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Inflation rate, % Annual growth rate of the GDP 
implicit deflator 
 
World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
GINI index Indicator of income inequality Solt (2014) 
http://fsolt.org/swiid/ 
 
Government 
effectiveness 
indicator 
Indicator of the quality of public 
institutions 
World Bank - Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Project 
http://info.worldbank.org/gover
nance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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Appendix B. Countries included and year of survey 
# Country Geographical region N 
Year of  
survey 
           1  Australia Oceania 2,781 2007 
           2  Canada North America 933 2006 
           3  Croatia Southern Europe 1,200 2006 
           4  Czech Republic Eastern Europe 1,201 2006 
           5  Denmark Northern Europe 1,368 2008 
           6  Finland Northern Europe 1,189 2006 
           7  France Western Europe 1,824 2006 
           8  Germany Western Europe 1,112 2006 
           9  Great Britain Northern Europe 930 2006 
         10  Hungary Eastern Europe 1,010 2006 
         11  Ireland Northern Europe 1,001 2006 
         12  Japan Eastern Asia 1,231 2007 
         13  Latvia Northern Europe 1,069 2006 
         14  Netherlands Western Europe 993 2006 
         15  Norway Northern Europe 1,330 2008 
         16  Poland Eastern Europe 1,293 2007 
         17  Portugal Southern Europe 1,837 2007 
         18  Russia Eastern Europe 2,407 2006 
         19  Slovenia Southern Europe 1,003 2007 
         20  Spain Southern Europe 2,517 2006 
         21  Sweden Northern Europe 1,194 2007 
         22  Switzerland Western Europe 1,003 2006 
         23  United States North America 1,518 2006 
 Total  31,944  
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Appendix C. International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey  
     wording  
 
Variable name Question wording 
Dependent variable 
Support for social welfare 
policies 
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the 
government's responsibility to … 
1.) Provide a job for everyone who wants one, 
2.) Keep prices under control, 
3.) Provide health care for the sick, 
4.) Provide a decent standard of living for the old, 
5.) Provide living standard for the unemployed, 
6.) Reduce income differences between the rich and the  
     poor, 
7.) Give financial help to university students from low- 
     income families,  
8.) Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it. 
 
Coding: 
1. Definitely should be 
2. Probably should be 
3. Probably should not be 
4. Definitely should not be 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
Independent variables 
Left political party Political party affiliation left/right placement is derived 
based on country specific inquiries about party 
identification. 
 
Coding: 
0. Not applicable, did not vote, not eligible 
1. Far left, etc. 
2. Left, center left 
3. Center, liberal 
4. Right, conservative 
5. Far right, etc. 
6. Other, no specification 
7. No party preference 
8. Don't know 
9. No answer, refused 
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Variable name Question wording 
Right political party Political party affiliation left/right placement is derived 
based on country-specific inquiries about party 
identification. 
 
Coding: 
0. Not applicable, did not vote, not eligible 
1. Far left, etc. 
2. Left, center left 
3. Center, liberal 
4. Right, conservative 
5. Far right, etc. 
6. Other, no specification 
7. No party preference 
8. Don't know 
9. No answer, refused 
Age Respondents were asked either the year of their birth or 
how old they are (dependent on country).  
 
Coding: 
15-98. (Age is derived from response.) 
99. No answer, refused 
Female Respondents were either asked their sex or it was coded 
by the interviewer (dependent on country). 
 
Coding: 
1. Male 
2. Female 
9. No answer, refused 
Low education Different questions are asked in with respect to the 
respondent's highest level of educational attainment in 
each country.  However, responses are coded consistently 
using the following scheme. 
 
Coding: 
0. No formal qualification, incomplete primary 
1. Lowest formal qualification attainable 
2. Above lowest qualification 
3. Higher secondary completed 
4. Above higher secondary level 
5. University degree completed, graduate studies 
8. Don't know 
9. No answer 
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Variable name Question wording 
Not working Different questions are asked in with respect to the 
respondent's current employment status in each country.  
However, responses are coded consistently using the 
following scheme. 
 
Coding: 
1. Employed, full-time, main job 
2. Employed, part-time, main job 
3. Employed, less than part-time, temporarily out of work 
4. Helping family member 
5. Unemployed 
6. Student, school, vocational training, apprenticeship or   
     trainee 
7. Retired 
8. Housewife, -man, home duties 
9. Permanently disabled 
10. Other, not in labour force 
97. Refused 
98. Don't know 
99. No answer 
Government employment Different questions are asked in with respect to the 
respondent's employment sector in each country.  
However, responses are coded consistently using the 
following scheme. 
 
Coding: 
0. Not applicable, never had a job 
1. Work for government 
2. Work for publicly owned firm, state owned firm,  
     nationalised industry 
3. Work for private firm or company, others 
4. Self employed 
9. No answer, don't know 
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Variable name Question wording 
Interpersonal trust 1.) If you are not careful, other people will take 
advantage of you. 
 
2.) There are only a few people I can trust completely. 
 
Coding: 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
Contact with others On average, about how many people do you have contact 
with in a typical week day, including people you live 
with. We are interested in contact on a one-to-one basis, 
including everyone with whom you chat, talk, or discuss 
matters. This can be face-to-face, by telephone, by mail, 
or on the internet. Please include only people you know. 
 
Coding: 
1. 0-4 persons 
2. 5-9 persons 
3. 10-19 persons 
4. 20-49 persons 
5. 50 or more persons 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
Internal political efficacy 1.) I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the 
important political issues facing our country. 
 
2.) I think most people are better informed about politics 
and government than I am. 
 
Coding: 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
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Variable name Question wording 
External political efficacy 1.) People like me have don't have any say about what 
government does. 
 
2.) The average citizen has considerable influence on 
politics. 
 
Coding: 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
Trust in civil servants Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for 
the country. 
 
Coding: 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
Perception of performance How successful do you think the government in 
[Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas? 
 
1.) Providing heal care for the sick? 
2.) Providing a decent standard of living for the old? 
3.) Dealing with threats to [Country's] security? 
4.) Controlling crime? 
5.) Fighting unemployment? 
6.) Protecting the environment? 
 
Coding: 
1. Very successful 
2. Quite successful 
3. Neither successful nor unsuccessful 
4. Quite unsuccessful 
5. Very unsuccessful 
8. Can't choose 
9. No answer 
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Appendix D. Valid and invalid responses: Dependent variable – social     
     welfare policy support 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 18.7 520 2,261 2,781 
Canada 22.8 213 720 933 
Croatia 16.1 193 1,007 1,200 
Czech Republic 15.9 191 1,010 1,201 
Denmark 16.7 229 1,139 1,368 
Finland 17.7 210 979 1,189 
France 16.6 302 1,522 1,824 
Germany 19.6 218 894 1,112 
Great Britain 18.7 174 756 930 
Hungary 8.9 90 920 1,010 
Ireland 11.9 119 882 1,001 
Japan 29.1 358 873 1,231 
Latvia 21.7 232 837 1,069 
Netherlands 20.0 199 794 993 
Norway 12.4 165 1,165 1,330 
Poland 15.6 202 1,091 1,293 
Portugal 10.0 183 1,654 1,837 
Russia 18.4 442 1,965 2,407 
Slovenia 6.4 64 939 1,003 
Spain 11.1 279 2,238 2,517 
Sweden 18.5 221 973 1,194 
Switzerland 16.3 163 840 1,003 
United States 7.4 112 1,406 1,518 
Total 15.9 5,079 26,865 31,944 
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Appendix E. Valid and invalid responses: Left political party affiliation 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 3.3 91 2,690 2,781 
Canada 4.4 41 892 933 
Croatia 15.7 188 1,012 1,200 
Czech Republic 24.0 288 913 1,201 
Denmark 10.8 148 1,220 1,368 
Finland 28.5 339 850 1,189 
France 29.4 537 1,287 1,824 
Germany 21.6 240 872 1,112 
Great Britain 6.0 56 874 930 
Hungary 37.1 375 635 1,010 
Ireland 1.2 12 989 1,001 
Japan 0.6 8 1,223 1,231 
Latvia 28.6 306 763 1,069 
Netherlands 4.2 42 951 993 
Norway 18.3 243 1,087 1,330 
Poland 36.8 476 817 1,293 
Portugal 14.6 268 1,569 1,837 
Russia 34.0 819 1,588 2,407 
Slovenia 34.3 344 659 1,003 
Spain 25.4 640 1,877 2,517 
Sweden 7.0 84 1,110 1,194 
Switzerland 4.4 44 959 1,003 
United States 0.8 12 1,506 1,518 
Total 17.5 5,601 26,343 31,944 
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Appendix F. Valid and invalid responses: Right political party  
     affiliation 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 3.3 91 2,690 2,781 
Canada 4.4 41 892 933 
Croatia 15.7 188 1,012 1,200 
Czech Republic 24.0 288 913 1,201 
Denmark 10.8 148 1,220 1,368 
Finland 28.5 339 850 1,189 
France 29.4 537 1,287 1,824 
Germany 21.6 240 872 1,112 
Great Britain 6.0 56 874 930 
Hungary 37.1 375 635 1,010 
Ireland 1.2 12 989 1,001 
Japan 0.6 8 1,223 1,231 
Latvia 28.6 306 763 1,069 
Netherlands 4.2 42 951 993 
Norway 18.3 243 1,087 1,330 
Poland 36.8 476 817 1,293 
Portugal 14.6 268 1,569 1,837 
Russia 34.0 819 1,588 2,407 
Slovenia 34.3 344 659 1,003 
Spain 25.4 640 1,877 2,517 
Sweden 7.0 84 1,110 1,194 
Switzerland 4.4 44 959 1,003 
United States 0.8 12 1,506 1,518 
Total 17.5 5,601 26,343 31,944 
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Appendix G. Valid and invalid responses: Age 
  
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 1.6 44 2,737 2,781 
Canada 6.8 63 870 933 
Croatia 0.5 6 1,194 1,200 
Czech Republic 0.5 6 1,195 1,201 
Denmark 0.0 0 1,368 1,368 
Finland 0.0 0 1,189 1,189 
France 0.0 0 1,824 1,824 
Germany 0.4 5 1,107 1,112 
Great Britain 0.2 2 928 930 
Hungary 0.0 0 1,010 1,010 
Ireland 1.0 10 991 1,001 
Japan 0.0 0 1,231 1,231 
Latvia 0.0 0 1,069 1,069 
Netherlands 0.1 1 992 993 
Norway 0.0 0 1,330 1,330 
Poland 0.0 0 1,293 1,293 
Portugal 0.0 0 1,837 1,837 
Russia 0.0 0 2,407 2,407 
Slovenia 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
Spain 0.1 2 2,515 2,517 
Sweden 0.0 0 1,194 1,194 
Switzerland 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
United States 0.7 10 1,508 1,518 
Total 0.5 149 31,795 31,944 
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Appendix H. Valid and invalid responses: Female 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 1.0 27 2,754 2,781 
Canada 1.6 15 918 933 
Croatia 0.0 0 1,200 1,200 
Czech Republic 0.0 0 1,201 1,201 
Denmark 0.0 0 1,368 1,368 
Finland 0.0 0 1,189 1,189 
France 0.0 0 1,824 1,824 
Germany 0.0 0 1,112 1,112 
Great Britain 0.0 0 930 930 
Hungary 0.0 0 1,010 1,010 
Ireland 0.2 2 999 1,001 
Japan 0.0 0 1,231 1,231 
Latvia 0.0 0 1,069 1,069 
Netherlands 0.0 0 993 993 
Norway 0.0 0 1,330 1,330 
Poland 0.0 0 1,293 1,293 
Portugal 0.0 0 1,837 1,837 
Russia 0.0 0 2,407 2,407 
Slovenia 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
Spain 0.0 0 2,517 2,517 
Sweden 0.0 0 1,194 1,194 
Switzerland 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
United States 0.0 0 1,518 1,518 
Total 0.1 44 31,900 31,944 
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Appendix I. Valid and invalid responses: Low education 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 1.9 53 2,728 2,781 
Canada 2.0 19 914 933 
Croatia 0.1 1 1,199 1,200 
Czech Republic 0.8 10 1,191 1,201 
Denmark 6.1 84 1,284 1,368 
Finland 4.7 56 1,133 1,189 
France 0.5 10 1,814 1,824 
Germany 0.2 2 1,110 1,112 
Great Britain 0.1 1 929 930 
Hungary 0.0 0 1,010 1,010 
Ireland 0.2 2 999 1,001 
Japan 0.9 11 1,220 1,231 
Latvia 0.0 0 1,069 1,069 
Netherlands 1.6 16 977 993 
Norway 0.8 11 1,319 1,330 
Poland 0.0 0 1,293 1,293 
Portugal 0.0 0 1,837 1,837 
Russia 0.0 0 2,407 2,407 
Slovenia 1.5 15 988 1,003 
Spain 0.5 13 2,504 2,517 
Sweden 2.4 29 1,165 1,194 
Switzerland 0.7 7 996 1,003 
United States 0.5 8 1,510 1,518 
Total 1.1 348 31,596 31,944 
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Appendix J. Valid and invalid responses: Not working 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 2.9 80 2,701 2,781 
Canada 3.0 28 905 933 
Croatia 0.2 2 1,198 1,200 
Czech Republic 0.8 10 1,191 1,201 
Denmark 3.1 43 1,325 1,368 
Finland 4.4 52 1,137 1,189 
France 0.4 7 1,817 1,824 
Germany 0.2 2 1,110 1,112 
Great Britain 0.0 0 930 930 
Hungary 0.0 0 1,010 1,010 
Ireland 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Japan 3.9 48 1,183 1,231 
Latvia 0.0 0 1,069 1,069 
Netherlands 6.0 60 933 993 
Norway 2.9 39 1,291 1,330 
Poland 0.0 0 1,293 1,293 
Portugal 0.2 3 1,834 1,837 
Russia 0.0 0 2,407 2,407 
Slovenia 1.0 10 993 1,003 
Spain 1.1 27 2,490 2,517 
Sweden 3.3 39 1,155 1,194 
Switzerland 0.4 4 999 1,003 
United States 0.1 2 1,516 1,518 
Total 1.4 456 31,488 31,944 
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Appendix K. Valid and invalid responses: Government employment 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 7.7 214 2,567 2,781 
Canada 15.5 145 788 933 
Croatia 24.6 295 905 1,200 
Czech Republic 7.4 89 1,112 1,201 
Denmark 9.4 129 1,239 1,368 
Finland 15.2 181 1,008 1,189 
France 11.4 208 1,616 1,824 
Germany 11.0 122 990 1,112 
Great Britain 3.3 31 899 930 
Hungary 9.1 92 918 1,010 
Ireland 6.4 64 937 1,001 
Japan 39.1 481 750 1,231 
Latvia 10.3 110 959 1,069 
Netherlands 8.0 79 914 993 
Norway 7.2 96 1,234 1,330 
Poland 14.2 184 1,109 1,293 
Portugal 12.6 231 1,606 1,837 
Russia 9.8 237 2,170 2,407 
Slovenia 18.0 181 822 1,003 
Spain 19.9 502 2,015 2,517 
Sweden 7.3 87 1,107 1,194 
Switzerland 6.4 64 939 1,003 
United States 4.9 75 1,443 1,518 
Total 12.2 3,897 28,047 31,944 
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Appendix L. Valid and invalid responses: Interpersonal trust 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 4.4 121 2,660 2,781 
Canada 3.5 33 900 933 
Croatia 2.8 34 1,166 1,200 
Czech Republic 1.5 18 1,183 1,201 
Denmark 3.4 47 1,321 1,368 
Finland 5.0 59 1,130 1,189 
France 7.0 127 1,697 1,824 
Germany 4.2 47 1,065 1,112 
Great Britain 3.2 30 900 930 
Hungary 0.8 8 1,002 1,010 
Ireland 1.1 11 990 1,001 
Japan 5.6 69 1,162 1,231 
Latvia 4.5 48 1,021 1,069 
Netherlands 4.1 41 952 993 
Norway 2.3 30 1,300 1,330 
Poland 3.2 41 1,252 1,293 
Portugal 0.7 12 1,825 1,837 
Russia 12.2 294 2,113 2,407 
Slovenia 1.2 12 991 1,003 
Spain 2.6 66 2,451 2,517 
Sweden 7.5 89 1,105 1,194 
Switzerland 0.4 4 999 1,003 
United States 0.6 9 1,509 1,518 
Total 3.9 1,250 30,694 31,944 
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Appendix M. Valid and invalid responses: Contact with others 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 3.5 97 2,684 2,781 
Canada 4.8 45 888 933 
Croatia 3.8 46 1,154 1,200 
Czech Republic 1.0 12 1,189 1,201 
Denmark 2.6 35 1,333 1,368 
Finland 2.0 24 1,165 1,189 
France 2.7 50 1,774 1,824 
Germany 1.6 18 1,094 1,112 
Great Britain 5.3 49 881 930 
Hungary 0.5 5 1,005 1,010 
Ireland 0.3 3 998 1,001 
Japan 3.0 37 1,194 1,231 
Latvia 18.3 196 873 1,069 
Netherlands 3.2 32 961 993 
Norway 1.9 25 1,305 1,330 
Poland 2.0 26 1,267 1,293 
Portugal 1.9 34 1,803 1,837 
Russia 3.7 89 2,318 2,407 
Slovenia 1.4 14 989 1,003 
Spain 0.8 19 2,498 2,517 
Sweden 1.7 20 1,174 1,194 
Switzerland 0.3 3 1,000 1,003 
United States 0.3 4 1,514 1,518 
Total 2.8 883 31,061 31,944 
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Appendix N. Valid and invalid responses: Internal political efficacy 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 5.1 141 2,640 2,781 
Canada 6.0 56 877 933 
Croatia 8.6 103 1,097 1,200 
Czech Republic 5.5 66 1,135 1,201 
Denmark 7.5 103 1,265 1,368 
Finland 13.0 155 1,034 1,189 
France 14.6 266 1,558 1,824 
Germany 9.5 106 1,006 1,112 
Great Britain 7.2 67 863 930 
Hungary 4.6 46 964 1,010 
Ireland 2.5 25 976 1,001 
Japan 17.5 215 1,016 1,231 
Latvia 13.1 140 929 1,069 
Netherlands 6.9 69 924 993 
Norway 7.0 93 1,237 1,330 
Poland 6.2 80 1,213 1,293 
Portugal 4.5 83 1,754 1,837 
Russia 18.2 439 1,968 2,407 
Slovenia 7.3 73 930 1,003 
Spain 4.0 101 2,416 2,517 
Sweden 13.8 165 1,029 1,194 
Switzerland 4.2 42 961 1,003 
United States 1.3 20 1,498 1,518 
Total 8.3 2,654 29,290 31,944 
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Appendix O. Valid and invalid responses: External political efficacy 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 4.6 128 2,653 2,781 
Canada 4.9 46 887 933 
Croatia 6.0 72 1,128 1,200 
Czech Republic 2.3 28 1,173 1,201 
Denmark 5.1 70 1,298 1,368 
Finland 5.1 61 1,128 1,189 
France 9.5 173 1,651 1,824 
Germany 3.9 43 1,069 1,112 
Great Britain 5.4 50 880 930 
Hungary 1.5 15 995 1,010 
Ireland 2.3 23 978 1,001 
Japan 9.3 115 1,116 1,231 
Latvia 6.5 69 1,000 1,069 
Netherlands 4.3 43 950 993 
Norway 2.5 33 1,297 1,330 
Poland 3.6 47 1,246 1,293 
Portugal 5.8 106 1,731 1,837 
Russia 10.3 249 2,158 2,407 
Slovenia 3.2 32 971 1,003 
Spain 7.6 191 2,326 2,517 
Sweden 7.6 91 1,103 1,194 
Switzerland 2.3 23 980 1,003 
United States 1.4 22 1,496 1,518 
Total 5.4 1,730 30,214 31,944 
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Appendix P. Valid and invalid responses: Trust in civil servants 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 4.0 110 2,671 2,781 
Canada 4.0 37 896 933 
Croatia 8.4 101 1,099 1,200 
Czech Republic 2.1 25 1,176 1,201 
Denmark 5.2 71 1,297 1,368 
Finland 5.7 68 1,121 1,189 
France 6.7 123 1,701 1,824 
Germany 6.8 76 1,036 1,112 
Great Britain 6.8 63 867 930 
Hungary 7.2 73 937 1,010 
Ireland 2.8 28 973 1,001 
Japan 7.4 91 1,140 1,231 
Latvia 10.0 107 962 1,069 
Netherlands 5.0 50 943 993 
Norway 3.2 42 1,288 1,330 
Poland 7.7 99 1,194 1,293 
Portugal 6.6 122 1,715 1,837 
Russia 11.1 267 2,140 2,407 
Slovenia 4.3 43 960 1,003 
Spain 9.2 231 2,286 2,517 
Sweden 6.9 82 1,112 1,194 
Switzerland 4.0 40 963 1,003 
United States 1.6 24 1,494 1,518 
Total 6.2 1,973 29,971 31,944 
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Appendix Q. Valid and invalid responses: Perception of performance 
 
Country 
Invalid 
responses, 
%  
(1) 
Total 
invalid 
responses 
(2) 
Total 
valid 
responses 
(3) 
Total 
responses 
(4=2+3) 
Australia 11.3 313 2,468 2,781 
Canada 17.9 167 766 933 
Croatia 32.3 388 812 1,200 
Czech Republic 7.9 95 1,106 1,201 
Denmark 15.9 218 1,150 1,368 
Finland 19.0 226 963 1,189 
France 11.8 216 1,608 1,824 
Germany 15.3 170 942 1,112 
Great Britain 11.1 103 827 930 
Hungary 15.9 161 849 1,010 
Ireland 13.4 134 867 1,001 
Japan 21.9 270 961 1,231 
Latvia 20.1 215 854 1,069 
Netherlands 13.1 130 863 993 
Norway 17.2 229 1,101 1,330 
Poland 22.1 286 1,007 1,293 
Portugal 18.8 346 1,491 1,837 
Russia 21.3 512 1,895 2,407 
Slovenia 14.5 145 858 1,003 
Spain 19.7 496 2,021 2,517 
Sweden 26.0 310 884 1,194 
Switzerland 10.1 101 902 1,003 
United States 7.2 109 1,409 1,518 
Total 16.7 5,340 26,604 31,944 
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Appendix R. Tests of heteroskedasticity for country-specific models 
Model χ2 P-value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Australia 3.92 0.0478 1,777 
Canada 0.00 0.9645 491 
Croatia 21.91 0.0000 406 
Czech Republic 0.06 0.8117 655 
Denmark 13.53 0.0002 748 
Finland 5.61 0.0179 504 
France 31.73 0.0000 803 
Germany 0.29 0.5875 525 
Great Britain 2.05 0.1527 583 
Hungary 7.24 0.0071 477 
Ireland 17.14 0.0000 682 
Japan 3.90 0.0484 439 
Latvia 3.21 0.0730 403 
Netherlands 4.97 0.0258 601 
Norway 0.07 0.7886 732 
Poland 13.51 0.0002 481 
Portugal 30.70 0.0000 986 
Russia 36.38 0.0000 801 
Slovenia 1.58 0.2086 469 
Spain 5.99 0.0144 1,154 
Sweden 5.13 0.0235 581 
Switzerland 0.65 0.4209 703 
United States 22.80 0.0000 1,231 
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Appendix S. Tests of heteroskedasticity for multilevel models 
Model χ2 P-value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Basic 351.62 0.000 22 
Welfare regime type 351.64 0.000 22 
Economic conditions 351.61 0.000 22 
Inequality 351.61 0.000 22 
Institutional quality 351.61 0.000 22 
Composite non-welfare regime  351.60 0.000 22 
Composite 351.62 0.000 22 
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Appendix T. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for country-level   
     correlates 
 
Model Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Welfare Regime Type 
Scandinavian welfare regime 1.24 0.8050 
Continental welfare regime 1.37 0.7285 
Post-communist welfare regime 1.39 0.7188 
 
Economic Conditions 
GDP in thousand $s per capita 1.85 0.5415 
Unemployment rate 1.70 0.5883 
Inflation rate 1.17 0.8524 
 Inequality Gini index 1.00 1.0000 
 Institutional Quality Government effectiveness 1.00 1.0000 
 
Composite Non-Welfare 
 Regime Variables 
Inflation rate 1.49 0.6700 
Gini index 1.37 0.7278 
Government effectiveness 1.47 0.6802 
 
Composite 
Scandinavian welfare regime 3.69 0.2713 
Continental welfare regime 3.09 0.3238 
Post-communist welfare regime 13.93 0.0718 
Inflation rate 2.80 0.3574 
Gini index 7.12 0.1404 
Government effectiveness 10.18 0.0982 
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